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play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 EU	 identity	 construction.	 This	 thesis	 analyses	 the	
nature	of	 the	US	elite’s	discourse	on	 the	EU,	 assessing	 the	 relative	 influence	of	






the	 framework	 to	 focus	 on	 competing	 elite	 sub-groups,	 the	 project	 seeks	 to	




and	 counter	 terrorism	 cooperation.	 Public	 and	 classified	 official	 texts	 in	 the	









the	 thesis	 provides	 a	 rich	 analysis	 of	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU	 in	 a	 context	 with	
significance	 both	 for	 scholars	 and	 policymakers	 concerned	 with	 external	
perceptions	of	the	EU	as	a	security	actor.	It	provides	a	novel	assessment	of	how	
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American	 officials’	 assessments	 of	 the	 EU	 differ	 in	 public	 and	 in	 private.	 By	
analysing	the	discursive	tactics	of	influential	elite	sub-groups,	it	reveals	an	arena	























actor,	 analysing	 how	 factors	 -	 internal	 and	 external	 to	 that	 community	 –	
influence	 the	pattern	of	 discourse	 in	 two	different	 policy	 contexts.	 The	project	




of	 European	 identities	 among	 national	 elites,	 the	 interplay	 of	 national	 foreign	
policies,	 and	 the	 conceptualization	 of	 its	 international	 role	 (Börzel	 1999;	
Torreblanca	 2001;	 Olsen	 2002;	 Grabbe	 2003;	 Tonra	 2003;	 Tonra	 and	
Christiansen	 2004;	 Wong	 2005).	 These	 works	 seek	 to	 understand	 the	
development	of	the	EU’s	changing	role	–	a	keenly	contested	concept	-	by	looking	








only	 act	 as	 its	 identity	 when	 a	 relevant	 social	 community	 acknowledges	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 that	 action	 within	 a	 social	 context.	 As	 Hopf	 argues,	 the	 choices	
available	 to	 actors	 in	 international	 politics	 are	 “rigorously	 constrained	 by	 the	
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webs	of	understanding	of	 the	practices,	 identities,	and	 interests	of	other	actors	
that	prevail	 in	particular	historical	contexts,”	(1998;	177).	Thus	the	EU’s	ability	






more	 powerful”	 (1999;	 331).	 	 In	 light	 of	 the	 significance	 attributed	 to	 the	
transatlantic	relationship	by	policymakers	and	historians,	both	 in	the	historical	
development	 of	 European	 integration	 and	 in	 contemporary	 policymaking,	
scholars	 seeking	 to	 understand	 the	 emergence	 of	 EU	 external	 action	 cannot	
ignore	perceptions	of	Europe	held	by	its	pre-eminent	ally.	The	ideas	held	by	the	





constructivist	 assumptions	 about	 the	 socially	 constructed	 nature	 of	 state	
identity.	Wendt	explored	how	a	state	comes	to	understand	its	identity,	interests	
and	other	 ideas	 through	a	social	process	of	 learning,	 involving	 interaction	with	
others	(1999).	Yet	this	approach	neglected	the	sub-state	processes	of	ideational	
development	in	discourse	that	take	place	within	each	party	to	this	exchange.	This	
dissertation	 opens	 up	 these	 sub-state	 processes	 by	 examining	 the	 nature	 of	
security	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU	 within	 a	 significant	 community	 of	 American	
opinion-leaders.	 The	 community	 is	 analysed	 as	 an	 institutionally	 and	

































The	 study	 seeks	 firstly	 to	 analyse	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU	 as	 a	
security	actor	within	 this	community,	mapping	out	 the	patterns	of	 ideas	about	
EU	 security	 action	 in	 two	 case	 studies:	 the	 institutional	 development	 of	 CSDP	
and	 PNR	 negotiations	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 counter-terrorism	 cooperation.	 It	
then	moves	 to	 examine	 various	 influences	 that	 shape	 the	 discourse;	 the	 cross	
case	 comparison	 examines	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 policy	 competence	 exercised	
(community	or	 intergovernmental)	on	the	pattern	of	discourse.	The	embedded	
case	 comparison	 looks	 at	 ideological	 and	 institutional	 cleavages	 within	 the	
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community	and	assesses	the	degree	to	which	they	produce	divergent	narrative	
accounts.	 Finally,	 a	 longitudinal	 analysis	 examines	 the	 changing	 pattern	 of	
discourse	over	time,	in	response	to	key	juncture	points	or	significant	events.	
	
Although,	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 EU’s	 identity	 is	 in	 part	 constituted	 by	 how	
significant	 others	 (such	 as	 the	 US)	 “mirror”	 a	 role	 onto	 it	 through	 social	














by	 summarising	 significant	 ideas	 about	 the	 EU	 that	 have	 been	 analysed	
extensively.		
2. Its	 second	purpose	 is	 to	demonstrate	a	gap	 in	 the	 literature	on	external	
perceptions	 of	 the	 EU,	which	 by	 contrast	with	 the	 discourses	 reviewed,	
have	been	relatively	neglected	by	scholars.		
	












The	EU	 is	 a	 unique	 and	unprecedented	 system	of	 states;	 a	 constantly	 evolving	
entity;	 neither	 state	nor	 international	 organisation,	 yet	which	 seeks	 to	present	
itself	 through	 official	 discourse	 as	 a	 coherent	 actor	 in	 international	 politics.	
Institutional	 developments	 since	1970	have	 seen	 its	 attempts	 at	 foreign	policy	
coordination	 evolve	 into	 more	 formalized	 modes	 of	 “common”	 foreign	 policy	
making	(Wessels,	1982).	Already	in	1974,	EU	leaders	were	pushing	for	a	greater	
role	 for	 the	 Union	 internationally	 and	 issued	 a	 “Declaration	 on	 European	
Identity,”	which	stated	that:	‘Europe	must	unite	and	increasingly	speak	with	one	
voice	if	it	wants	to	make	itself	heard	and	play	its	proper	rôle	in	the	world’.1	The	
institutional	 innovations	 of	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 integrated	 policymaking	
further	 in	areas	where	 intra-European	policies	 took	on	greater	external	 impact	





global	 role.	 The	 bloc	 now	 wields	 a	 number	 of	 state-like	 foreign	 and	 security	
policy	tools:	 from	a	foreign	policy	“chief,”	to	 jointly	organised	common	military	
missions	 abroad.	 Alongside	 these	 institutions	 are	 the	 explicit	 statements	 it	
makes	about	this	role:	its	stated	aim	is	“to	assert	its	identity	on	the	international	
scene...”	 (Article	 32,	 TEU).	 This	 identity	 is	 said	 to	 be	 rooted	 in	 a	 liberal	
internationalist	 conception	 of	 universal	 rights	 –	 the	 treaties	 proclaim:	 “The	








itself	 as	 a	 post-Westphalian	 international	 actor,	 summoning	 the	 combined	
resources	of	 its	members	 to	 champion	 the	causes	of	human	rights,	dignity	and	
the	rule	of	law	on	the	world	stage.		
	
And	 yet,	 notable	 foreign	 policy	 failures	 in	 Bosnia,	 Kosovo	 and	 elsewhere	
appeared	to	support	rationalist	arguments	 insisting	that	power	remains	vested	
in	 national	 actors,	 operating	 within	 a	 logic	 of	 relative	 security-maximisation,	
derived	 from	 the	 structural	 pressures	 of	 anarchy.	 The	 empirical	 record	 of	 the	
1990s	 suggested	 that	 when	 international	 crises	 struck,	 the	 EU’s	 policies	 were	
widely	criticised,	(Everts;	2003).	Concerns	that	the	Union	had	not	lived	up	to	its	
responsibilities	in	numerous	security	crises	in	former	Yugoslavia	led	French	and	









From	St.	Malo	 sprang	 the	beginnings	of	 a	 common	security	 and	defence	policy	
(CSDP),	 now	 presented	 as	 a	 means	 for	 member	 states	 to	 act	 collectively	 by	
cooperating	in	resource	development	and	as	a	rapid	response	to	defence	issues:	
“The	 CSDP	 allows	 EU	 Member	 States	 to	 pool	 their	 resources	 and	 to	 build	
stronger	 defence	 capabilities	 to	 act	 rapidly	 and	 effectively.”2	Today,	 official	
communications	from	the	EEAS	lay	emphasis	on	the	global	 leadership	role	that	








a	 leading	 role	 in	 peacekeeping	 operations,	 conflict	 prevention	 and	 in	 the	
strengthening	of	the	international	security.3	
	
And	 yet,	 the	 most	 recent	 institutional	 revisions	 to	 the	 EU’s	 security	 policies	
appeared	 to	 disappoint	 senior	 European	 politicians,	 who	 lamented	 the	
continuing	 lack	 of	 unified	 purpose	 and	 resolute	 action.	 The	 Union’s	 new	 high	
representative	 for	 foreign	 affairs	 and	 security	 policy	 was	 described	 as	









- 	Bernard	 Kouchner,	 statement	 on	 the	 appointment	 of	 Pierre	
Vimont	 as	 Executive	 Secretary-General	 of	 the	 European	
External	Action	Service.	Paris,	October	25th,	2010.4	
	
These	 complaints	 underline	 the	 preference	 of	 many	 politicians	 for	 a	 more	
coherent	EU	role	in	security	politics	but	they	also	reveal	a	perceived	mismatch	





The	European	Union,	which	 is	 the	 foremost	 economic	power	 in	 the	World	
and	 is	 home	 to	 half	 a	 billion	 people,	 should	 be	 in	 a	 position	 to	 play	 a	
consequential	role	on	the	international	stage.	
	









International	 relations	 scholars	 have	 struggled	 to	 integrate	 this	 new	 and	
uncertain	system	of	states	 into	orthodox	 interstate	security	 frameworks	based	
on	 structural	 assumptions.	 The	 emergence	 of	 common	 foreign	 and	 security	
policies	 among	 European	 nation	 states	 may	 be	 characterised	 by	 neo-
functionalists	as	the	result	of	functional	spill	over	from	integration	in	economic	
policy	fields,	by	liberal	intergovernmentalists	as	a	tool	of	internal	power	balance	
management	 and	 by	 realists	 as	 an	 example	 of	 classical	 balancing	 against	 an	
emergent	 unipolar	 actor.	 For	many,	 the	 EU	 appeared	 to	 be	 ‘somehow	beyond	
international	 relations’	 (Long,	 1997,	 187).	 Bull’s	 (1982)	 description	 of	 EU	
military	 integration	 as	 a	 desirable	 but	 implausible	 prospect	 was	 echoed	 in	
Robert	Kagan’s	 (2002)	 account	 of	 Europe	 as	 a	 ‘Kantian	paradise’	 incapable	 or	
unwilling	 to	 develop	 conventional	 power	 projection	 capabilities	 (Orbie	 2006:	
124).		
	
The	 scholarly	 debate	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 EU’s	 international	 role	 has	 been	
flourishing	 for	 well	 over	 two	 decades	 now.	 Since	 Duchene’s	 conception	 of	 a	
civilian	 power	 Europe	 (1972),	 we	 have	 had	 Manners	 and	 Whitman’s	 (2010)	
portrait	of	a	 “Normative	Power	Europe”	describing	 the	Union,	not	as	an	actor,	




as	 an	 entity	with	 no	 real	 power	 of	 note	 at	 all	 (Damro	 2012,	Orbie	 2008,	 Toje	
2011).	Thus	the	EU’s	role	is	a	highly	contested	concept	that	not	only	challenges	







The	 highly	 contested	 nature	 of	 EU	 external	 action	 and	 its	 largely	 discursive	
nature	–	most	visibly	consisting	of	a	daily	flurry	of	declarations	and	statements	-
have	provided	fertile	ground	for	constructivist	analysis.	CFSP	appeared	to	some	
as	 a	 tool	 of	 rhetoric,	 designed	 to	 “personify”	 an	 EU	 identity	 but	 without	 the	
credibility	 that	 comes	 from	 commanding	 external	 relations	 (Tonra	 2005;	 10).	
Ben	 Rosamond	 noted	 that	 CFSP	 is	 ‘aspirational,	 declaratory	 and	 full	 of	
positioning	 statements’	 (2005;	470).	This	 “declaratory”	 aspect	of	CFSP	 reveals	
its	 importance	 as	 a	way	 for	 the	 EU	 to	 project	 itself	 externally,	 articulating	 its	
significance	 and	 coherence	 as	 a	 purposeful	 international	 actor.	 In	 this	
perspective,	foreign	policy	statements	have	ideational	purposes	–	they	construct	
an	 idea	 of	 the	 EU	 abroad	 and	 they	 reveal	 how	 the	 Union	 is	 “engaged	 in	 a	
continuous	discursive	struggle	 to	define	 the	substantive	ways	 in	which	 the	EU	
should	impact	upon	the	world,”	(Baker-Beall	2014;	212).	
	
But	 who	 is	 this	 performance	 for?	 And	 what	 is	 its	 content?	 A	 good	 deal	 of	
constructivist	 scholarship	 examines	 how	 the	 official	 claim	 for	 an	 international	
role	for	the	Union	has	been	interpreted	in	domestic	contexts,	among	national	and	
European	audiences.	Larsen’s	(2004)	exploration	of	how	the	EU	is	constructed	in	
European	 public	 discourse	 identified	 a	 wide	 spectrum	 of	 views;	 the	 EU	 as	 a	
capable	actor	that	defends	its	own	interests	and	acknowledges	its	international	
responsibilities	 or	 a	 benevolent	 experiment	 in	 peace	 building	 and	 integration.	
His	 analysis	 also	 explored	 a	 competing	 Eurosceptic	 discourse	 rejecting	 the	
concept	of	the	EU	as	an	international	actor	because	it	had	abrogated	the	rights	of	
member-states,	 and	 taken	 on	powers	 rightly	 belonging	 elsewhere	 (69).	 Larsen	
mapped	out	the	patterns	of	discourse	and	compared	them	with	cleavages	within	
European	 society:	 the	 official	 EU	 level	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 Eurosceptics	 in	
Denmark,	the	UK,	Ireland	and	France	on	the	other.	
	
By	 focussing	 on	 internal	 discursive	 construction,	 these	 analyses	 implied	 that	
Europeans	were	the	primary	audience	for	this	performance	–	an	orientation	that	
this	 section	 will	 return	 to.	 But	 what	 kind	 of	 role	 was	 the	 Union	 performing?	
Karen	 Smith	 explored	 analysis	 of	 the	Union	 as	 an	 international	 actor	 exerting	
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influence	 and	 power	 beyond	 its	 borders,	 not	 through	 conventional	 military	
means,	 but	 rather	 by	 deploying	 the	 soft	 power	 tools	 of	 attraction	 (Smith,	 K;	






a	 transformative	 impact	 on	 its	 neighbours	 by	 offering	 carrots	 rather	 than	










Critics	argued	 that	European	efforts	 to	 reconceptualise	 the	nature	of	power	 in	
international	 politics	 have	 been	 “after-the-fact”	 attempts	 to	 create	 new	
categories	of	power	that	suited	the	EU’s	unbalanced	institutional	capacities.	Was	
soft	power	really	the	key	to	influence	in	international	politics,	in	which	case	the	
EU	 could	 claim	 to	 be	 a	 post-modern	 superpower?	 (Leonard	 2005)	 Or	 were	
Europeans	 deluded	 in	 thinking	 that	 glaring	 hard	 power	 deficits	 were	 less	
relevant	in	a	new	multi-polar	world?		
	
These	 questions	 are,	 of	 course,	 unresolved	 within	 European	 academic	 and	
political	circles.	But	are	these	debates	mirrored	in	an	American	context?	Do	US	
assessments	of	 the	EU	as	a	security	actor	share	evaluations	of	 the	EU’s	unique	
offering	 to	 international	 politics?	 Or	 is	 the	 dialogue	 sketched	 out	 thus	 far	









Despite	this	 flourishing	debate	on	the	nature	of	the	EU,	 its	 implications	for	the	
international	system,	and	its	discursive	construction	among	domestic	audiences,	
only	 rarely	have	 studies	 analysed	perceptions	of	 the	EU’s	 role	by	key	external	
audiences.	Lucarelli	(2007)	and	Holland	and	Chaban	(2010)	presented	research	
on	 the	 external	 image	 of	 the	 EU,	 based	 on	 studies	 of	 public	 opinion,	 elite	
commentary,	media	content	and	non-governmental	organisation	(NGO)	opinion	
in	 several	 countries.	 A	 2007	 study	 report	 noted	 “the	 corpus	 of	 literature	
explicitly	dealing	with	EU’s	external	 image	 is	very	small,	 fragmented	and	at	an	
early	 stage,”	 (Fioramonti	 and	 Lucarelli	 2007;	 326	 –	 342)	 and	 highlighted	 the	




self-perception	 is	 confirmed	 by	 performance,	 has	 forgotten	 to	 ask	 the	 most	
crucial	key	informants	(i.e.	the	targeted	societies)	what	they	think,”	(Fioramonti	
and	 Lucarelli	 2007,	 326).	 The	 lack	 of	 studies	 on	 external	 perceptions	 or	




be	 relevant	 for	 the	 discussion	 about	 whether	 the	 EU	 is	 a	 special	 normative	
power,”	(896).	
	
The	 absence	 of	 studies	 into	 the	 perceptions	 of	 the	 EU	 among	 external	 target	
groups	 is	even	more	striking	given	the	resources	deployed	by	official	actors	 in	
ongoing	efforts	to	shape	attitudes	of	the	EU	among	these	audiences.	A	sizeable	
portion	 of	 the	 work	 of	 those	 officials	 and	 diplomats	 in	 the	 EEAS	 in	 Brussels,	
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consists	 of	 declarations	 and	 statements	 that	 seek	 to	 communicate	 ideas	 about	
the	 EU’s	 role.	 More	 specifically,	 the	 EU	 Delegation	 to	 the	 US,	 a	 “full-fledged	
diplomatic	 mission”	 employing	 90	 people	 in	 an	 office	 on	 Washington	 DC’s	 K	
Street,	 seeks	 to	 shape	 perceptions	 by	 producing	 leaflets,	 video	 clips,	 policy	
events,	school	 trips,	study	competitions	and	deploying	direct	engagement	with	




the	 EU-U.S.	 relationship	 among	 the	 American	 public.” 7 	Research	 on	 the	





undertake	 an	 analysis	 of	 US	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU.	 Lucarelli’s	 study	 revealed	 a	
degree	of	confusion	about	the	relevant	empirical	data	studies	of	this	kind	should	
collect,	and	concluded	by	pointing	to	the	need	to	refine	a	“stringent	method,”	of	
analysing	 perceptions	 among	 key	 external	 audiences,	 recognising	 important	
contextual	differences	depending	on	the	subject	group.	On	a	basic	level,	differing	
methodological	 approaches	 to	 sampling	 “elite”	 perceptions	 in	 the	 limited	
literature	 on	 external	 perceptions	 of	 the	 EU,	 reduce	 the	 avenues	 for	
complementary	 comparative	 research	 on	 the	 topic	 (Larsen,	 2014;	 901).	 This	
commentary	points	to	a	need	for	a	theoretically	consistent	and	methodologically	
sound	 method	 to	 analyse	 relevant	 views	 among	 significant	 external	
constituencies.	This	 study	 responds	 to	 that	 call,	 developing	a	novel	qualitative	
content	 analysis	 of	 the	 discourse	 produced	 by	 the	 US	 elite	 foreign	 policy	
community,	specifically	on	EU	security	action.	It	is	hoped	that	not	only	will	the	
empirical	 findings	 prove	 a	 valuable	 contribution	 to	 this	 debate	 but	 that	 the	














elite’s	 ideas	 on	 EU	 security	 action	 are	 expressed	 in	 discourse.	 Discursive	
institutionalism	offers	a	model	 for	examining	not	merely	 ideas	as	 text	but	also	
the	context	for	communicative	action:	the	where,	when,	how	and	why	ideas	are	
expressed	 in	 discourse.	 It	 provides	modes	 of	 classification	 for	 different	 types	




also	 the	 context	 for	 discursive	 acts	 and	more	 significantly,	 the	ways	 in	which	
agents	consciously	seek	to	shape	the	institutions	of	discourses.		
	
A	 criticism	 of	 the	 discursive	 institutionalist	 approach	 is	 that	 while	 the	
framework	 proposes	 an	 agent-centred	 model	 of	 institutional	 change,	 the	
mechanisms	by	which	agent-level	discursive	action	lead	to	institutional	change,	
and	 the	 power	 relations	 involved	 in	 this	 process,	 remain	 under-specified	
(Panizza	and	Miorelli;	2013).	In	what	circumstances	do	individual	level	actions	
produce	 institutional	 change	 and	 which	 agent-level	 actions	 have	 significant	
consequences?	 This	 work	 modifies	 the	 framework	 by	 proposing	 a	 domestic	
discursive	competition	model	that	analyses	how	competing	sub-groups	advance	
narrative	 accounts	 of	 EU	 security	 action,	 arising	 from	 differing	 ideological	
standpoints.	 Significant	 think	 tanks,	 possessing	 the	 requisite	 financial,	 media,	
intellectual	 and	political	 resources	 to	 be	 influential,	 can	 thus	 act	 as	 discursive	
entrepreneurs,	 advocating	 particular	 ideas	 about	 Europe	 in	 line	 with	 their	
preferences.	By	comparing	the	patterns	of	discourse	with	ideological	cleavages	
within	the	community,	we	can	probe	the	plausibility	of	this	modification	in	the	
empirical	 chapters.	 This	 model	 is	 an	 attempt	 therefore,	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	
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performing	 a	 constitutive	 analysis	 of	 the	 discourse	 itself.	 Such	 an	 enterprise	
requires	the	author	to	make	choices	about	the	groups	of	actors	to	be	included,	
the	kind	of	documents	to	be	selected	and	manner	in	which	content	is	coded	for	
meaning	 and	 compared.	 The	 study	 will	 propose	 transparent	 and	 replicable	
methods	 for	 selecting	 an	 ideologically	 and	 institutionally	 balanced	 corpus	 of	





classified	 State	Dept	 cables	 and	 emails,	which	 are	 now	 in	 the	 public	 domain8.	
The	 availability	 of	 these	 documents	 provide	 the	 study	 with	 an	 invaluable	
opportunity	to	examine	how	officials	talk	about	the	EU	behind	closed	doors	as	
well	as	 in	public.	By	doing	so,	 the	study	seeks	 to	 further	our	understanding	of	
the	different	modes	of	official	discourse	in	different	settings.	
	
This	study	develops	an	argument	 for	a	narrow	elite	 focus	 in	 the	US	context,	by	
critically	 engaging	 with	 academic	 literature	 on	 the	 domestic	 influences	 of	 US	





heard	 of	 the	 European	 Union.	 Given	 the	 informational	 costs	 to	 voters	 of	









cleavages	 between	 parties	 on	 this	 issue,	 the	 generally	 low	 salience	 nature	 of	
foreign	policy	and	the	sporadic	nature	of	elections,	this	thesis	argues	that	public	








The	 literature	 on	 the	 role	 of	 ideas	 in	 US	 foreign	 policy	 is	 characterised	 by	
differing	 assumptions	 about	 whose	 ideas	 matter	 and	 how	 they	 influence	
policymaking.	 Should	we	 look	 at	 the	 attitudes	 of	 the	 general	 public	 on	 a	 given	
foreign	 policy	 question	 or	 actor,	 or	 should	 we	 instead	 examine	 the	 policy	





This	 study	 argues	 that	 a	 narrow	 elite	 focus	 allows	 us	 to	 best	 understand	 the	
ideas	of	actors	who	are	consequential	for	EU-US	security	relations.	The	empirical	
analysis	focuses	on	a	foreign	policy	community,	comprising	official	foreign	policy	
makers	 and	 influential	 think	 tanks.	 This	 narrow	 scope	 restricts	 our	 focus	 to	
those	 actors,	 which	 can	 claim	 significant	 influence	 over	 the	 discourse	 on	 EU	
external	action,	 rather	 than	broad	elites	or	mass	public	opinion.	Foreign	policy	
making	 today	 is	 produced	 by	 complex	 interactions	 between	 policy	 makers,	
decision-makers,	experts	and,	to	a	lesser	or	greater	degree,	public	opinion.	In	the	
case	 of	 transatlantic	 relations	 however,	 the	 low	 policy	 salience	 of	 the	 issue	
narrows	the	field	of	consequential	actors.		
	
Furthermore,	 the	 dissertation	 proposes	 a	 qualitative	 content	 analysis	 (QCA)	
method	 that	 seeks	 to	 provide	 rich	 insights	 into	 the	 themes	 and	 forms	 of	
discourse	 on	 the	 EU,	 as	 opposed	 to	 more	 clearly	 measurable	 but	 empirically	
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As	 this	 chapter	 and	 chapter	 three	 argue,	 ideas	 conveyed	 in	 discourse,	 imbue	
institutions,	 structures	 and	 actors	 with	 meaning.	 An	 understanding	 of	 these	
discourses	 can	 assist	 in	 explaining	 outcomes	 by	 highlighting	 interpretations	 of	
the	 world	 that	 function	 as	 causal	 conditions	 for	 agents	 within	 it.	 The	 central	
objective	of	this	thesis	is	to	examine	the	discursive	battle	of	ideas	within	a	small	
group	 of	 influential	 policy	 actors,	 comparing	 various	 factors	 that	 shape	 that	
discourse	and	 thus	produce	a	discursive	map	of	EU	external	action	 that	guides	
US	policymaking.	Tables	1.1	and	1.2	provide	us	with	working	definitions	for	the	























This	 section	 outlines	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 thesis,	 chapter-by-chapter,	
emphasising	 the	 key	 arguments	 presented	 throughout	 and	 how	 the	 evidence	
will	be	marshalled	 in	 the	service	of	 the	overall	 research	design	and	questions.	
Chapter	 two	presents	 an	historical	 argument	 for	 the	narrow	elite	 focus	 of	 the	
study	 by	 briefly	 reviewing	 the	 background	 of	 US	 attitudes	 towards	 European	
integration	 and	 the	 central	 role	 played	 by	 a	 select	 group	 of	 influential	 actors	
during	 the	 post-war	 period,	 oftentimes	 insulated	 from	 public	 opinion	 and	
political	 contestation.	 The	 evidence	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 derived	 from	 primary	
historical	 research	 conducted	using	 records	 from	 the	official	 state	department	
foreign	 relations	 of	 the	 United	 States	 series	 as	 well	 as	 a	 critical	 analysis	 of	
secondary	literature	on	this	period.	The	chapter	analyses	a	number	of	recurrent	
themes	in	US	elite	discourse,	which	provide	valuable	context	for	the	subsequent	
case	 studies.	 The	 recurrent	 themes	 in	 this	 period	 provide	 an	 important	
ideational	 framework	 for	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 later	 timeframe	 of	 this	
thesis.	
	
Chapter	 three	 provides	 a	 theoretical	 grounding	 for	 the	 narrow	 elite	 focus,	
justifying	 the	 analytical	 focus	 on	 a	 community	 of	 foreign	 policy	 analysts	 and	
officials	 in	Washington	D.C,	 as	 opposed	 to	 broader	 public	 opinion	 approaches	
employed	in	other	studies.	It	also	identifies	the	ideological	and	institutional	sub-
groups	within	 the	 policy	 community,	which	 constitute	 the	 embedded	 cases	 in	
the	 research	 design.	 It	 introduces	 the	 interpretive	 constructivist	 approach	
focusing	 on	 the	 role	 of	 discourse	 in	 creating	 meaning	 in	 the	 context	 of	
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transatlantic	 relations	 and	 by	 critically	 reviewing	 the	 literature	 in	 the	 field,	 it	




understand	how	competing	 ideological	and	 institutional	sub-groups	within	 the	
policy	 community	 advance	 ideas	 about	 the	 EU.	 This	 approach	 enables	 us	 to	
understand	the	themes	and	discursive	processes	that	these	actors	purposefully	
deploy.	But	 the	chapter	also	addresses	some	of	 the	criticisms	of	 this	approach	



















advance	 a	 given	 narrative.	 Chapter	 six	 compares	 these	 findings	 with	 official	
discourse	 in	private	settings,	 examining	how	officials	analysed	 the	evolution	of	
CSDP	in	their	internal	correspondence	and	developed	strategies	in	response	to	
events.	 This	 analysis	 allows	 the	 study	 to	 deepen	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	
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official	coordinative	discourse	differs	from	policymakers’	public	comments.	The	
key	 questions	 for	 these	 chapters	 are:	 how	 is	 EU	 portrayed	 in	 each	 of	 the	







Agreements.	 The	 framework	 for	 analysis	 remains	 the	 same:	 chapter	 seven	
analyses	public	discourse,	while	chapter	eight	analyses	private	official	discourse.	
Each	 chapter	 analyses	 the	 main	 narratives,	 examining	 how	 the	 pattern	 of	
discourse	 maps	 onto	 sub-groups	 cleavages,	 identifying	 key	 language,	 themes	
and	 processes	 and	 finally,	 comparing	 the	 coordinative	 and	 communicative	
discourses	 of	 official	 actors.	 As	 the	 second	 and	 final	 case	 study,	 these	 two	
chapters	 will	 present	 the	 cross-case	 comparative	 findings,	 revealing	 the	
dominant	role	played	by	ideological	position	in	influencing	discourse	on	the	EU	
among	 policy	 analysts,	 producing	 consistent	 narratives	 of	 the	 EU	which	 cross	
cut	the	differing	policy	competences	exercised	by	the	EU	in	each	case.		
	








and	 significance	 of	 the	 enquiry	 and	 the	 dissertation’s	 intended	 theoretical	 and	











as	 passive	units	 directed	by	 structure	 –	 instead,	 the	dissertation	 also	 seeks	 to	
examine	how	 individuals	 and	groups,	 skilled	 in	 the	 arts	 of	 policy	 analysis	 and	
communication,	 can	purposefully	 re-shape	 the	 institutions	of	 discourse,	which	
form	the	ideational	map	for	those	assessing	the	EU’s	role.	As	with	any	enterprise	





and	 relevant	 data	 that	 can	 increase	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	 EU’s	 pre-
eminent	 ally	 understands	 its	 security	 role	 and	 thus	 its	 expectations	 for	 policy	
cooperation.	Analysing	how	our	subject	group	assesses,	discusses	and	projects	
ideas	about	EU	security	action	 involves	making	considered	theoretical	choices,	




The	 chapter	 identified	 a	 number	 of	 empirical,	 theoretical	 and	 policy-relevant	
gaps	in	our	understanding	of	the	EU’s	role	as	a	security	actor.	The	scope	of	work	
outlined	 in	 this	 chapter	 represents	 an	 attempt	 to	 address	parts	 of	 these	 gaps:	
empirically,	 we	 must	 analyse	 and	 document	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 discourse	 in	 a	
theoretically	 sound	 and	 methodologically	 reliable	 fashion.	 Theoretically,	 the	
study	 can	 contribute	 to	 broader	 scholarship	 on	 the	 role	 of	 power	 relations	 in	
discursive	 change,	by	 revealing	how	elite	groups	purposefully	 seek	 to	 reshape	
patterns	of	discourse.	Finally,	the	chapter	quoted	extensively	from	policymakers	




accusations	 of	 rhetorical	 aspiration	 without	material	 commitment	 or	 of	 mere	
wishful	thinking.	As	policymakers	seek	to	generate	compelling	narratives	about	
the	 EU’s	 role	 in	 the	 World,	 qualitatively	 rich	 analyses	 of	 frank	 external	

































This	 chapter	 reviews	US	elite	discourse	on	European	 security	 integration	 from	
the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	to	the	present	day.	The	purpose	of	the	chapter	
is	 to	 identify	 the	 dominant	 themes	 in	 accounts	 of	 US	 attitudes	 to	 European	
security	 integration,	 thus	 providing	 important	 historical	 context	 for	 the	 case	
studies.	An	analysis	of	this	kind	can	reveal	long-running	strands	of	thought	in	US	
elite	 ideas	 about	 Europe,	 which	 we	 can	 compare	 with	 our	 later	 analysis	 to	
discern	whether	contemporary	attitudes	are	characterised	more	by	continuity	or	
change	 with	 pre-existing	 paradigms	 of	 understanding.	 Additionally,	 landmark	
events	 and	 developments	 from	 this	 historical	 period	 (post-WW2)	 form	 an	
important	 ingredient	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 security	 actor	 in	 US	
minds	today.	Modern-day	diplomats	and	analysts	base	their	analysis,	at	least	in	
part,	 on	 interpretations	 of	 the	 past	 that	 are	 transmitted	 through	 historical	
accounts,	 diplomatic	 training	 and	 contemporary	 discourse	 on	 the	 roots	 of	
integration.	 Finally,	 the	 analysis	 will	 provide	 further	 support	 for	 the	
dissertation’s	 narrow	 elite	 focus,	 by	 illustrating	 the	 key	 role	 played	 by	 small	
groups	of	officials	and	analysts	in	determining	US	policy	towards	Europe	in	this	
period,	 often	 insulated	 from	 public	 opinion	 and	 party	 politics.	 Thus	 analysing	
this	historical	period	is	of	value	on	three	counts:	by	providing	valuable	thematic	
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context	 and	 historical	 comparison	 for	 current	 discourse,	 by	 revealing	 the	
dominant	 accounts	 of	 relevant	 historical	 events	 that	 inform	 contemporary	
Europe	 specialists	within	 the	 foreign	policy	elite	 and	 finally,	 by	 supporting	 the	
elite-level	focus	of	the	project	by	reference	to	the	historical	record.	
	
Two	modes	of	 research	were	employed	 to	analyse	American	attitudes	 towards	
European	integration	since	1945.	Firstly;	a	selection	of	the	secondary	literature	




series	 and	 other	 select	 primary	 materials.	 Although	 declassified	 records	 of	
conversations	and	correspondence	between	the	White	House,	State	Department	
and	US	 embassies	 abroad	 cannot	 be	 considered	 a	 “complete”	 historical	 record	
and	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 particularly	 sensitive	 documents	 have	 remained	 classified,	
the	FRUS	presents	us	with	a	useful	historical	record	of	private	reflections	of	elite	
actors	 and	 can	 assist	 us	 in	 comparing	 private	 and	 public	 elite	 discourse	 on	
European	security	integration	for	this	timeframe	(Schmidt,	2008).	
The	aim	with	both	methods	 is	 to	review	the	evidence	of	how	US	 foreign	policy	
elites	 perceived	 European	 integration,	 with	 particular	 reference	 to	 security	
topics,	in	the	period	from	the	end	of	World	War	Two	to	the	present	day	(1945	–	
2013).	Shifts	and	differences	in	US	elite	discourse	in	recent	administrations	can	
only	 be	 fully	 understood	 within	 a	 broader	 historical	 context.	 Without	 such	
context,	 the	 study	 becomes	 vulnerable	 to	 charges	 of	 firstly,	 overstating	 the	
importance	 of	 contemporary	 and	 recent	 events	 in	 shaping	 elite	 ideas	 and	





Analysis	of	 trends	 in	post-war	US	elite	 attitudes	 towards	European	 integration	
can	 usefully	 be	 conceived	 of	 in	 three	 phases	 as	 indicated	 in	 Fig	 4.2	 below.	 Of	
course	 this	 useful	 classification	 inevitably	 simplifies	 the	 trends	 of	 this	 period;	
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American	 elite	 attitudes	 to	 European	 integration	 were	 never	 entirely	
enthusiastic	nor	 indeed	entirely	sceptical.	As	a	 review	of	 the	 literature	reveals,	
the	transatlantic	relationship	has	always	been	characterised	by	crises,	tensions,	
disagreements	 and	 uncertainty	 (Kissinger	 1965;	 Steel	 1964;	 Spaak	 1967;	
























partner	 for	 the	 United	 States.	 This	 new	 Europe	would	 safely	 contain	Western	
Germany	 and	 act	 as	 a	 bulwark	 against	 Communism.	 The	 strategy	 involved	
stationing	 large	 forces	 abroad,	 entering	 into	 alliances,	 increasing	 defense	
spending	 and	 explicitly	 supporting	 nascent	 efforts	 towards	 European	
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integration:	 “the	 US	 favored	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 supranational	 Europe	within	 its	





for	 its	 contrast	 with	 pre-war	 isolationism.	 American	 politicians,	 blessed	 by	





our	 peace	 and	 prosperity	 in	 the	 toils	 of	 European	 ambition,	 rivalship,	
interest,	humor	or	caprice?”		
(George	 Washington,	 Final	 Address	
1796)	
	





















control	 over	 the	 foreign	 policy	 process.	 By	 1946,	 Democrats	 and	 Republicans	
were	 united	 behind	 the	 President	 Truman’s	 foreign	 policy	 and	 the	
administration	was	able	 to	get	almost	all	 its	 foreign	policy	 initiatives	approved	
by	 the	 Republican	 controlled	 congress	 (Lundestad	 2003;	 27-63).	 This	was	 the	
beginning	of	a	period	of	remarkably	low	political	contestation	of	foreign	policy,	
wherein	 the	 president,	 together	with	 the	 State	 dept.	 could	 set	 and	 implement	
policy	without	fear	of	popular	backlash	or	legislative	confrontation.	This	period	
laid	 the	 conditions	 for	 an	 unprecedented	 state-led	 investment	 in	 Europe’s	





The	 planning,	 political	 promotion	 and	 execution	 of	 the	 Marshall	 Plan	 was	 an	
unmistakeably	elite-led	project.	This	group	was	composed	of	high-level	officials,	
diplomats,	 politicians	 and	 technocrats	 based	 in	 prominent	 think	 tanks.	
Historians	have	commented	that	these	actors	formed	a	tightly	woven	web	of	“the	
best	 and	 the	 brightest”;	 wealthy	 and	 highly-educated	 individuals	 who	 moved	
easily	between	elite	settings	 inside	and	outside	of	Government	(Winand	1993).	
These	social	ties	allowed	for	a	fluid	group	of	elite	actors	in	differing	institutional	
settings	 to	 collaborate	 on	 US	 policy	 planning	 for	 a	 reconstructed	 Europe.	 The	
Council	on	Foreign	Relations	(CFR)	is	the	most	prominent	example	of	think-tank	
influence	 on	 policy	 towards	 Europe	 in	 this	 period,	 although	 the	 Brookings	
Institution	also	assisted	in	the	development	of	the	Marshall	Plan	(Medvetz	2012;	
96).	 Tasked	 by	 the	 State	 Department	 with	 developing	 strategy	 on	 major	
European	 questions,	 CFR	 produced	 682	 memoranda	 for	 State	 in	 this	 period,	
underwritten	 by	 grants	 from	 Rockefeller	 Foundation	 for	 $300,000	 (Winand	










side	 by	 side	with	 official	 foreign	policy	 actors;	 in	 fact	 42%	of	 Truman’s	 senior	







Congress	 involved	 a	 small	 number	 of	 influential	 elite	 actors.	 The	 massive	
investment	 program	 attracted	 some	 criticism	 due	 to	 the	 scale	 of	 expenditure	
involved	–	the	total	was	$26bn,	or	roughly	10	per	cent	of	total	US	GDP	in	1948,	if	
other	European	aid	in	the	period	1945-1948	is	included	(Milward,	1984;46).	But	
the	 Committee	 for	 the	 Marshall	 Plan,	 led	 by	 Henry	 Stimson,	 undertook	 a	
significant	lobbying	campaign	that	ensured	strong	bi-partisan	support	(Hitchens,	
1968;	52).	The	bill	passed	by	a	majority	of	69-17	 in	 the	Senate	 in	March	1948.	
The	 program	 was	 supported	 by	 almost	 all	 national	 newspaper	 titles,	 radio	
networks	and	over	50	business	organisations.	The	Committee	worked	to	provide	
congressmen	 with	 extensive	 briefings,	 analyses,	 legislative	 reports	 and	
testimony	 before	 the	 house	 and	 generated	 massive	 pressure	 on	 legislators	 to	
back	the	investment	program.	This	form	of	activity	–	creating	and	promoting	the	
intellectual	 capital	 for	 a	policy	 initiative	 –	 is	 not	dissimilar	 from	 the	work	of	 a	
specialised	think	tank.	But	the	Committee’s	targets	were	not	just	legislators,	they	
were	 also	 focussed	 on	 moulding	 mass	 opinion.	 As	 for	 the	 public,	 initial	
ambivalence	 reported	 in	 surveys	 by	 the	 New	 York	 Times	 was	 massaged	 by	
favourable	 news	 coverage	 and	 the	 Committee’s	 national	 advertising	 campaign	
into	 enthusiastic	 support	 (Ibid).	 In	 this	 account	 elite	 influence	 is	 tri-furcated;	
shaping	a	malleable	public	opinion	to	support	a	major	policy	initiative,	ensuring	
almost	 uniformly	 positive	 media	 coverage	 and	 simultaneously	 seeing	 the	











and	 external	 threats	 from	 Communist	 forces,	 promoted	 European	 integration	
and	more	broadly	mobilised	American	support	 for	a	 comprehensive	US	 role	 in	
Europe	 (2008:	 44).	 An	 economically	 strong	 Europe	 would	 be	 a	 growing	
destination	for	American	exports	and	would	form	a	prosperous	Western	sphere	
with	 the	US.	Eisenhower	spoke	of	 shaping	Europe	 into	a	 “third	 force	…	a	great	
power	bloc,	after	which	development	the	US	would	be	permitted	to	sit	back	and	
relax	 somewhat”	 (Brogi	 2002).	 Although	 the	 levels	 of	 investment	 in	 the	 Plan	




documents,	 that	 almost	 all	 relevant	 senior	 administration	 members	 under	
Truman	 and	 Eisenhower	 were	 strongly	 pro-integrationist	 and	 extremely	
ambitious	 as	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 integration	 in	 economic	 and	 security	 terms.	
Secretary	of	State	John	Foster	Dulles	wrote	that	“Germany	ought	to	be	integrated	
within	 a	 unified	 Europe”	 and	 believed	 that	 that	 would	 need	 “some	 form	 of	
application	 of	 the	 federal	 solution”	 (Winand	 1993;	 7,	 11).	 His	 Head	 of	 Policy	













to	 the	 economic	 sphere.	 More	 than	 most,	 Eisenhower	 strongly	 favoured	 a	
politically	integrated	Europe	that	could	in	time	have	a	single	defense	identity.	He	
was	“undeterred	 in	his	determination	 to	 include	a	military	security	component	
in	 the	European	 integration	process”	 (Ruggie	1996;	61).	 In	concrete	 terms	 this	
meant	 explicit	 support	 for	 the	 French	 European	 Defence	 Community	 (EDC)	
initiative.	 The	 EDC	 was	 an	 initiative	 started	 by	 French	 Prime	 Minister	 René	
Plevin	 to	 form	 a	 6-country	military	 force	 including	 a	 rearmed	West	 Germany.	







always	 been	 our	 hope	 that	 this	 great	 project,	which	 holds	 the	 promise	 of	
such	magnificent	permanent	benefits	for	Europe,	would	come	into	being	at	
the	earliest	possible	time.”	
- President	Dwight	D.	 Eisenhower,	 Correspondence	with	 Prime	
Minister	Laniel	of	France.	September	20,	1953.11	
The	 unity	 of	 purpose	 on	 the	 American	 side	 in	 supporting	 EDC	 at	 this	 time	 is	
striking;	 Secretary	 of	 State	 John	 Foster	 Dulles	 described	 the	 EDC	 glowingly	 as	
“the	 panacea	 for	 Europe’s	 difficulties,	 a	 symbol	 of	 its	 regeneration	 and	 a	
touchstone	of	its	future”	(Winand	1993;	28).	However	this	starry-eyed	optimism	










for	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 EDC	 and	 warned	 against	 any	 further	 delays	 by	
staking	the	very	future	of	the	Atlantic	Alliance	on	its	passage:	“It	is	our	conviction	
that	 further	 delay	 in	 the	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 the	 EDC	 and	Bonn	Treaties	would	
damage	the	solidarity	of	the	Atlantic	nations.”	(Joint	Statement,	June	29	1954)13	
	
By	mid	1954	 it	was	 clear	 that	 France	was	delaying	 the	 ratification	 of	 the	 very	
EDC	concept	it	had	initially	promoted.	The	Assemblée	Nationale	was	hostile,	with	
Socialists	 divided	 and	 Gaullists	 concerned	 about	 implications	 for	 French	
sovereignty	 and	 German	 remilitarization.	 In	 a	 letter	 to	 the	 French	 Foreign	





the	 standpoint	 of	 Franco-American	 relations	 …	 I	 urge	 in	 the	 strongest	
possible	 terms	 that	 EDC	 should	 be	 brought	 to	 a	 vote	 before	 the	 Easter	




- Letter	 from	 Secretary	 Dulles	 to	 Foreign	 Minister	 Bidault,	
Washington,	February	23,	1954.14	
	












condemning	 French	 intransigence.	 With	 the	 EDC	 initiative	 abandoned,	 West	
Germany	was	 admitted	 into	NATO	 and	 that	 organisation’s	 position	 as	 the	 pre-
eminent	European	security	organisation	was	cemented.	The	2-year	long	debacle	
had	 disappointed	 Eisenhower	 and	 Dulles	 and	 never	 again	 would	 a	 US	
administration	 so	 enthusiastically	 support	 the	 development	 of	 an	 autonomous	
European	defence	framework.	
	
US	 official	 became	 increasingly	 frustrated	 with	 European	 integration	 	 efforts	
from	 late	 1954	 onwards.	 Delays	 to	 currency	 convertability	 arrangements,	
extensions	 to	 what	 were	 once	 thought	 to	 be	 temporary	 troop	 deployment	









It	 would	 be	 simplistic	 to	 claim	 that	 all	 groups	 within	 the	 US	 elite	 shared	
Eisenhower	 and	 Dulles’	 early	 Euro-enthusiasm.	 The	 US	 Atomic	 Energy	
Commission	 and	 private	 industry	 had	 reservations	 about	 Euratom15	and	while	
the	 White	 House	 and	 the	 State	 Dept	 favoured	 supranational	 economic	
institutions,	 the	 Treasury	 Department	 had	 concerns	 about	 the	 protectionist	
nature	 of	 the	 EEC	 and	wanted	 a	more	 open,	multilateral	 trading	 environment	
(Winand	 1993;	 68,	 Lundestad	 2003,	 63-111).	 For	 the	 Euro-enthusiasts,	 the	
political	 ends	 of	 European	 stability	 justified	 the	 integrative	 means	 and	 in	 a	
longer	 term	 economic	 perspective,	 a	wealthier	 Europe	would	 import	more	 US	
goods.	But	interests	outside	the	White	House	and	State	Department	believed	that	
















as	 he	 did,	 particularly	 in	 security	 matters.	 The	 development	 of	 the	 Common	
Market	 after	 the	 establishment	of	 the	European	Economic	Community	 in	1957	
led	to	growing	concerns	of	European	protectionism	among	US	elites	(Milward	et	




period	 also	 witnessed	 a	 gradual	 generational	 shift	 which	 was	 changing	 the	
composition	 of	 the	 US	 policy	 elite.	 Stephen	 Walt	 –	 one	 of	 the	 few	 structural	




was	 worth	 fighting	 -	 and	 perhaps	 dying	 -	 for,	 and	 they	 were	 willing	 to	 risk	
considerable	blood	and	treasure	to	protect	these	allies.”	(Ibid,	3-11).	Yet	the	new	
elites	 of	 the	 1960s	 did	 not	 share	 this	 direct	 emotional	 and	 professional	









European	 defense	 within	 an	 Atlantic	 framework	 and	 continuing	 European	
integration.	The	logic	had	remained	the	same,	an	integrated	Europe	would	assist	
in	containing	Germany	and	thwarting	the	rise	of	conservative	movements	there,	




In	 spite	 of	 this	 compelling	 strategic	 argument,	 French	 President	 De	 Gaulle’s	
period	in	office	(1959-69)	saw	further	friction	with	the	US	on	European	security	
integration.	 Shortly	 after	 blocking	 British	 membership	 of	 the	 EEC,	 De	 Gaulle	
concluded	 a	 Franco-German	 Treaty	 on	 defence,	 education,	 and	 culture	 and	
announced	his	 intention	 to	develop	a	French	nuclear	deterrent	 capability.	This	
provoked	 irritation	 in	Washington,	which	perceived	these	moves	 together	with	
De	 Gaulle’s	 statements	 on	 NATO	 as	 threatening	 to	 the	 Atlantic	 structure	 of	
defence	(Memo	of	Conversation,	230,	1961.)17	In	contrast	to	Eisenhower’s	policy	
of	 encouraging	 exclusively	 European	 security	 institutions,	 Kennedy	 saw	 the	
move	 as	 “an	 unfriendly	 act”	 and	 demanded	 Germany	 make	 a	 declaration	 of	
loyalty	to	US	and	include	it	as	a	preamble	in	the	Treaty	(Lundestad,	2003:	124).	
Furthermore,	De	Gaulle	enraged	the	Americans	by	making	a	visit	to	Moscow	and	
explicitly	 criticising	 American	 policy.	 Kennedy’s	 circle	 swiftly	 came	 to	 the	
conclusion	 that	De	Gaulle’s	Government	was	 intent	on	shutting	 the	British	and	





State	 Department	 remained	 supportive	 of	 the	 EEC	 in	 spite	 of	 growing	
resentment	of	tariffs	in	Congress	and	elsewhere.	This	resentment	erupted	into	a	
full	scale	trade	war	when,	 in	response	to	the	suspension	of	EEC	concessions	on	
US	 textiles,	 protectionist	 elements	 in	 Congress	 responded	with	 restrictions	 on	






Council	 (NSC)	 advisors	 and	 hardliners	 about	 the	 public	 response	 to	 France’s	
withdrawal	from	military	 integration	in	NATO	saw	NSC	advisors	Robert	Komer	
and	Francis	Bator	prevail	against	Dean	Rusk,	who	had	long	resented	De	Gaulle’s	






withdrawn	 their	Mediterranean	 fleet;	 denied	US	 nuclear	 storage	 rights	 in	
France,	made	integrated	air	defense	system	less	effective;	and	more	recently	
refused	to	give	us	permission	to	establish	tropospheric	scatter	link	from	low	
countries	 into	 nerve	 center	 at	 SHAPE	 …	 their	 purpose	 for	 establishing	
national	 strategic	 deterrent	 is	 not	 to	 cooperate	with	US	 and	 the	Alliance,	
but	to	ensure	France’s	independence	of	US	and	Alliance.”	
	 	




but	 as	 time	went	 on,	 senior	 figures	 in	 successive	 administrations	would	 grow	
similarly	 suspicious	 of	 European	 efforts	 that	 appeared	 to	 run	 counter	 to	 the	
“Atlantic”	 framework.	 Germany	 under	 Willy	 Brandt	 was	 pursuing	 a	 more	
independent	 foreign	policy,	exemplified	by	his	 “Ostpolitik”	 initiative.	The	EEC’s	
expansion	 in	 the	1970s	 together	with	 the	development	of	 the	Common	Market	
continued	to	be	a	source	of	grievance.	Taken	with	the	US’s	own	crisis	of	power	in	
the	 wake	 of	 its	 withdrawal	 from	 Vietnam	 and	 the	 growing	 oil	 crisis,	 US	










President	Richard	Nixon	Administration’s	 unease	with	European	 integration	 is	
clearly	manifested	 in	 a	 number	 of	 official	 documents	 from	 the	 period19.	 Nixon	
and	 his	 national	 security	 advisor,	 Henry	 Kissinger,	 shared	 an	 instinctive	
suspicion	 of	 the	 EEC	 and	Western	 Europe	 in	 general,	 which,	 combined	with	 a	
more	 vocal	 Congress	 and	 increasingly	 influential	 Departments	 of	 Trade,	
Agriculture,	Commerce	produced	a	more	Euro-critical	perspective	than	previous	




EC	 appears	 nowhere	 in	 the	 index	 of	 Nixon’s	 memoirs.	 The	 US	 now	 no	 longer	
advocated	 supranationalism,	 ostensibly	 because	 it	 was	 an	 internal	 matter	 for	








“that	 jackass	 in	 the	 European	 Commission	 in	 Brussels”	 (FRUS,	 Vol.	 Xli).	 The	
marginalisation	of	 the	 State	Department	was	 felt	most	 keenly	 in	 its	mission	 to	
the	 EC,	 where	 Ambassador	 Robert	 Shaetzel	 wrote	 that:	 “in	 its	 isolation	 in	
Brussels	the	US	mission	to	the	EC	might	as	well	have	been	located	on	the	upper	
reaches	of	the	Orinoco”.	Other	diplomats	at	the	time	reported	that	White	House	–	







At	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 more	 Euro	 critical	 perspective	 was	 the	 calculation	 by	
Kissinger	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 European	 unity	 that	 successive	 administrations	 had	
supported	was,	to	some	degree,	contrary	to	American	interests:	“We	have	sought	
to	 combine	 a	 supranational	 Europe	with	 a	 closely	 integrated	 Atlantic	 network	
under	 US	 leadership,	 these	 objectives	 are	 likely	 to	 prove	 incompatible”	
(Lundestad	2003;	178).	Congressmen	sympathetic	to	agricultural	interests	were	
increasingly	 vociferous	 in	 their	 criticism	 of	 European	 protectionism:	 “The	
congress	 is	simply	not	going	 to	 tolerate	 this	 too	passive	attitude	on	 the	part	of	




effort	 by	 Europeanists,	 this	 complaint	 is	 still	 heard	 in	 the	 Houses	 of	 Congress	
today.		
	
The	 subsequent	 Ford	 and	 Carter	 administrations	 saw	 further	 personal	 and	
political	 skirmishes	 over	missile	 deployment	 among	 other	 issues.	 The	 US	 was	
relieved	that	the	UK	had	finally	been	admitted	to	the	EEC	in	1973	and	although	
the	Community	had	taken	tentative	steps	towards	security	 integration	with	the	
informal	 European	 Political	 Cooperation	 process	 in	 the	 1970s	 there	 were	 no	
formal	 steps	 towards	 security	 integration	 in	 this	 period.	 New	 questions	 about	






It	 was	 not	 until	 end	 of	 Cold	 War	 and	 the	 development	 of	 CFSP/ESDP	 in	 the	
Maastrict	 Treaty	 that	 scholars	 began	 to	 seriously	 assess	 the	 EU’s	 emergent	





analysts	 were	 sounding	 the	 death	 knell	 for	 the	 NATO	 Alliance	 (Hogan	 1992;	
Keohane,	Nye,	Hoffmann	1993).	Structural	Realist	scholars	such	as	Mearsheimer	
(1990)	predicted	that	the	absence	of	a	common	enemy	to	unite	Europe	and	the	
US	would	 lead	 to	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	NATO	 alliance	 and	 the	 return	 of	 classical	
balancing	behaviour	among	European	states:	
	
“It	 is	 the	 Soviet	 threat	 that	 provides	 the	 glue	 that	 holds	 NATO	 together.	
Take	away	that	offensive	threat	and	the	United	States	is	 likely	to	abandon	
the	 Continent,	 whereupon	 the	 defensive	 alliance	 it	 has	 headed	 for	 forty	




Not	 only	 did	 some	 realists	 predict	 the	 end	 of	 NATO,	 several	 identified	 the	
possibility	of	Europe	emerging	as	an	autonomous	counter-balance	 to	American	
power.	Writing	 in	1993,	Waltz	argued	that	 it	would	be	 irrational	 for	a	reunited	
Germany	to	choose	to	remain	dependant	on	the	US	for	its	security:	“A	reunited,	
economically	powerful	Germany	will	seek	military	power	and	influence	to	match	
its	 economic	might”	 (Waltz	1993:	65).	CSDP	has	 also	been	 labelled	as	 an	early	
sign	of	“soft	balancing”	behaviour	(Pape	2005;	Art	2006;	Posen	2006).	For	these	
writers,	 CSDP	 demonstrated	 a	 fear	 of	 dependence	 on	 the	 US	 and	 a	 desire	 for	
security	 autonomy	 arising	 from	 the	 pressures	 of	 the	 anarchic	 system	 (Jones	
2007)21.	
	
Analysts	 noted	 increasing	 alarm	 in	 the	 Bush	 41	 and	 Clinton	 administrations	
about	the	risks	that	a	new	European	defence	identity	could	pose	to	NATO	and	US	






















Any	 lingering	 tensions	over	Europe’s	 security	 ambitions	were	 inflamed	greatly	
by	 the	 controversy	 over	 the	 invasion	 of	 Iraq,	 which	 divided	 Europeans	 in	 full	
public	view	(Daalder	2003;	Pond	2004;	Gordon	and	Shapiro	2004;	Kagan	2003;	
Habermas	and	Derrida	2005;	Peterson	2006;	Cox	2007).	Irritated	by	German	and	
French	 efforts	 to	 obstruct	 the	 US	 invasion,	 US	 Defense	 Secretary	 Donald	
Rumsfeld	 famously	dismissed	their	objections	as	 the	voice	of	 “Old	Europe”	and	
welcomed	 the	 eager	 support	 of	 new	EU	member	 states	 in	 Central	 and	Eastern	









“Europeans	 today	 are	 not	 ambitious	 for	 power,	 and	 certainly	 not	 for	
military	 power.	 Euripeans	 over	 the	 past	 half-century	 have	 developed	 a	










(Andrews,	 2005)	 struggling	 under	 “another	 major	 crisis.”	 Some	 texts	 sought	
clues	as	to	the	likely	trajectory	of	relations	by	closely	comparing	the	contents	of	
the	EU’s	first	Security	Strategy	(published	in	the	wake	of	the	Iraq	invasion)	with	
its	American	 counterpart	 (Peterson	 and	Dannreuther,	 2006).	Others	posed	 the	
question	of	whether	 the	present	 crisis	was	driven	by	personality	or	by	deeper	
trends	 (Anderson	 et	 al,	 2008;	 Peterson	 and	 Pollack,	 2003).	 The	 central	
controversies	 remained	 the	 same:	 was	 policy	 divergence	 inevitable	 given	
structural	 changes,	 divergent	 views	 and	 European	 integration?	 Was	 Europe	
doing	enough	to	bolster	its	military	capabilities?	Was	NATO’s	position	as	the	pre-
eminent	 security	 alliance	under	 threat?	And	 to	what	 factors	 should	we	 look	 in	





This	 chapter	 reviewed	 primary	 sources	 and	 secondary	 literature	 on	 US	 elite	
attitudes	 to	 European	 security	 integration	 since	 1945,	 building	 a	 picture	 of	 an	
elite-driven	American	project	 to	 reconstruct	Europe	as	 a	prosperous	 continent	
within	 an	 Atlantic	 security	 framework.	 Employing	 a	 review	 of	 secondary	
literature	 analysis	 and	 primary	 archival	 research,	 the	 chapter	 presented	 the	
dominant	 themes	 that	 have	 shaped	 US	 elite	 attitudes	 from	 the	 Eisenhower	
administration	 up	 until	 the	 present	 day.	 Although	 no	 period	 was	 marked	 by	
unfettered	 enthusiasm	 or	 hostility,	 a	 pattern	 of	 growing	 scepticism	 was	
identified	 from	 the	 Kennedy	 administration	 onwards.	 Bureaucratic	 divisions	
became	 more	 marked	 from	 the	 1970s	 onwards,	 with	 the	 Europeanist	 State	
Department	 struggling	 to	 retain	 its	pre-eminent	position	 in	 foreign	policy.	The	
post-Cold	War	 Era	 saw	 an	 intensification	 of	 the	 debate	 over	 the	 future	 of	 the	







NATO	 Alliance;	 the	 institutional	 symbol	 of	 American	 security	 leadership.	 The	
review	 of	 these	 themes	 and	 events	 demonstrates	 the	 influential	 role	 of	 a	









decision	 makers	 apply	 when	 engaging	 with	 the	 EU	 is	 shaped	 in	 part	 by	 the	
experience	of	 their	predecessors	and	the	“lessons”	that	were	 learned	about	the	
European	 security	 integration	 since	 1945.	 The	 official	 historical	 record	 of	 this	
time	 period	 therefore	 is,	 in	 itself,	 a	 cognitive	 and	 normative	 discursive	
framework	 that	 contemporary	 officials	 employ	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 European	
security	integration.	As	Brian	Friel	wrote:	“it	is	images	of	the	past,	embodied	in	
language”	that	shape	us,	and	our	understandings	of	the	World	(Friel	1981;	445).		
Thus	 it	 would	 be	 foolish	 to	 embark	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 contemporary	 US	 elite	













“Very	 frequently	 the	 ‘world	 images’	 that	 have	 been	 created	 by	 ideas	 have,	 like	
switchmen,	 determined	 the	 tracks	 along	 which	 action	 has	 been	 pushed	 by	 the	
dynamic	of	interest”			
	






Europe	 in	 discourse	 and	 what	 effects	 do	 these	 processes	 have?	 This	 chapter	
argues	that	only	a	narrow	elite	hold	 ideas	about	the	EU	that	are	consequential	
for	 policymaking.	 Ideas	 matter,	 but	 not	 all	 ideas	 are	 created	 equally.	 This	
analysis,	 based	 on	 a	 critical	 review	 of	 literature	 on	 public	 influences	 on	 US	
foreign	policy	making,	 rejects	alternative	 investigations	of	public	attitudes	and	
broad	elite	opinions	 in	 favour	of	an	 interpretive	discourse	analysis	of	a	 tightly	
defined	 elite	 community	 with	 a	 plausible	 claim	 to	 policy	 influence.	 More	
broadly,	 the	 chapter	 highlights	 how	 the	 role	 of	 ideas	 in	 policymaking	 is	
neglected	 within	 “objective	 interest”	 approaches,	 which	 take	 interests	 as	
exogenous	 to	 ideational	 factors.	 Only	 by	 employing	 a	 thin	 constructivist	
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approach	can	we	fully	investigate	the	discursive	processes	by	which	sub-groups	
within	 an	 influential	 policy	 community	 exchange	 ideas	 and	 compete	 for	
dominance.	
	
Section	 3.1	 situates	 the	 thesis	 within	 an	 interpretive	 constructivist	 approach	
that	 focuses	 on	 the	 role	 of	 discourse	 in	 creating	 meaning	 in	 international	
politics.	The	section	will	contrast	this	approach	with	objective	interest	accounts	
of	 international	 politics,	 which	 neglect	 the	 role	 of	 ideational	 factors	 in	
policymaking.	Sections	3.2	and	3.3	will	explain	how	the	study	will	be	conducted	
using	 a	 discursive	 institutionalist	 approach,	 which	 allows	 us	 to	 interpret	 and	
analyse	the	competition	of	ideas	within	the	US	foreign	policy	elite.	The	sections	
will	 also	 show	 how	 narratives	 act	 as	 both	 carriers	 of	 ideas	 that	 channel	
behaviour	and	also	as	constructs	that	agents	consciously	re-mould	according	to	
their	preferences.	It	will	define	and	analyse	the	key	concepts	introduced	in	the	
previous	 chapter,	 namely	discourse,	 the	 forms	 that	 ideas	 take	 therein	 and	 the	
processes	by	which	they	become	successfully	established.	The	final	section	(3.4)	
provides	 the	 justification	 for	 focusing	 our	 analysis	 on	 a	 tightly	 defined	 elite	
community,	rather	than	alternative	levels	of	policymaking	influencers	(i.e:	broad	
elite,	 public	 opinion,	 etc.).	 It	 also	 argues	 against	 a	 standard	 “epistemic	
communities,”	 approaches	 to	 Washington	 think	 tanks	 by	 highlighting	 the	
ideologically	diverse	and	competitive	nature	of	the	think	tank	community,	thus	
strengthening	 the	 case	 for	 an	 analysis	 of	 purposeful	 discursive	 competition	
within	the	elite.	
	
The	 chapter	 poses	 a	 number	 of	 questions:	 which	 theoretical	 school	 within	
international	relations	best	explores	the	relationship	between	ideas	and	policy?	
What	theoretical	approach	best	allows	us	to	understand	how	competing	groups	
advance	 ideas	 about	 the	 EU	 through	 discourse?	 And	 how	 should	 we	
conceptualise	 the	US	 foreign	policy	elite	 in	 a	way	 that	 focuses	our	analysis	on	













Examining	 the	 nature	 of	 elite	 discourse	 implies	 a	 number	 of	 theoretical	 steps	
which	should	be	made	explicit,	justified	and	placed	within	the	broader	debate	on	
the	 role	 of	 ideas	 in	 security	 studies.	 A	 constructivist	 analysis	 of	 the	 role	 of	
discourse	at	the	domestic	level	of	analysis	differs	from	conventional	studies	that	
employ	 structural	 explanations	 of	 “rational”	 state	 behaviour.	 Constructivists	
argue	 that	we	can	only	access	 the	social	world	via	our	ways	of	categorizing	 it.	
Rather	 than	providing	mirror	 images	of	objective	 reality,	human	knowledge	 is	
viewed	as	 a	 socially	 contingent	phenomenon,	made	up	of	 ideas,	 identities	 and	
interests	that	vary	depending	on	context	(Larsen,	2004).	This	approach	does	not	
assume	 that	 interests	 are	 self-evident	 facts,	 but	 instead	 analyses	 interests	 as	
endogenous	 to	 ideas,	 identities	 and	 beliefs	 (Hopf,	 1999,	 Wendt,	 1999).	
Ideational	factors	are	not	merely	intervening	variables,	but	are	analysed	as	the	
building	blocks	of	a	discursive	construction	with	consequences	 for	 ‘real	world’	
outcomes.	 Ideas	 and	 beliefs	 matter	 because	 they	 provide	 meaning	 for	 both	
subjects	 and	 objects	 and	 thus	 produce	 different	 actions	 and	 modes	 of	
organization	(Checkel,	2004).	
	








given	 state	 interests	 (Waltz	 1978,	 Mearsheimer,	 2001).	 Constructivists	
identified	two	problems	arising	from	this	assumption:	the	first	criticism	relates	
to	the	relationship	between	interests	and	ideas,	the	second	relates	to	the	level	of	
analysis.	 Structural	 realists	 view	 states	 as	 unitary	 actors	 operating	 with	 pre-
given	 interests,	 derived	 from	 self-evident	 instrumental	 logic	 arising	 from	 the	
anarchic	 structure	 of	 the	 international	 system.	 But	 as	 constructivists	 argued,	
anarchy	must	be	interpreted	to	have	meaning	–	anarchy	is	what	states	make	of	it	
(Wendt,	1999).	Taking	the	state	as	a	rational	agent	creates	other	difficulties;	can	
states	 really	 behave	 in	 the	 economic	 mode	 of	 a	 self-interest	 maximising	
individual?	Neo-realists	sidestep	this	by	taking	states	as	agents,	given	that	they	
are	 assumed	 to	 be	 rational	 and	 unitary	 actors	 (Waltz,	 2001).	 Secondly,	 neo-
realists,	for	the	most	part,	adopt	a	“black	box”	approach	to	the	state,	bracketing	
sub-state	 factors,	 such	 as	 competing	 domestic	 interest	 groups,	 or	 relegating	
them	to	a	second-order	position.	Ideological	affinities	and	political	proximity	are	
referred	to	by	some	Realist	writers	as	relevant	but	not	decisive	in	core	questions	
of	 security	 (Walt,	 1987).	 This	 minimalist	 approach	 to	 international	 politics	





Liberal	 approaches	 do	 better	 at	 addressing	 the	 level	 of	 analysis	 question	 by	
postulating	 that	 state	 foreign	 policy	 is	 a	 complex	 amalgam	 of	 domestic	 and	
international	factors.	Foreign	policy	choices	are	analysed	as	aggregate	outcomes	
determined	 by	 the	 choices	 of	 domestic-level	 micro-actors,	 whose	 preferences	
are	at	a	later	stage	mediated	by	systemic	factors,	the	preferences	of	other	states,	
so	that	the	generation	of	 interests	in	single	states	is	as	dependent	on	domestic	
factors	 as	 it	 is	 interdependent	 with	 the	 interests	 of	 other	 states	 (Moravcsik	
1997).	Policymaking	is	viewed	as	a	porous	process,	vulnerable	to	politicisation	
by	competing	domestic	interest	groups	(Chadwick,	Alger,	1977).	This	opens	up	
new	 units	 of	 analysis	 for	 IR	 scholars;	 regime	 types,	 public	 opinion,	 political	
parties,	bureaucracies,	cross-national	coalitions,	etc.	The	1980s	and	1990s	saw	
new	moves	 in	 Liberalism	 to	 theorise	 patterns	 of	 domestic	 interest	 formation	
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But	 on	 the	 question	 of	 interests,	 and	 how	 they	 come	 to	 be	 understood,	 neo-
liberal	 writers	 continue	 to	 view	 ideas	 as	 only	 intervening	 variables	 between	
states	maximizing	security	in	the	context	in	the	anarchic	system	(Waever	2002,	
21).	Liberal	 intergovernmentalist	writers	 like	Moravcsik	remained	reluctant	 to	
wander	 down	 the	 sociological	 path	 and	 retained	 state	 rationality	 as	 a	 core	
assumption	 (Moravcsik,	 1998).	 Simplifying	 policy	 behaviour	 by	 adopting	 the	
assumption	of	 rationality	provides	useful	models	of	behaviour	 for	phenomena	
but	it	achieves	this	at	the	expense	of	an	ontological	simplification.	By	relying	on	
simplified	 rational	 behaviour	 assumptions,	 these	 approaches	 ignore	 the	
intersubjective	 process	 by	 which	 sub-state	 actors	 come	 to	 understand	 their	
interests	 and	 translate	 them	 into	 state	 policy,	 in	ways	 that	 are	 not	materially	
pre-determined.	 As	 Ted	 Hopf	 argued,	 ideational	 politics	 in	 domestic	 settings	
constrain	 identity,	 interests	 and	 actions	 abroad	 (1988,	 196).	 Or,	 put	 more	
simply:	 the	 social	 world	 consists	 of	 “facts	 that	 are	 only	 facts	 by	 human	
agreement,”	 (Searle,	1995:	12).	The	structuralists	were	also	overtaken	by	new	
models	of	cognitive	complexity	in	decision-making	pursued	by	sociological	and	
psychological	 studies	 of	 human	 behaviour	 in	 other	 academic	 fields,	 which	
challenged	state-level	objective	interest	approaches.	
	
Some	 structural	 and	 institutional	 theorists	 acknowledged	 this	 omission	 as	 a	











Although	 he	 encouraged	 the	 development	 of	 “theories	 of	 interests,”	 Keohane	
expressed	 concern	 at	 the	 emerging	 gap	 between	 “reflectivists”	 –	 those	 who	
addressed	 ideational	 issues	 –	 and	 “rationalists”	 –	 comprised	 of	 the	 dominant	
schools	of	 international	 relations,	whose	work	was	predicated	on	a	 rationalist	
epistemology	 focussed	 upon	 testing	 causal	 hypotheses	 in	 the	 mode	 of	 the	
physical	 sciences	 (Keohane	1988).	He	 appealed	 for	 reflectivist	 enquiries	 to	 be	
conducted	 within	 a	 structure	 compatible	 with	 the	 traditional	 social	 scientific	
method	-	a	scientific	middle	ground,	where	epistemological	differences	could	be	
bridged	 by	 shared	 language	 and	 positivist	 modes	 of	 investigation.	 The	 next	
section	will	briefly	review	how	this	dissertation	responds	to	Keohane’s	appeal;	












independently	 from	 their	 objective	 positions,”	 (Parsons	 2002;	 50).	 Excluding	
social	and	ideational	factors	foreclose	fruitful	avenues	of	empirical	enquiry	and	
theoretical	 insight	 that	 could	 enhance	 our	 understanding	 of	 international	
politics	 (Katzenstein,	 1996;	 7).	 Scholars	 embracing	 the	 turn	 towards	 ideas	
ranged	 widely	 over	 the	 forms	 of	 ideas	 (programs,	 doctrines,	 paradigms,	
ideologies,	philosophy,	culture)	and	their	mode	of	operation	(through	elites,	 in	
discourse,	 in	 organizational	 settings).	 For	 neo-liberals	 Goldstein	 and	 Keohane	
(1993)	ideas	were	switches	for	 interests,	road	maps	or	focal	points.	For	Jobert	
(1989)	 and	 Muller	 (1994)	 they	 were	 “frames	 of	 reference”.	 And	 for	










contested,	 making	 it	 difficult	 to	 examine	 them	 as	 variables	 or	 explanations	
(Zehfuss	2001;	336).	As	outlined	by	Yee	(1996),	 ideas	are	usually	only	“one	of	
many	 probable	 and	 partial	 causes	 of	 policies.	 Moreover,	 since	 ideation	 and	
policy	 are	 both	 differentiated,	 seeking	 their	 connections	 across	 their	
differentiations	 become	 difficult	 and	 even	 more	 complex”	 (p.	 70).	 More	
fundamentally,	reflectivists	asserted	that	“the	material	world	that	exists	cannot	
be	 understood	 without	 shared	 intersubjective	 frameworks	 (language,	 social	
practices,	 codes,	 symbols,	etc.)	 that	offer	an	agreed	base	 for	 the	 interpretation	
and	explanation	of	‘reality,’”	(Tonra.	2006:	ch.	1).	
	
Some	 scholars	 of	 ideas	 sought	 to	 bridge	 the	 rationalist-reflectivist	
epistemological	divide.	Parsons	(2003)	aimed	to	demonstrate	 the	role	of	 ideas	
as	 causal	 variables,	 by	 demonstrating	 how	 a	 French	 elite	 conception	 of	
European	 integration	 -	 the	 Community	 model	 -	 came	 to	 shape	 the	 European	
institutions	decisively	in	the	period	of	1947	–	1997.	This	outcome	could	not	be	
explained	 by	 reference	 only	 to	 material	 factors	 forming	 “objective	 interests.”	
Parson’s	theoretical	proposition	was	that	in	settings	where	ideas	strongly	cross-
cut	 lines	of	shared	material	 interests,	we	can	clearly	 isolate	 individuals'	beliefs	
from	objective	 pressures,	 thus	 demonstrating	 the	 autonomous	 effects	 of	 ideas	
(Ibid).	 But	 the	 approach	 restricts	 examination	 of	 the	 role	 of	 ideas	 to	 a	 small	
universe	 of	 demonstrable	 cases	 and	 precludes	 an	 examination	 of	 ideas	 in	




More	 significantly,	 the	 price	 of	 Parsons’	 entry	 into	 rationalist	 terms	 of	
explanation	 was	 sacrificing	 the	 crucial	 constructivist	 assumption	 that	 the	
meanings	 actors	 attribute	 to	 material	 interests	 are	 socially	 constructed	 and	
culturally	specific.	While	there	may	be	a	reality	of	subjects	and	objects	existing	
outside	 of	 socially	 constructed	 ideas,	 it	 is	 only	 through	 shared	 intersubjective	
understandings	 that	 subjects,	 objects	 and	 concepts	 come	 to	 be	 imbued	 with	
meaning.	This	dissertation	integrates	this	assumption	in	what	is	best	described	
as	a	“thin	constructivist”	epistemological	approach,	which	foregrounds	the	role	
of	 ideas	while	 seeking	 traditional	 laws	 of	 social	 reality	 (Checkel	 2004,	Wendt	
1999).	 Arising	 from	 the	 acknowledgement	 that	 intersubjective	 ideas	 shape	
policymakers’	 conceptions	 of	 their	 interests,	 thus	 shaping	 their	 actions,	 our	
objective	is	to	understand	how	ideas	about	European	security	action,	conveyed	
through	competing	elite	discourses,	 come	 to	gain	acceptance	as	 reasonable,	or	
even	 common	sense,	 explanations	 for	 complex	aspects	 for	 the	EU’s	behaviour.	





The	previous	 sections	 have	 traced	 the	 debate	 among	 scholars	 of	 international	
politics	 about	 the	 role	 of	 ideas	 in	 shaping	 policy;	 from	 structural	 theorists	
bracketing	 rationality,	 sub-state	 policy	 dynamics	 and	 the	 socially	 constructed	
nature	of	interests	to	thin	constructivist	research	that	has	sought	to	carve	out	a	












While	 some	 scholars	 sought	 to	 examine	 the	 influence	 of	 ideas	 through	
institutions	 (Sikkink	 1999,	 Goldstein	 1993,	 Hall	 1986)	 and	 others	 sought	 to	
explore	 the	 role	 of	 experts	 as	 bearers	 of	 ideas	 (Haas	1992),	 these	 approaches	
tend	 to	 obscure	 analysis	 of	 the	 ideas	 themselves	 by	 focusing	 on	 institutional	
context	 and	political	 conditions.	 If,	 as	Hall	 argues,	 institutions	 of	 this	 kind	 are	
“critical	 mediating	 variables”	 while	 the	 ideas	 themselves	 are	 “the	 ultimate	
motors	of	political	action,”	then	a	theoretical	focus	on	the	ideas	–	as	expressed	
through	discourse	–	can	enhance	the	institutional	approach	(Hall	1992,	109).		An	
approach	 that	 focuses	on	patterns	of	 ideas	 as	discourse	offers	 the	prospect	 of	
greater	 insight	 into	 the	 nature,	 form	 and	 discursive	 processes	 of	 the	 ideas	
themselves	 and	 not	 other	 intervening	 variables.	 These	 observations	 underpin	
the	theoretical	approach	of	this	thesis,	which	seeks	to	examine	the	competition	
of	elite	ideas	in	discourse	on	the	nature	of	the	EU	as	a	security	actor.	The	field	of	
discourse	 analysis	 is	 wide	 and	 extends	 across	 differing	 epistemological	
positions.	 This	 section	 will	 outline	 the	 theoretical	 assumptions	 made	 in	 this	




For	 postmodernists,	 who	 emphasise	 the	 linguistic	 construction	 of	 reality,	
language	is	seen	not	as	a	property	concept	that	acts	as	a	tool	of	a	given	subject	
or	a	constraint	on	him,	but	rather	“a	medium	through	which	the	social	identity	
of	 the	 subject	 is	 made	 possible”	 (George	 and	 Campbell	 1990,	 2850)24.	 This	
Foucauldian	 approach	 sees	 discourse	 as	 not	 merely	 a	 collection	 of	 signs	 and	
identifiers	but	rather	as	a	practice	that	systematically	forms	social	subjects	and	
their	related	objects.	The	approach	sprung	 from	the	work	of	French	structural	
linguist	 Ferdinand	 de	 Saussure’s	 relational	 theory	 of	 language,	 which	 posited	











and	 intervention.	 Constructivists	 –	 both	 critical	 and	 conventional	 -	 attend	 to	
how	 discourses	 perform	 numerous	 functions	 that	 give	 meaning	 to	 the	 way	
people	 understand	 and	 explain	 reality.	 Discourses	 create	 boundaries	 between	
what	is	constructed	is	“real”	and	“that	which,	by	discursive	definition,	does	not	
correspond	with	 reality,”	 (George	1994,	29-30).	 In	particular,	poststructuralist	
discourse	 analysts	 seek	 to	 unveil	 the	 role	 of	 hegemonic	 discourses	 in	
establishing	 “regimes	 of	 truth,”	 that	 distinguish	 between	 truth	 and	 falsehood	
and	 between	 reality	 and	 nonsense.	 While	 post-structuralist	 or	 “thick	
constructivists”	 and	 middle-ground	 “thin”	 reflectivists	 share	 the	 ontological	
assumption	 that	 our	 reality	 is	 socially	 constructed,	 post-structuralism	 rejects	
attempts	 at	 causal	 or	 even	 “quasi-causal”	 epistemology,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 an	





scholars	 to	avoid	causal	explanations,	 instead	embracing	causal	 indeterminacy	
and	the	ambiguity	of	interpretations.	For	these	scholars,	a	search	for	causation	
is	 a	 misguided	 quest	 for	 connections	 in	 a	 world	 where	 causation	 is	
indeterminate,	 impermanent	 and	 intangible.	 And	 yet,	 acknowledging	 that	
objects	and	policies	are	imbued	with	meaning	that	is	outside	material	form,	and	















If,	 at	 one	 extreme	 of	 this	 debate,	 we	 place	 behaviouralists	 such	 as	 Parsons	
(2003),	 who	 seek	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 causal	 effects	 of	 ideas	 by	 using	 semi-
controlled	experiments	within	circumscribed	contexts	and	at	the	other	end	we	
place	 post-modernists,	 who	 reject	 a	 causal	 focus	 entirely,	 are	 there	 any	
prospects	for	combining	explanatory	models	with	an	appreciation	of	the	role	of	
ideational	 factors	 in	 policymaking?	 This	 dissertation	 adopts	 a	 pragmatic	
approach,	 which	 rejects	 the	 sharp	 dichotomy	 between	 explaining	 and	
understanding,	 instead	adopting	 a	 framework	exploring	how	 ideas	 and	beliefs	
come	to	be	established	as	important	factors	and	then	shape	policy	outcomes	in	
discernible	 ways.	 Such	 an	 approach	 can	 be	 both	 theoretically	 coherent	 and	
methodologically	self-aware.	
	




the	 meaning	 subjects	 ascribe	 to	 objects,	 or	 in	 our	 case,	 actors	 ascribe	 to	 the	
behaviour	 of	 the	 EU,	 we	 can	 approach	 a	 better	 framework	 for	 understanding	
why	certain	policy	responses	become	more	or	less	plausible,	acceptable	or	valid	






Others	 and	 policy	 responses.”	 Adopting	 these	 observations	 as	 fundamental	




reflectivists:	 neither	 adopting	 the	 positivist	 presumption	 that	world	 politics	 is	
homogenous	 enough	 that	 universally	 generalizable	 rules	 can	 be	 generated	 in	
theory,	but	also	rejecting	the	poststructuralist	position	that	“world	politics	is	so	
heterogeneous	 that	 we	 should	 presume	 to	 look	 for	 only	 the	 unique	 and	 the	
differentiating,”	 (Hopf,	 1998:	 199).	 Scholars	 can	 acknowledge	 semantic	
instability,	 the	 multiple	 and	 uncertain	 nature	 of	 causation	 and	 the	
indeterminacy	 of	 intentional	 action,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 seeking	 to	
demonstrate,	 within	 appropriate	 methodological	 boundaries,	 the	 manner	 in	
which	 ideas	 come	 to	 be	 accepted	 and	 cases	 where	 this	 process	 shaped	
outcomes.	The	 concept	of	 “quasi-causal”	 explanations	 is	 an	appeal	 to	 a	 shared	
dialogue	 between	 the	 differing	 traditions	 outlined	 on	 the	 role	 of	 ideas,	
recognising	 that	 “interpretive	 indeterminacy	 can	 be	 subordinated	 to	 the	





that	 cross-cuts	 “objective”	 interests.	 It	 is	 a	 hermeneutic	 epistemological	
approach,	based	on	 relativist	 ontological	 grounds.	But	 it	 can	allow	us	 to	 show	
how	 intersubjective	meanings	 firstly	 come	 to	 be	 established	 and	 then	 “quasi-
causally	 affect	 certain	 actions”	 by	 widening	 or	 narrowing	 the	 envelope	 of	
socially	 acceptable	 actions.	 The	 approach	 fits	 within	 a	 conventional	
constructivist	middle	ground	that	seeks	out	how	shared	understandings	within	
“communities	of	intersubjectivity,”	yield	“predictable	and	replicable	patterns	of	
action	 within	 a	 specific	 context,”	 (Hopf,	 1998:	 200).	 A	 methodologically	 self-
aware	 approach	 in	 this	 vein	 aims	 therefore,	 not	 to	 derive	 definitive	 causal	





domestic-level	 actors	 and	 analyses	 how	 their	 beliefs,	 intentions	 and	 language	
are	expressed	within	a	competitive	discursive	environment.	Specifically,	the	unit	
of	 analysis	 is	 the	 discourse	 of	 a	 foreign	 policy	 élite	 on	 the	 EU’s	 role	 and	 the	
factors	operating	thereon.	Once	we	have	analysed	that	discourse,	observing	the	
cognitive	 and	normative	 ideas	 that	 channel	 political	 action	 in	 particular	ways,	
the	 task	 is	 to	 analyse	 why	 certain	 narratives	 came	 to	 dominate	 within	 that	







This	dissertation	applies	a	discursive	 institutionalist	 approach	 in	 line	with	 the	
ontological	 and	 epistemological	 positions	 outlined	 in	 the	 preceding	 sections.	
Schmidt’s	 approach	defines	 discourse	 as	 “the	 interactive	 process	 of	 conveying	
ideas,”	 (2008,	 303).	 Additionally,	 discourse	 is	 analysed	 not	merely	 as	 ideas	 in	
text	 (what	 is	 said)	 but	 also	 context	 (where,	 when,	 how	 and	 why	 it	 is	 said).	
Schmidt’s	 approach	 presents	 several	 advantages	 over	 analysts	 who	 examine	
ideas	 in	 isolation,	 chiefly	 that	 it	 makes	 explicit	 the	 interactive	 processes	 of	
discourse	 that	are	vital	 to	 the	generation,	discussion	and	competition	of	 those	
ideas	 (Ibid,	 306).	 The	 approach	 also	 clearly	 conceptualises	 differing	 types	 of	
ideas	(cognitive,	normative),	 forms	of	 ideas	(narratives,	myths,	memories,	etc.)	
and	 audiences	 or	 contexts	 (coordinative	 discourse,	 communicative	 discourse)	
(Ibid).	
	
Adopting	 this	 framework,	 with	 some	 modifications,	 allows	 us	 to	 assess	
discursive	models	 that	 explain	why	 some	 ideas,	 conveyed	 through	 narratives,	
thrive	 and	 others	 disappear.	 It	 also	 means	 we	 can	 distinguish	 between	 the	




between	policy	actors	 in	 the	policy	development	process	 (Ibid,	310).	Adopting	
this	 approach,	 which	 analyses	 the	 form	 and	 type	 of	 ideas,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
discursive	process	and	context,	provides	us	with	conceptual	clarity	and	allows	
us	 to	 explore	how	 “institutionalized	 structures	 of	meaning	…	 channel	 political	
thought	and	action	in	certain	directions,”	(Connolly,	1983).	
	
This	 approach	 strips	 discourse	 of	 its	 post-modernist	 baggage,	 analysing	 it	
directly	 as	 the	 way	 people	 talk	 about	 ideas,	 paying	 close	 attention	 to	 the	
interactive	processes	by	which	they	convey	them.	It	also	permits	us	to	approach	
Yee’s	 challenge	 of	 examining	 how	 the	 terms	 of	 particular	 discourses	 render	
certain	 actions	 plausible	 or	 implausible,	 appropriate	 or	 inappropriate	 and	 in	

















creating	 codes	 of	 language	 that	 as	 act	 as	 heuristics,	 or	 shorthand,	 for	 shared	
ideas	 about	 reality,	 which	 are	 inter-subjectively	 created	 and	 re-created.	
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Observing	discourse	as	 the	process	 through	which	 ideas	are	conveyed,	we	can	
identify	 four	 functions	 of	 narratives	 as	 outlined	 by	 Bach,	 providing	 us	with	 a	
useful	schema	for	understanding	this	process.	The	functions	are	as	 follows:	To	
order,	 to	delimit,	 to	perpetuate	and	 to	challenge	 (Bach	1999,	quoted	 in	Tonra,	
2007).	
	
Firstly,	narratives	order	 the	world	by	presenting	us	with	 “cognitive	 ideas”	 that	
tell	us	“what	is	and	what	to	do,”	(Schmidt	2008,	307).	These	types	of	ideas	–	also	
described	 as	 frames	 -	 act	 as	 templates	 for	 understanding	 a	 multitude	 of	
phenomena	 and	 actors.	 Cognitive	 ideas	 order	 and	 explain	 phenomena,	 and	 as	
time	goes	on,	successful	narratives	incorporate	and	assimilate	new	information	
into	these	frames.	The	diversity	of	Europe	and	the	complexity	of	its	institutional	
structure	are	expressed	 in	numerous	 frames,	which	we	will	seek	to	examine	 in	
later	chapters.	
	
Secondly,	 narratives	 delimit,	 by	 adjudicating	 between	 many	 competing	
understandings	or	reports	of	events	or	facts	and	producing	a	manageable	set	of	
understandable	stories.	These	stories	assert	objectivity	or	“truth	claims”	(Tonra,	
2007),	 which	 claim	 to	 present	 reality	 as	 it	 is	 “in	 fact”.	 These	 discursive	
constructions	assert	authoritative	interpretations	as	“truth”	or	“common	sense”	
and	 maintain	 those	 understandings	 through	 discursive	 practices.	 Narratives	
“mark	 out	 the	 range	 of	 legitimate	 possibilities”	 for	 actors	 (Idem,	 p.10)	 and	 in	
policy	settings,	 they	can	produce	“normative	 frames”	attaching	values	 to	policy	
action	and	legitimating	political	programs	by	reference	to	their	appropriateness	
(see	March	&	Olsen	1989).	In	this	vein,	the	approach	borrows	from	earlier	works	




Thirdly,	 narratives	 have	 a	 self-perpetuating	 function.	 Coherent	 narratives	 seek	
discursive	 dominance	 through	 being	 instantiated	 or	 embedded	 successfully,	
perhaps	 even	 becoming	 elements	 of	 dominant	 ideologies	 or	 identities.	 This	 is	
when	 a	 narrative	 achieves	 something	 close	 to	 acceptance	 as	 “common	 sense”.	
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This	 process	 is	 not	 static	 however.	 Narratives	 are	 constructed	 in	 inherently	









Cognitive	 ideas:	 “provide	 the	recipes,	guidelines,	and	maps	 for	political	action	
and	 serve	 to	 justify	 policies	 and	 programs	 by	 speaking	 to	 their	 interest-based	
logic	and	necessity”		
	






institutionalism	 not	 as	 external	 rule-following	 structures	 but	 rather	 as	
simultaneously	 structures	 and	 constructs	 internal	 to	 agents.	 This	 approach	
challenges	the	premise	of	the	“old	institutionalisms”;	historical	 institutionalism,	
rational	 institutionalism	 and	 sociological	 institutionalism,	 that	 institutions	 are	
mostly	 in	 stable	 equilibria.	 Whereas	 sociological	 institutionalists,	 for	 instance,	
describe	 all-encompassing	 cultural	 norms	 as	 fixed	 and	 unmoving,	 discursive	
institutionalism	 provides	 a	 theory	 of	 dynamic	 change.	 By	 using	 their	
“background	 ideational	 abilities”	within	 a	 given	 “meaning	 context”	we	 can	 see	
how	agents	come	to	understand,	and	operate	within	discursive	structures.	Those	







how	 these	 institutions	 change	or	 persist.	 This	 purposeful	 behaviour	 resembles	
what	 Habermas	 describes	 as	 “communicative	 action,”	 (1996).	 Thus,	 discursive	
institutionalism	 “simultaneously	 treats	 institutions	 as	 given	 (as	 the	 context	
within	which	agents	think,	speak,	and	act)	and	as	contingent	 (as	the	results	of	
agents’	 thoughts,	 words,	 and	 actions,”	 (2008,	 314).	 By	 treating	 institutions	 as	
simultaneously	structures	and	constructs	internal	to	agents,	Schmidt’s	approach	





itself	 as	 a	 group	 of	 ideologically	 diverse,	 critical	 analysts.	 A	 discursive	




in	 communicative	 and	 coordinative	 discourses	 (see	 fig	 3.3).	 Our	 analysis	 will	
analyse	 the	 types	of	 ideas	expressed;	both	normative	and	cognitive.	 It	will	also	
examine	the	discursive	strategies	of	actors	seeking	to	convey	 ideas	by	 focusing	


























an	 ideologically	 and	 institutionally	 heterogeneous	 group	 –	 provides	 a	 lively	
arena	 for	 observing	 discursive	 competition	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 EU.	 The	
“marketplace	of	ideas”	should	offer	the	discourse	analyst	a	rich	and	varied	set	of	
perceptions	 of	most	 foreign	 actors,	 but	 especially	 so	 in	 the	 EU’s	 case,	 a	much-
contested	 concept	 (Holland	 and	 Chalaban	 2010,	 Manners	 and	Whitman	 2010,	
232).	The	next	section	will	 lay	out	the	modifications	which	will	be	made	to	the	
discursive	 institutionalist	 approach,	which	 address	 criticisms	 that	mechanisms	
of	 institutional	 change	are	underspecified	by	Schmidt	and	propose	a	model	 for	






We	 have	 sketched	 out	 a	 picture	 so	 far	 which	 paints	 a	 dynamic	 relationship	
between	 narratives	 and	 ideas.	 Certain	 cognitive	 and	 normative	 ideas	 become	
expressed	 through	 narratives,	 which	 then	 can	 shape	 the	 conduct	 of	 actors	 by	




precise	 ways	 in	 which	 discourses	 become	 established,	 persist	 and	 are	 then	
reshaped	remains	underspecified	 in	Schmidt’s	 framework.	Panizza	and	Miorelli	
(2013)	 have	 called	 for	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 intervening	 steps	 that	 connect	
agent-level	 action	 and	 institutional	 change,	 and	 more	 broadly,	 the	 power	
relations	 at	 work	 in	 this	 action.	 How	 can	 we	 understand	 how	 a	 particular	
narrative	succeeds	where	others	fail,	for	instance?	Why	do	actors	seek	discursive	
change	 and	 what	 power	 resources	 do	 they	 marshal	 when	 exercising	 their	
foreground	 discursive	 abilities?	 Discourse	 theory	 tells	 us	 that	 successful	
narratives	 (i.e.,	 those	 that	 can	 become	 instantiated	 or	 accepted	 as	 common	
knowledge)	 must	 possess	 a	 number	 of	 basic	 qualities	 to	 persist	 (Milliken,	
1999)25 .	 But	 these	 accounts	 merely	 outline	 the	 general	 qualities	 of	 sticky	
narratives;	they	neglect	explanations	of	discursive	change.	How	does	a	particular	




engaging	 their	 foreground	 discursive	 abilities,	 the	 processes	 by	 which	 these	
individual-level	acts	 come	 to	 shape	 the	pattern	of	discourse	 in	a	wider	context	
remains	 an	 unsolved	 puzzle.	 How	 exactly	 do	 micro-level	 discursive	 actions	
produce	macro-level	institutional	change?	This	gap	requires	a	theoretical	bridge	
connecting	 agent-level	 activity	 to	 structural	 transformation.	 This	 dissertation	
seeks	to	enhance	the	discursive	institutionalist	approach	by	specifying	processes	



















financial	 resources	 and	 access	 to	 the	 means	 of	 publicity.	 Having	 acquired	
influence	 of	 this	 kind,	 elite	 actors	 promote	 ideas	 and	 perceptions	 of	 the	
international	 system,	 its	 actors	 and	 phenomena	 in	 line	 with	 their	 political	 or	
ideological	 preferences.	 As	 Checkel	 (2004)	 argues,	 the	 discourse	 of	 political	
elites	at	the	government	level	matters	most,	because	their	 ideas	are	articulated	
in	authoritative	institutional	settings	with	strong	persuasive	power	(240).	But	so	
too,	 does	 the	 discourse	 of	 major	 think	 tanks	 who	 exercise	 differing	 forms	 of	
scholarly	 and	 political	 authority	 in	 the	 policy-making	 system	 (Medvetz,	 2012).	
According	 this	 competitive	 view,	 normative	 structures	 –	 narratives	 about	 the	
nature	 and	 desirability	 of	 EU	 action	 -	 are	 themselves	 being	 reshaped	 by	 the	
activities	 of	 purposeful	 agents,	 using	 their	 foreground	 discursive	 abilities	
(Schmidt	 2008,	 Checkel	 1998,	 341).	 This	 can	 happen	 in	 a	 top-down	 fashion:	
when	 leaders	 or	 elites	 utilize	 their	 position	 and	 re-shape	 norms	 or	 identities.	
This	is	more	likely	to	succeed	in	the	absence	of	public	pressure	or	countervailing	
domestic	forces.	It	is	also	possible	that	certain	ideas	about	external	actors	could	
make	 their	way	 into	 official	 discourse	 from	 the	 bottom	 up:	 domestic	 pressure	
groups	 could	 exercise	 influence	 on	 elites	 to	 change	 policy	 in	 accordance	 with	
these	 ideas	(Sikkink	1999).	As	will	be	discussed	 in	section	3.4	however,	 that	 is	
unlikely	 in	matters	of	 foreign	policy	and	particularly	when	 it	 comes	 to	Europe.	
More	 plausibly,	 elites	 that	 establish	 an	 influential	 discursive	 position	 by	
leveraging	 expertise,	 resources	 and	 access	 to	 decision-makers	 can	 act	 as	
effective	and	purposeful	agents	in	discursive	change	(see	section	3.4).	
	
It	 should	 be	 acknowledged	 that	 proposing	 a	 domestic	 agent-centred	model	 of	
discourse	 construction	 is	 not	 an	 uncontroversial	 move.	 For	much	 of	 the	 early	
years	of	Constructivism,	scholars	pursued	mostly	structure-centred	approaches	
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to	 idea	 construction,	 this	 despite	 their	 acknowledgement	 that	 agent	 and	
structure	 are	 mutually	 constituted.	 Influential	 social	 constructivists	 –	 in	
particular	 Wendt	 –	 explicitly	 bracket	 individual	 agency	 and	 domestic	 factors,	
leading	to	a	notable	gap	in	Wendtian	scholarship	(1999).	
	
For	 our	 purposes,	 we	 can	 assume	 that	 individuals	 or	 sub-groups	 within	 the	




unofficial,	 and	 this	 feature	 of	 the	 community	 turns	 what	 might	 otherwise	 be	
inconsequential	 individual	 agents,	 into	 larger,	 more	 powerful	 organised	 sub-
groups.	 Actors	 in	 think	 tanks	 stake	 a	 claim	 to	 expertise	 and	 sophisticated	
understandings	 of	 complex	 issues,	 and	 use	 privileged	 access	 to	 foreign	 policy	
makers	 and	 a	 toolkit	 of	 resources	 to	 advance	 proposals.	 Thus	 it	 seems	
reasonable	to	expect	that	the	tools	identified	by	Sikkink	and	Finnemore	might	be	
used	by	our	sources	to	promote	certain	 ideas	about	Europe.	The	expectation	 is	
that	 if	 any	 of	 these	 particular	 sub-groups	 advocate	 distinct	 narratives	 about	
Europe’s	role,	then	coding	the	discursive	findings	for	ideology,	political	affiliation	
or	bureaucratic	position	should	reveal	this.	Our	first	examination	of	the	pattern	























This	dissertation	consists	of	a	domestic	 level	analysis	of	 the	 factors	 influencing	
foreign	policy	discourse.	Yet	adopting	a	focus	on	the	role	of	ideas	and	discourse	
within	 the	 domestic	 sphere	 is	 but	 a	 starting	 point.	 This	 section	 builds	 on	 the	
historical	evidence	presented	in	the	preceding	chapter,	which	illustrated	the	role	
of	 elite	 groups	 in	 shaping	 US	 policy	 towards	 European	 integration	 in	 the	 post	





us	 with	 choices	 as	 to	 which	 domestic	 actors	 are	 most	 significant	 for	 our	
purposes.	 Whose	 ideas	 matter?	 And	 in	 which	 domestic	 context?	 This	 section	
critically	 assesses	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 relative	 influence	 of	 elites	 on	 US	 policy	
towards	European	integration	as	compared	with	the	impact	of	mass	opinion.	The	
























Scholars	 have	 long	 debated	 the	 relative	 influence	 of	 mass	 opinion	 ideas	 on	
foreign	 policy	 outcomes,	 as	 compared	 to	 that	 of	 individual	 decision	 makers,	
bureaucracies,	 elites	 and	 parties.28	In	 a	 transatlantic	 relations	 context,	 several	
scholars	 identify	 mass	 public	 opinion	 trends	 as	 important	 drivers	 of	 policy	







Marshall	 Fund	 have	 conducted	 annual	 opinion	 surveys	 of	 US	 public	 views	 on	
European	 issues	 and	 vice	 versa	 (Transatlantic	 Trends	 2003	 -	 2012,	 German	
Marshall	Fund).	These	studies	focus	primarily	on	opinion	poll	findings	on	topics	
such	 as	 transatlantic	 security,	NATO	and	 the	 rise	 of	 other	 powers	 and	present	
















indirectly	 at	 least,	 shapes	 foreign	 policy	 choices	 in	 significant	 ways	 by	 either	
being	 of	 interest	 to	 policymakers	 in	 their	 decision	 calculations,	 by	 shaping	 the	
contours	of	the	debate	or	by	determining	the	outcome	of	elections	in	which	the	
candidates	differ	markedly	on	their	approach	to	European	questions.	In	doing	so,	
such	 works	 place	 themselves	 within	 the	much	wider	 debate	 on	 the	 impact	 of	
public	opinion	on	foreign	policy	 in	the	United	States	(Holsti	1996,	Sobel	2001).	
The	question	is	whether	it	is	the	views	of	the	public	that	should	be	the	focus	of	









Analytically	 prior	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 public	 opinion	 shapes	 foreign	 policy	 is	 the	
hypothesis	that	the	public	can	actually	form	coherent	opinions	on	foreign	policy	
questions.	 Public	 opinion	 studies	 on	 foreign	 policy	 questions	 from	 the	 1960s	
onwards	 focussed	 on	 understanding	 whether	 mass	 opinion	 beliefs	 on	 foreign	
policy	 questions	 aligned	 with	 domestic	 ideological	 cleavages	 (Campbell	 et	 al,	
1964).	For	these	scholars,	the	question	was	whether	the	general	public	thought	
about	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 policy	 choices	 in	 consistent	 ways	 and	 whether	
ideology	determined	a	 larger	belief	structure.	Converse	was	as	withering	about	
the	 consistency	 of	mass	 opinion	 belief	 structures	 as	 he	was	 about	 the	 level	 of	
knowledge	 among	 his	 subjects,	 finding	 no	 coherent	 pattern.	 Campbell	 and	 his	
colleagues	 (1964:	113)	 reported:	 "Across	our	sample	as	a	whole	 in	1956	 there	
was	no	relationship	between	scale	positions	of	individuals	on	the	domestic	and	
foreign	 attitudinal	 dimensions."	 Partisanship	 characterized	 responses	 to	











wars	 in	Afghanistan	and	 Iraq,	 the	public	 rarely	pay	 focussed	attention	 to	more	





policy	 decisions.	 As	 Canes-Wrone	 and	 Shott	 note	 in	 their	 study	 in	 presidential	
responsiveness	to	public	opinion:		
	






Scholarship	 has	 moved	 on	 since	 the	 early	 polling	 days	 of	 Converse’s	 study	 in	
1964	and	research	acknowledges	differences	between	public	opinion	on	general	
foreign	 policy	matters	 and	 the	more	 salient	 “crisis”	 foreign	 policy	 questions	 –	
which	 elicit	 more	 engagement	 from	 the	 public	 (Baum	 and	 Potter,	 2008:	 44).	
Perhaps	 the	 period	 of	 highest	 salience	 for	 transatlantic	 relations	 was	 in	 the	
immediate	 wake	 of	 the	 invasion	 of	 Iraq	 when	 surveys	 detected	 significant	
opposition	 in	 many	 European	 countries	 to	 US	 leadership	 and	 a	 frustration	 in	
some	 US	 quarters	 at	 Franco-German	 obstruction	 at	 the	 UN.	 In	 that	 year,	 the	
Transatlantic	Trends	study	developed	a	measure	of	“Atlanticism”:	“the	desire	on	
either	 side	 of	 the	 Atlantic	 to	 continue	 close	 cooperation	 and	 work	 together	
through	institutions	like	NATO,	the	U.S.-	EU	relationship	or	the	United	Nations	as	
opposed	 to	 seeking	 greater	 autonomy	 to	 go	 separate	 ways”	 (Transatlantic	
Trends,	2004).		The	study’s	findings	presented	support	for	the	argument	that	the	
general	public	had	developed	polarized	views	on	questions	of	 cooperation	and	
furthermore,	 that	 these	 aligned	 with	 deeper	 ideological	 cleavages.	 Atlanticism	
was	 stronger	 among	 centre-left	 and	 Democrat	 voters.	 Republicans	 were	more	
likely	 to	 be	 “hawks”,	 favouring	 unilateral	 military	 interventions	 and	markedly	
less	 Atlanticist.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 bear	 in	mind	 the	 context	 for	 this	 pattern	 of	
public	 opinion;	 a	 post-invasion	 election	 year,	 in	 a	 period	 of	 unprecedented	
polarization	of	public	opinion	and	extremely	salient	and	divergent	foreign	policy	
choices.	Even	 the	 report’s	authors	acknowledge	 that	 such	strong	differences	 in	
opinion	on	the	question	of	Europe	were	unprecedented:	“While	partisan	foreign	






transatlantic	 politics,	 are	 these	 significant	 variables	 in	 determining	 policy	
outcomes?	 Recent	 work	 on	 the	 determinants	 of	 US	 economic	 policymaking	
examined	 a	 unique	 data	 set	 measuring	 influence	 variables	 for	 1,779	 policy	
issues,	 finding	 little	 or	 no	 impact	 for	 mass	 opinion:	 “Economic	 elites	 and	
organized	groups	representing	business	 interests	have	substantial	 independent	




the	 case	 of	 foreign	 policy.	 Several	 structural	 factors	 	 operate	 to	 limit	 the	
influence	 of	 public	 opinion	 in	 determining	 foreign	 policy	 outcomes,	 firstly;	 the	
public’s	interest	in	and	access	to	information	on	foreign	policy	and	secondly;	the	
limited	 channels	 of	 influence	 the	 public	 holds	 over	 policymakers.	 Hoese	 and	
Oppermann’s	 (2007)	 principal-agent	 model	 suggests	 that	 public	 opinion	 can	
never	 be	 a	 substantial	 driver	 of	 US	 policy	 towards	 the	 EU,	 given	 the	
informational	 costs	 to	 voters	 to	 inform	 themselves	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 identifiable	
cleavages	 between	 political	 parties	 on	 most	 transatlantic	 matters.	 Empirical	
studies	 of	 the	 relative	 influence	 of	 the	 public	 on	 national	 security	 choices	 as	
compared	with	that	of	elites	also	bear	this	out,	as	Flynn	and	Rattinger	note:	
	
Restrictions	 on	 the	 range	 of	 national	 security	 options	 open	 to	 decision	
makers	 are	 far	 more	 strongly	 imposed	 by	 the	 positions	 taken	 and	
articulated	 by	 political	 and	 social	 elites	 and	 counter-elites	 than	 by	 public	









To	 some	 degree,	 denying	 any	 form	 of	 influence	 for	 public	 opinion	 over	 policy	
towards	Europe	appears	simplistic.	Public	opinion	scholarship	has	engaged	with	
cognitive	 psychology	 studies	 to	 identify	 points	 at	 which	 foreign	 policy	 issues	
become	salient	to	voters,	yet	even	still,	these	issues	are	always	mediated	by	third	
parties.	 The	 public	must	 engage	with	 these	 questions	 as	 they	 are	mediated	 by	
news	 outlets,	 expert	 commentators	 and	 the	 political	 community	 itself	
(Druckman,	2001).	Allowing	for	limited	influence,	on	high	salience	issues,	during	
periods	of	high	public	 interest	 (on	matters	of	war,	 for	 instance)	 the	causal	 link	
therefore	remains	complicated	by	multiple	intervening	variables.	Despite	efforts	
to	 find	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 public	 sentiment	 and	 foreign	 policy,	
scholars	 struggle	 to	 convincingly	 present	 limited	 correlations	 as	 evidence	 that	
opinion	 is	guiding	policy	and	not	vice	versa.	Shapiro	and	Page	(1988)	reported	
that	 public	 opinion	 reacts	 to	 events	 “as	 these	matters	 have	been	 reported	 and	
interpreted	by	the	mass	media	and	by	policy	makers	and	other	elites”.	Research	
since	 has	 bolstered	 the	 position	 that	 opinion	 is	 guided	more	 by	 foreign	 policy	
leadership	 than	 vice	 versa,	 a	 particularly	 well	 documented	 version	 of	 this	




such	questions.	Opinion	 leadership	of	 this	 kind	 conforms	with	 studies	of	 ‘‘cue-
taking,’’:	 when	 citizens	 use	 the	 endorsements	 of	 like-minded	 political	 elites	 as	
“cognitive	shortcuts”	in	reaching	their	political	choices	(Lupia	2000).	
	
Therefore,	 given	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 interplay	 between	 elite	 “framing”	 and	
public	opinion	and	 the	 lack	of	empirical	 evidence	 for	public	 sentiment	 shaping	
outcomes	in	matters	of	transatlantic	relations,	an	elite-focussed	approach	offers	
us	a	number	of	 advantages.	Firstly,	 elite	opinions	–	 sourced	 from	elite	 texts	or	
interviews	 –	 offer	 a	 significantly	 more	 rich	 and	 substantial	 body	 of	 ideas	
expressed	through	discourse	than	scant	public	opinion	data.	Secondly,	 in	so	far	





2001).	 In	other	words,	 elite	discourse	 shapes	views	both	upwards	 (to	decision	





The	 vast	 literature	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 public	 opinion	 on	 foreign	 policy	 is	 not	







American	 elite	 attitudes	 toward	 foreign	 policy	 is	 limited.	 Distinguishing	





Holsti	 and	 Rosenau’s	 (1996)	 work	 over	 15	 years	 presented	 the	 first	
comprehensive,	empirically-based	study	of	US	foreign	policy	beliefs	among	elites	
since	 the	 Vietnam	 War.	 Their	 findings	 on	 elite	 belief	 structure	 were	 based	










of	 thought,	 in	 the	 foreign	 policy	 beliefs	 of	 America's	 leaders:	 Cold	 War	
internationalism,	 post-Cold	War	 internationalism,	 and	 semi-isolationism.	 They	
referred	 to	 this	 as	 the	 three-headed	 eagle.	 After	 a	 time,	 Holsti	 and	 Rosenau	
extended	 this	 to	 become	 a	 4-headed	 eagle,	 noting	 a	 split	 in	 the	 Cold	 War	
Internationalist	 group:	 between	 unilateralists	 and	 multilateralists	 (Ibid).	
Unfortunately,	 the	 breadth	 of	 issues	 covered	 allowed	 only	 one	 question	 to	 be	
posed	 that	 might	 relate	 to	 Europe:	 “Should	 America’s	 allies	 assume	 a	 greater	
burden	 for	 their	 own	 defence?”	 All	 four	 groups	 produced	 strong	majorities	 in	
favour	 of	 the	 proposition,	 suggesting	 no	 cleavages	 in	 opinion	 at	 all	 on	 the	









beliefs	 in	 relation	 to	 an	 abstract	 question	 but	 this	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	 they	
would	 recommend	 the	 same	 or	 even	 similar	 policy	 responses	 to	 a	 particular	
policy	 problem.	 Finally,	 the	 study’s	 conceptualisation	 of	 elite	 is	 so	 wide	 as	 to	
suggest	that	the	respondents	are	merely	a	cross	section	of	prominent	community	






diversity	 and	 complexity	 of	 elite	 beliefs	 in	 U.S.	 foreign	 policy.	 This	 qualitative	
method	 enables	 the	 authors	 to	 engage	with	 complex	 policy	 presentations	 and	
analyses	 instead	 of	 coding	 for	 basic	 binary	 policy	 propositions	 using	 a	 priori	




First,	 they	 are	major	 outlets	 that	 American	 opinion	 leaders-practitioners,	
policy	 analysts,	 journalists,	 scholars,	 intellectuals,	 and	 the	 like	 rely	 on	 to	
communicate	their	point	of	view	(see	Rosenau,	1961).	Second,	they	are	the	
most	 common	 sources	 of	 information	 beyond	 the	 popular	 media	 (that	 is	
television,	 the	 newspaper,	 and	 maybe	 a	 newsweekly)	 to	 which	 the	 most	
politically	attentive	and	active	members	of	 the	elite	are	 likely	 to	 turn	(see	
Weiss,	 1974;	 Zaller,	 1992).	 Third,	 content	 analysis	 of	 the	media,	 including	
national	 journals	 of	 opinion,	 is	 widely	 used	 for	 studying	 elite	 attitudes	 in	





The	 authors	 report	 considerable	 support	 for	 the	 theory	 that	 the	 Cold	 War	
consensus	 had	 broken	 down	 but	 had	 no	 significant	 findings	 in	 relations	 to	
European	security	matters.	Nevertheless,	their	study	offers	useful	suggestions	as	










within	 a	 transatlantic	 context,	 historical	 studies	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 elites	 on	





post-war	 liberal-economic	 model	 in	 Europe	 which	 is	 firmly	 in	 the	 corporatist	
elite	 school	 (1981:	 327-352).	 Comparing	 structural	 economic,	 political	 and	
cultural	factors,	Maier	concludes	that	the	remarkable	stability	and	growth	of	the	
post-war	 period	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 genesis	 of	 a	 pluralist	 corporate	 elite	
comprising	 trade	unions,	 state	economic	agencies	and	bureaucratized	pressure	
groups	 in	 twentieth	century	America	who	sought	 to	develop	an	 integrated	and	
productive	 European	 economy	 (Ibid:	 351).	 Employing	 a	 narrower	 elite	model,	
Hogan	(1985;	44-72)	identifies	the	consensus	among	American	policy	planners,	
as	 the	 key	 factor	 enabling	 the	 massive	 investment	 of	 the	 Marshall	 Plan	 to	
reshape	 and	 reform	 economic	 structures	 in	 Europe	 and	 pave	 the	 way	 for	
subsequent	 integration.	Within	 a	 European	 context,	 Parsons	 (2003)	 adopts	 an	
elite	 ideational	 model,	 demonstrating	 that	 a	 small	 elite	 within	 the	 French	
Government	was	able	to	impose	the	“Community	Method”	of	governance	on	the	
European	 integration	 project	 and	 that	 once	 implemented,	 this	 elite	 group’s	
particular	 governance	 ideas	 constrained	 their	 successors	 in	 the	 European	





actors	 can	 select	 from	a	 range	of	 institutional	 and	 structural	possibilities.	How	
exactly	 they	 set	 the	 policy	 agenda	 through	 discourse,	 is	 the	 significant	 puzzle	
(Parsons	2003:	48).	
	
Yet	 another	 group	of	 scholars	 examined	 the	 close	 relations	 between	European	
and	American	 leaders	 as	 a	 form	of	 “transnational	 elite”	 (Isaacson	 and	Thomas	







Walt	 1998).	 This	 approach	 owes	 much	 to	 Deutsch’s	 notion	 of	 a	 security	
community;	a	group	of	elite-led	states	characterised	by	a	sense	of	trust,	common	
interests	 and	 association,	 that	 can	 achieve	 peaceful	 change	 though	 collective	
problem-solving	 (1957).	 Adler	 and	Barnett	 developed	 the	 concept	 in	 line	with	









factors	 alone	 cannot	 explain	 the	 way	 in	 which	 European	 integration	 and	
transatlantic	relations	developed	in	the	post-War	era	and	that	rather	than	mass	
public	opinion	shifts,	economic	interest	or	individual	actions,	it	was	the	influence	
of	 groups	 of	 elite	 actors	 at	 pivotal	 moments	 that	 determined	 the	 course	 of	
integration.	The	historical	studies	and	the	scientific	studies	on	elite	opinion	differ	
on	 three	points	 however:	 Firstly,	 how	wide	 should	our	definition	of	 the	 “elite”	
be?	Is	 it	merely	a	group	of	 influential	executive	actors;	a	transnational	network	
of	leaders,	a	community	of	policy	experts,	or	a	broader	group	of	senior	actors	in	






The	 elite	 community	 as	 conceptualised	 in	 this	 thesis	 comprises	 three	 distinct	
groups	 with	 plausible	 claims	 to	 influence	 over	 policymaking.	 Firstly,	 senior	
officials	 in	 the	 US	 government,	 specifically	 the	 White	 House	 and	 relevant	
departments	 (State,	 Homeland	 security)	 are	 included	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	
authoritative	role	they	play	in	discourse	arising	from	their	institutional	position.	
As	 Checkel	 (2004)	 states,	 political	 leaders	 are	 are	 the	 major	 agents	 and	
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interpreters	 of	 policy	discourse,	 as	 they	 are	 embedded	 in	 institutional	 settings	
that	are	optimised	 for	persuasion	 (p.	240).	 Secondly,	where	 relevant	 for	either	
case,	public	testimony	by	political	representatives	in	the	legislature	was	selected	
and	coded.	Although	congressmen	and	senators	are	not	officials,	in	the	sense	of	
representing	 the	 executive,	 their	 institutional	 position	 as	 members	 of	 the	
legislature	 grants	 them	 a	 platform	 allowing	 for	 authoritative,	 or	 at	 the	 least,	
influential	 contributions	 to	 policy	 discourse.	 Thirdly,	 in	 line	 with	 Rosati	 and	
Creed’s	analysis	(1997)	of	elite	opinion,	policy	analysis	texts	produced	by	major	
think	 tanks	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 analysis	 (p.	 590).	 The	 following	






knowledge	 within	 that	 domain	 or	 issue-area"	 (Haas,	 1992:	 3).	 However,	 the	
epistemic	 communities	 approach	 implies	 a	 level	 of	 shared	 expertise	 and	





credentialed	 “experts,”	 former	 policy	 practitioners,	 and	 academics	 from	 the	
university	sector.		
	
This	 thesis	 argues	 for	 a	 broader	 view	 of	 think	 tanks	 as	 ideologically	 diverse	
entrepreneurial	institutions	that	seek	to	maximize	influence,	often	in	the	service	
of	 competing	 political	 preferences.	 This	 view	 better	 allows	 us	 to	 analyse	
discursive	 acts	 and	 processes	 produced	 by	 these	 actors,	 not	 as	 merely	 the	
outcomes	 of	 differing	 methodological	 approaches	 to	 a	 supposed	 shared	
intellectual	 enterprise	 of	 developing	 policy	 “solutions,”	 but	 rather	 as	 part	 of	 a	
competition	for	discursive	influence	among	competing	elite	sub-groups.	In	order	
to	 demonstrate	 the	 value	 of	 this	 approach,	 the	 following	 sections	 will	 briefly	
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review	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 modern	 think	 tank,	 its	 power	 resources	 and	 its	






The	 term	 “think	 tank”	 entered	 the	 English	 language	 in	 1958,	 according	 to	 the	
Oxford	English	dictionary,	and	was	generally	used	to	describe	a	privileged	haven	
for	 intellectuals	 and	 technocrats,	 often	 referring	 to	 publicly-funded	 research	
institutes	 established	 in	 the	 mid-20th	 century	 (Medvetz	 2012,	 26).	 From	 the	
1950s	 onwards,	 leading	 writers	 within	 the	 growing	 think	 tank	 community	
asserted	 a	 claim	 to	 sophisticated,	 specialist	 knowledge	 of	 the	 field	 of	 foreign	






which	 often	 worked	 on	 outsourced	 public	 policy	 questions,	 including	 in	 the	
development	of	the	Marshall	Plan	(see	chapter	2	for	further	discussion).	But	the	
field	expanded	rapidly	 in	 subsequent	decades,	with	 the	emergence	of	privately	
funded	and	politically	linked	research	institutes.	These	new	forms	of	analysts	led	
to	 a	 view	 of	 the	 field	 as	 being	 populated	 by	 competing	 groups	 of	 “hacks”	 and	




motivations	 to	 leverage	 self-credentialed	 expertise	 to	 influence	 key	 political	
actors	 and	 policy	 discourse	 more	 broadly.	 Paul	 Weyrich,	 a	 co-founder	 of	 the	




What	 was	 needed	 was	 an	 outside	 operation	 that	 could	 provide	 timely	
information	 to	 members	 of	 Congress	 from	 a	 principled	 perspective	 [and]	
supply	 witnesses	 for	 hearings	 and	 experts	 to	 privately	 brief	 senators	 and	
congressmen.		






of	 access	 and	marshal	 different	 strategies	 and	 forms	 of	 capital	 to	 achieve	 that	
aim.	Nowadays	in	the	US	context,	the	term	encompasses	a	broad	range	of	policy-
focused	 actors,	 differentiated	 by	 logics	 of	 academic,	 political,	 economic	 and	
media	objectives.	As	Medvetz	(2012)	argues,	think	tanks	in	Washington	occupy	a	
“liminal	 structural	 position,”	 between	 universities,	 the	 media	 commentariat,	
lobby	groups,	and	business	and	political	interests	and	do	so	by		
	
Gathering	 and	 juggling	 various	 forms	 of	 capital	 acquired	 from	 different	
arenas:	 scholarly	 prestige	 and	 credentials,	 competence	 in	 specifically	
political	 forms	 of	 expression,	 money	 and	 fundraising	 ability,	 quasi-
entrepreneurial	styles,	and	access	to	the	means	of	publicity,	(46).		
	
These	 think	 tanks	 are	 often	 early	 predictors	 of	 policy	 developments	 and	
articulate	 a	 synthesis	 of	 public	 and	 private	 debates.	 They	 occupy	 a	 position	 of	
significant	influence	and	authority	within	the	policy	community	and	are	said	to	
perform	 “the	 deepest	 and	 most	 critical	 thinking	 within	 the	 policy-planning	
network,”	(Domhoff	2006;	87).	The	ideological	bent	of	some	of	these	actors	can	
also	 flesh	out	 the	parameters	of	 the	discourse.	 Indeed,	political	 factions	within	
the	 US	 Foreign	 Policy	 process	 have	 often	 produced	 their	 arguments	 and	
hypotheses	in	think-tank	settings.	Arguably,	these	sources	are	a	more	frank	and	
open	articulation	of	US	perceptions	on	foreign	and	security	matters	than	public	
comments	 made	 by	 officials.	 Policy	 analysis	 publications	 are	 themselves	
designed	with	 a	 view	 to	 influencing	 these	 other	 actors,	 contextualizing	myriad	
complex	 phenomena	 and	 events	 and	 presenting	 them	 in	 easily	 understood	
analyses	supporting	policy	proposals.	Including	these	actors	within	our	analysis	
acknowledges	 their	 increasingly	 influential	 role	 as	 sometimes	 partisan	 or	
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ideological	 opinion	 shapers	 within	 the	 political	 class	 and	 suppliers	 of	 media	
soundbytes,	 statistics	 and	 arguments,	 in	 the	 present-day	 era	 of	 ”organised	
punditry”	(Jacobs	and	Townsley	2011).		
	
Think	 tank	 analysts	 also	 influence	 the	 process	 by	moving	 into	 and	 out	 of	 the	




the	 cabinet	 and	 the	 President’s	 staff.	 62.5	 per	 cent	 of	 policy	 experts	 in	
Washington	D.C.	think	tanks	reported	previous	state	employment	of	some	kind.30	
These	 data	 indicate	 several	 points.	 Firstly,	 that	 the	 sources	 selected	 were	
influential	and	highly	regarded	contributors	to	policy	discourse.	Secondly,	think	
tank	 analysts	who	were	 formerly	 involved	 at	 senior	 level	 in	 the	 conduct	 of	US	
foreign	 policy	 had	 comparable	 training	 and	 access	 to	 information	 as	 their	
colleagues	 who	 remained	 in	 official	 positions,	 thus	 giving	 them	 a	 privileged	
access	 to	 information.	 Finally,	 this	 “revolving	door”	phenomenon	 suggests	 that	





departments,	political	 actors	and	analysts	 from	 the	 think	 tank	community.	The	
chapter	argued	for	an	approach	to	think	tanks	that	moved	beyond	the	standard	
epistemic	 communities	 approach	 to	 analyse	 the	 think	 tank	 community	 as	 a	
ideologically	 heterogeneous	 group	 of	 actors	 deploying	 sophisticated	 skills	 and	
forms	 of	 capital	 (intellectual,	 political,	 financial,	 media)	 to	 maximize	 political	








(medical	 professionals,	 clergy,	 etc,)	 as	 these	 actors	 cannot	 claim	 to	 have	 a	
primary	professional	 interest	 in	 foreign	policy.	The	section	also	 introduced	 the	
think	 tank	 dimension	 of	 the	 community,	 justifying	 the	 inclusion	 of	 these	 non-
official	analysts	by	analysing	the	secondary	literature	on	think	tank	influence	in	
Washington.	The	specific	process	for	selecting	analysts	and	think	tanks	that	are	







scholarship,	 highlighting	 how	 structuralist	models	 treat	 interests	 and	 ideas	 as	
exogenously	 given.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 analysis	 critiqued	mainstream	approaches	
that	 bracket	 domestic	 level	 factors	 despite	 the	 profound	 effects	 such	 factors	
have	 on	 policy	 outcomes.	 Turning	 towards	 reflectivist	 accounts	 of	 ideational	
influences	 on	 policymaking,	 it	 set	 out	 the	 justification	 for	 an	 interpretive	
constructivist	 approach	 that	 seeks	 to	 understand	 and	 explain	 how	 ideas	 are	
expressed,	 instantiated	 and	 have	 policy	 impact	 within	 a	 specific	 context.	 A	
discursive	 institutionalist	 approach	 was	 selected	 and	 modified	 to	 provide	 a	








forms	 of	 ideas	 therein	 and	 the	 processes	 by	 which	 they	 shape	meanings.	 The	
elite	 was	 defined	 as	 a	 community	 of	 foreign	 policy	 analysts	 (in	 leading	 think	
tanks)	and	foreign	policy	makers	(in	official	and	political	settings)	who	assert	a	
	 86	
claim	 to	 specialist	 knowledge	 and	 influence	 over	 the	 levers	 of	 policy.	 The	 text	
argued	 for	 a	 fuller	 recognition	 of	 the	 ideologically	 diverse	 and	 competitive	
nature	 of	 the	 think	 tank	 community	 which	 moved	 beyond	 an	 “epistemic	
communities”	 approach	 to	 think	 tanks	 as	 technocratic	 research	 institutes	
operating	under	shared	assumptions	of	expertise	and	competence.	Instead,	these	
institutes	are	analysed	as	 influential	groups	marshalling	considerable	 financial,	
media,	 political	 and	 intellectual	 resources	 to	 promote	 ideas	 about	 Europe,	
arising	from	their	preferences,	within	a	competitive	discursive	arena.	
	
The	 chapter	 presented	 arguments	 demonstrating	 the	 relative	 influence	 of	 elite	
opinion	vis	a	vis	mass	public	opinion,	justifying	the	overall	level	of	analysis.	This	
approach	 is	 inclusive	 enough	 to	 allow	 for	 the	 complexity	 and	 ideological	
diversity	 of	 views	 to	 emerge,	 but	 yet	 is	 exclusive	 enough	 so	 as	 to	 only	 study	




These	 arguments	 have	 established	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 and	 theoretical	
approach	with	clear	ontological	 and	epistemological	 foundations.	Pursuing	 this	
enterprise	 requires	 a	 transparent	 research	 design	 and	 set	 of	 methodological	




content	 analysis	 of	 a	 representative	 sample	 of	 elite-authored	 texts,	 combined	
















a	 security	 actor	 employs	 a	 discursive	 institutionalist	 approach	 to	 explore	 how	
discourses	 are	 constructed	 by	 a	 diverse	 foreign	 police	 elite,	 comprised	 of	
competing	 ideological	 and	 institutional	 groups	 (Schmidt	2008,	Connolly	1983).	
Having	 outlined	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 and	 theoretical	 approach,	 the	 next	
step	is	to	clearly	set	out	how	an	analysis	will	be	performed	on	a	representative	
corpus	 of	 texts	 produced	 by	 US	 foreign	 policy	 elite	 on	 the	 EU	 in	 two	 security	
policy	 domains.	 This	 chapter	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 explaining	 how	 the	 chosen	
methods	 of	 analysis	 will	 connect	 the	 research	 questions	 to	 the	 ultimate	
conclusions.	These	methods	will	 compare	 the	 influence	of	 factors,	 internal	 and	
external	 to	 the	 elite,	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 discourse.	 An	 examination	 of	 their	
discursive	 competition	 within	 two	 case	 studies	 can	 reveal	 the	 impact	 of	 sub-





selection	 strategy	 and	 the	multi-level	 comparative	 approach.	Having	 explained	
the	logic	behind	the	case	selection	and	research	design,	Section	4.2	will	explore	





data	was	 selected	 and	 texts	 analysed	 in	 the	 service	 of	 the	 research	 questions.	
Section	 4.4	 outlines	 how	 interview	 results	 and	 coding	 results	 will	 be	 brought	











discourse	 –	 itself.	 By	mapping	 out,	 coding	 and	 interpreting	 this	 discourse,	 the	
research	 assumes	 that	 the	 dependent	 variable	 –	 to	 borrow	 the	 language	 of	
positivist	 research	 -	 is	 multi-dimensional.	 Each	 case	 –	 representing	 a	 field	 of	
discourse	 –	must	 be	 inspected	 and	 compared	 to	 see	 how	 they	 differ	 from	 one	
another	(Becker	2000,	210).	The	research	is	not	exclusively	descriptive	however;	
although	a	descriptive	analysis	of	this	under-examined	field	of	US	foreign	policy	
has	 a	 significant	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	 contribution	 to	 make,	 the	 sub-
questions	make	 clear	 that	 this	 preliminary	 analysis	 opens	 the	 path	 to	 a	 quasi-






The	 case	 selection	 strategy	 employs	 an	 analytic	 generalisation	 approach	 (Yin	
2013:	 30-32).	 This	 means	 that	 rather	 than	 selecting	 cases	 which	 might	 be	
presented	as	 representative	 of	 the	universe	of	 cases	–	 according	 to	 the	 logic	of	
statistical	 generalisation	 for	 survey	 studies	 –	 the	 two	 cases	 are	 analysed	 as	
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separate	experiments	in	which	the	key	research	questions	can	be	explored	and,	if	
replicated,	 the	 findings	 generalized	 to	 theories	 about	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU’s	
security	action.	Analytic	generalisation	studies	are	usually	more	appropriate	for	
hermeneutic	 and	 qualitatively	 “thick”	 studies,	 like	 discourse	 analysis	 projects,	
which	can	seek	to	develop	theory	by	replicating	findings	that	can	be	generalized	
to	a	 theory	 of	discourse	on	Europe	 for	 example,	 rather	 than	generalized	 to	 the	
universe	of	all	comment	on	Europe	(Ibid:	30-32).	Approaches	based	on	statistical	
generalization,	surveys	for	example,	are	better	suited	to	positivist	studies	which	
aim	 to	provide	 results	 that	are	generalizable	 to	 the	universe	of	 cases	based	on	
the	selected	samples	(Blaikie	2010:	192-194,	217).	It	should	be	noted	that	within	
each	 of	 the	 cases,	 the	 text	 selection	 strategy	 was	 designed	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
analysis	 covered	 an	 ideologically	 and	 institutionally	 diverse	 universe	 of	 texts	
mirroring,	 as	 much	 as	 practicable,	 the	 full	 spectrum	 of	 opinion	 within	 the	 US	
foreign	policy	community,	on	the	specific	theme	in	question.	Representativeness	

































the	 EU	 in	 security	 matters	 within	 the	 selected	 timeframe	 (1992	 –	 2012):	 the	
development	of	common	security	and	defence	policies	and	the	role	of	the	EU	as	a	
counter	 terrorism	partner.	 The	 following	 sections	will	 outline	 how	 the	 criteria	
for	case	selection	led	to	these	choices.	
	
The	 first	 criterion	 for	 case	 selection	 was	 significance.	 According	 to	 Lijphart	
(1971,	691),	the	potential	contribution	of	the	cases	to	theory	building	should	be	
a	 key	 motivation	 for	 their	 selection	 and	 analysis.	 In	 this	 light,	 a	 study	 of	
discourse	 on	 marginal	 themes	 would	 be	 of	 limited	 utility	 in	 broader	 theory	
development	 on	 US	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU.	 Instead,	 the	 cases	 must	 comprise	
central	concerns	of	the	discourse	on	EU	in	security	matters.	In	other	words,	for	
the	purposes	of	this	study,	a	case	of	EU	security	action	could	only	be	taken	as	a	
relevant	 case	 for	 discourse	 analysis	 if	 it	 was	 a	 major	 topic	 of	 discussion.	 As	
Larsen	(2004)	argues	in	his	analysis	of	European	discourse	on	the	EU	as	a	foreign	
policy	actor,	using	discourse	analysis	to	examine	the	EU’s	“actorness”	can	only	be	
considered	worthwhile	 in	 subjects	where	 it	 is	 constructed	 as	 such	 (p.	 69).	 For	
the	 same	 reason,	 the	 cases	 selected	 for	 this	 study	 must	 capture	 areas	 of	 US	
foreign	 policy	 discourse	 where	 the	 EU	 is	 constructed	 as	 an	 actor	 worthy	 of	
comment,	 and	 not	 merely	 topics	 of	 interest	 from	 an	 external	 or	 European	




the	 analyst	 and	 over-representation	 of	 the	 perceptions	 of	 certain	 marginal	
groups	or	even	individuals.	
	
An	 initial	 quantitative	 content	 analysis	 was	 undertaken	 to	 ensure	 the	 cases	
satisfied	 the	 significance	 criterion.	 This	 analysis	 provided	 a	 preliminary	
evaluation	 or	 “map”	 of	 subjects	 related	 to	 the	 EU’s	 security	 role	 which	 were	
addressed	 by	 four	 selected	 US	 think	 tanks,	 without	 of	 course,	 indicating	 the	
manner	in	which	the	EU’s	role	was	evaluated	by	these	authors.	Once	a	corpus	of	
relevant	texts	was	gathered,	the	next	step	was	to	code	each	text	according	to	the	
main	 subject	 addressed.	 A	 list	 of	 themes	 of	 EU	 external	 relations	 topics	 was	
created	 with	 a	 corresponding	 figure	 indicating	 how	 many	 articles	 addressed	










were	 therefore	 excluded	 as	 possible	 cases	 as	 they	 did	 not	 meet	 the	 primary	
criterion	 of	 significance.	 In	 practice,	 a	 hypothetical	 corpus	 of	 texts	 related	 to	
these	“insignificant”	themes	would	risk	being	too	small	to	provide	useful	insight	
into	 broader	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 security	 actor.	 While	 it	 would	 be	
interesting	to	examine	why	or	in	what	circumstances,	EU	external	action	in	fields	
such	 as	 the	 Iran	 talks,	 for	 instance,	 are	not	 substantially	 addressed	 by	 the	 US	
foreign	 policy	 community,	 that	 is	 beyond	 the	 realm	 of	 this	 research	 project,	
which	seeks	to	provide	a	qualitatively	rich	analysis	of	how	US	elite	discourse	on	




The	 second	 criterion	 for	 case	 selection	 was	 variation	 in	 the	 major	 external	
independent	variable:	policy	competence	level.	This	requirement	indicates	the	
first	 comparative	 dimension	 of	 the	 research	 design	 and	 is	 the	 key	 external	
variable	 examined	 for	 impact	 on	 discourse.	 CSDP	 is	 broadly	 understood	 as	 an	
intergovernmental	policy	 field,	 whereas	 counter-terrorism	 is	 conducted	 within	





The	 third	 criterion	 for	 case	 selection	 indicates	 the	 second	 comparative	
dimension	 of	 the	 research	 design;	 the	 requirement	 for	 variation	 between	
embedded	cases	to	allow	for	a	comparison	of	factors	internal	to	the	US	foreign	
policy	community	that	might	explain	variation	in	discourse.	Both	cases	needed	to	
allow	 for	 a	 comparison	 of	 4	 source	 groups	 or	 embedded	 cases	 of	 US	 elite	
discourse	on	each	field	of	security	(internal	and	conventional).	These	are:	Public	
official	 US	 discourse,	 Private	 official	 US	 discourse,	 Conservative	 unofficial	
discourse,	Liberal	unofficial	discourse.	Identifying	these	embedded	cases	allows	
us	to	examine	the	impact	of	ideological	(conservative	or	liberal)	and	institutional	




As	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 Fig.	 4.1,	 the	 cases	 and	 subcases	 selected	 ensure	 a	 high	
degree	 of	 variation	 in	 both	 internal	 and	 external	 comparative	 dimensions.	
Taking	 two	 cases	 that	 are	most	 different	 on	 the	 policy	 competence	 dimension	
(cross-case	 comparison)	 and	 four	 sub-cases	 or	 “source	 groups”	 that	 are	 most	
different	 on	 the	 ideology	 and	 institutional	 context	 dimension	 (comparison	












The	 final	 comparative	 dimension	 for	 the	 research	 design	 is	 a	 longitudinal	
comparison	 within	 the	 cases,	 which	 allows	 the	 study	 to	 analyse	 how	 the	
discourse	 within	 each	 case	 develops	 over	 time,	 with	 reference	 to	 contextual	
events	 and	 landmark	moments.	 The	 timeframe	 selected	 allowed	 an	 analysis	 of	
how	 discourse	 developed	 in	 response	 to	 the	 major	 institutional	 changes	 in	
policymaking	 in	 the	 security	 domain;	 1992	 saw	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 common	
foreign	and	 security	policy	 (CFSP)	and	 starting	 the	analysis	 in	 this	 year	allows	
for	an	exploration	of	US	responses	to	institutionalized	EU	security	policies	from	
their	 genesis,	 through	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 most	 recent	 institutional	
reforms	of	 the	Lisbon	Treaty,	which	was,	 in	part,	 intended	to	enhance	 the	EU’s	
global	 security	 role.	 Taking	 1992	 as	 our	 starting	 point	 also	 coincides	with	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 first	Bill	 Clinton	White	House	 administration	 and	 the	20-year	



















are	 distinct	 from	 each	 other	 in	 the	 policy	 competence	 level	 of	 each	 field.	
Furthermore,	the	source	groups	for	each	case	can	be	clearly	distinguished	from	
each	 other	 on	 both	 ideological	 and	 institutional	 criteria,	 enabling	 the	 study	 to	
separately	analyse	embedded	cases	–	where	the	role	of	internal	variables	can	be	
examined.	 	Having	 outlined	 the	 key	 research	 questions,	 variables	 and	 the	 case	













































will	 address	 the	 coding	 for	 think	 tanks	 (method	 5),	 while	 section	 4.4	 will	
succinctly	outline	the	approach	taken	to	interviews.	
Content	 Analysis	 (CA)	 is	 not	 a	 monolithic	 research	 method	 but	 is	 rather	 best	
described	 as	 “a	 family	 of	 analytic	 approaches	 ranging	 from	 impressionistic,	











subjective	 interpretation	 of	 the	 content	 of	 text	 data	 through	 the	 systematic	
classification	 process	 of	 coding	 and	 identifying	 themes	 or	 patterns”	 (Hsieh	 &	
Shannon	 2005:	 1278).	 This	 definition	 acknowledges	 the	 inevitable	 element	 of	
interpretation	 required	on	 the	part	of	 the	 researcher	but	 lays	emphasis	on	 the	
systematic	nature	of	the	exercise;	 implying	transparent	rules	of	procedure,	text	
selection	and	methods	 to	augment	 the	credibility,	 transferability,	dependability	
and	confirmability	of	findings.		
The	 origins	 of	 QCA	 lie	 in	 classical	 quantitative	 content	 analysis	 approaches	
developed	in	the	mid-twentieth	century.	Berelson’s	text	was	the	first	to	lay	out	a	
comprehensive	methodology	for	the	interpretation	of	the	meanings	within	texts	
(Berelson,	 1952).	 For	 Berelson,	 reliability	 and	 validity	 were	 best	 assured	
through	eliminating	 subjective	 interpretation	on	 the	part	of	 the	 researcher.	He	
advocated	 “A	 research	 technique	 for	 the	 objective,	 systematic,	 and	quantitative	
description	 of	 the	 manifest	 content	 of	 communication”	 (Ibid,	 p.489).	 This	
approach	employed	random	sampling	strategies	and	a	deductive	epistemological	
approach	 wherein	 coding	 categories	 were	 created	 in	 advance	 and	 applied	
subsequently	 to	 texts.	 The	 approach	 is	 firmly	 within	 the	 positivist	 research	
paradigm;	 validity,	 reliability	 and	 objectivity	 are	 criteria	 used	 to	 evaluate	 the	
quality	of	research.	
Researchers	 employing	 content	 analysis	 within	 communication	 science	 later	
shifted	to	more	qualitative	approaches	 in	the	 late	twentieth	century,	motivated	
by	a	 sense	 that	hard	quantitative	approaches	were	misguided	 in	attempting	 to	
remove	all	human	inference	and	interpretation	from	the	research	agenda.	In	the	
late	 1960s	 Holsti	 (1969,	 p.	 14)	 wrote	 “Content	 analysis	 is	 any	 technique	 for	
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making	 inferences	 by	 objectively	 and	 systematically	 identifying	 specified	
characteristics	 of	messages.	…Our	 definition	 does	 not	 include	 any	 reference	 to	
quantification”.	 While	 not	 abandoning	 the	 requirement	 for	 “systematic”	 and	
“objective”	 methods	 of	 analyzing	 texts,	 scholars	 were	 coming	 to	 acknowledge	
that	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 rich	 insights	 into	 the	 themes	 and	 ideas	 of	 texts,	 simple	
word	 count	 analyses	 were	 not	 enough;	 a	 degree	 of	 human	 interpretation	 and	
considered	 reflection	 on	 coding	 categories	 was	 needed.	 “Classical	 quantitative	
















multi-stage	 mixed	 mode	 of	 analysis	 which	 incorporates	 observations	 about	
source	 context	 and	 the	 inferred	 meanings	 of	 texts.	 The	 researcher	 begins	 by	
quantifying	certain	words	or	content	in	a	text	in	order	to	understand	their	usage	
in	conjunction	with	their	context.	The	intention	here	is	not	to	assess	the	meaning	
of	 these	 text	 patterns	 but	 rather	 to	 explore	 how	 they	 are	 used	 (ie:	 are	 certain	
terms	 more	 common	 in	 texts	 than	 others?	 Are	 certain	 groups	 of	 words	 used	




going	 beyond	 the	 mere	 frequency	 of	 the	 words	 to	 interpret	 their	 meaning	 in	
context.	The	process	is	a	careful	exercise	in	thematic	detection,	exploration	and	
revision:	 identifying	 patterns	 of	 words	 which	 create	 narrative	 meaning	 but	
remaining	 open	 to	 unanticipated	 patterns	which	might	 not	 be	 present	 in	 an	 a	
priori	coding	manual	(Babbie	1992;	Catanzaro	1988;	Morse	&	Field	1995)	
As	will	 be	 discussed	 later	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 advantages	 of	 this	 approach	 are	
that	 it	 allows	us	 to	 firstly	 examine	quantitative	 clues	 as	 to	what	 authors	 focus	
most	 attention	 on.	 For	 instance,	 general	 security	 strategy	 statements	 can	 be	
quantitatively	 coded	 to	assess	how	often	 “Europe”	or	 the	 “EU”	 is	mentioned	 in	





efforts	 to	credibly	demonstrate	 that	 the	 textual	evidence	 is	 consistent	with	 the	
interpretation.	The	researcher	must	also	take	care	to	set	out	a	 transparent	and	
credible	strategy	for	source	selection.	This	is	as	important	as	the	thematic	coding	
itself	 as	differing	 criteria	 for	 selection	 could	 in	principle,	 lead	 to	 very	different	






This	 section	 presents	 the	 text	 selection	 and	 sampling	 strategy	 and	 the	 coding	
process	itself,	laying	special	emphasis	on	measures	taken	to	ensure	the	findings	
are	 robust,	 and	 the	 method	 is	 transparent	 and	 replicable.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	
familiarize	 the	 reader	with	 the	 discourse	 analysis	 process	 from	 start	 to	 finish:	





In	 order	 to	 select	 a	 sample	 of	 texts	 that	 can	 be	 credibly	 presented	 as	
representative	 of	 US	 élite	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 global	 actor,	we	 first	must	
have	working	criteria	 for	who	 this	group	includes	(the	source	of	 the	text)	what	
subjects	are	deemed	relevant	(the	subject	of	the	text)	and	when	the	text	should	
have	been	produced	 (the	valid	 timeframe	 for	 texts).	A	 scientifically	 robust	 and	
credible	 text	 selection	 strategy	 requires	 rigorous	 and	 transparent	 criteria	 to	
ensure	 that	 the	 selection	 process	 is	 not	 arbitrary	 and	 that	 themes	 or	 subjects	
from	other	settings	do	not	contaminate	the	sample.	By	applying	these	criteria	in	
selecting	 a	 corpus	 of	 relevant	 and	 comparable	 texts,	 the	 study	 is	 adopting	 a	
purposive	sampling	strategy,	rather	than	a	random	sampling	approach.	
Being	 cognisant	 of	 these	 important	 contextual	 features	 of	 texts	 (authors,	





In	 the	 preceding	 chapter,	 the	 US	 Foreign	 Policy	 Community	 was	 defined	 as	 a	
group	of	heterogeneous	officials	with	a	high	level	of	access	to	and	influence	over	
the	machinery	of	US	foreign	policy	and	unofficial	analysts	with	influence	within	
think	 tank	 discourse	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 institutional	 position.	 In	 addition	 to	
official	 sources	 (Presidential	 administrations,	 government	 departments,	
members	 of	 Congress)	 the	 sample	 also	 includes	 texts	 from	 influential	 foreign	
policy	think	tanks.	Foreign	policy	analysts	in	these	organisations	are	included	as	
they	have	a	major	role	in	shaping	foreign	policy	discourse	and	indeed	in	shaping	
foreign	 policy	 decision-making	 itself.	 Thus,	 the	 elite	 group	 consists	 of	 policy	
makers	and	policy	analysts.	The	function	of	this	section	is	to	outline	the	criteria	









This	 group	 is	 composed	 of	 documents	 produced	 by	 official	 actors	 including	
Congressional	 hearings	 and	 papers,	 National	 Security	 Statements,	 public	
pronouncements,	 opinion	 articles	 in	 national	 publications	 and	 speeches.	 In	 all	
cases	the	authors	are	official	actors	from	one	of	the	arms	of	Government	listed	in	









reflect	 genuinely	held	beliefs,	 and	not	merely	 the	 image	or	message	 that	 these	




available	 Wikileaks	 “Public	 Library	 of	 US	 Diplomacy”	 –	 an	 online	 archive	 of	
classified	 State	 Dept.	 correspondence. 33 	Of	 course,	 official	 actors	 are	 still	
constrained	 by	 procedural,	 bureaucratic	 and	 political	 factors	 when	 discussing	












actors.	 The	 secondary	 research	 method	 (interviews)	 goes	 some	 way	 towards	
probing	the	beliefs	of	the	subjects	further	(see	Section	4.4.)	However	this	project	
is	 primarily	 interested	 in	 the	 social	 process	 whereby	 images	 of	 Europe	 are	
constructed	 and	meanings	 created	 as	 part	 of	 a	 shared	 discourse.	 The	method	
outlined	 aligns	 with	 the	 theoretical	 assumption	 that	 language	 constitutes	
meaning	 and	 thus	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 process	 is	 on	 “the	 productive	 and	






“real”	 beliefs,	 but	 it	 can	 still	 provide	 empirically	 and	 theoretically	 valuable	
findings.	 In	 particular,	 the	 results	 will	 show	whether	 –	 in	 line	 with	 Schmidt’s	
framework	(2008;	310)	 -	 there	 is	systematic	variation	between	communicative	




Within	 these	 sub-groups	 there	 is	 one	 further	 dominant	 cleavage	 –	 the	 party	
divide	between	Republican	and	Democrat	administrations,	 representatives	and	
individuals.	The	coding	process	must	record	this	and	all	other	cleavages	for	each	
























To	 avoid	 selection	 bias	 with	 think–tank	 sources,	 the	 sample	 includes	 a	 cross	
section	of	prominent	 institutes,	representative	of	 the	 full	 ideological	 field	of	US	
foreign	 policy	 research.	 Tim	 Groseclose	 and	 Jeffrey	 Milyo’s	 (2005)	 work	 on	
ideological	 positioning	 of	 research	 institutes	 was	 used	 to	 select	 a	 balanced	
sample	 of	 institutes.	 Using	 the	 Congressional	 Record,	 Groseclose	 and	 Milyo	
coded	 all	 citations	 of	 research	 institutes	 by	 members	 of	 congress	 between	
January	 1	 1993	 and	 Dec	 31	 2002.	 The	 researchers	 then	 used	 the	 ten-year	
average	ADA	scores	(an	evaluation	of	the	ideological	position	of	each	member	of	
congress	 based	 upon	 their	 voting	 record)	 of	 the	 members	 to	 place	 the	 think	
tanks	 on	 an	 ideological	 spectrum.	 The	 work	 assumes	 ideological	 proximity	
between	 the	 congressman	 and	 the	 source	 he/she	 cites	 –	 this	 assumption	 is	
verified	 by	 the	 results	 which	 conform	 to	 generally	 held	 wisdom	 on	 the	
ideological	leanings	of	the	groups	measured.	It	is	also	reaffirmed	by	the	groups’	
own	 descriptions	 of	 themselves,	 often	 as	 “conservative”	 or	 “progressive”.	 The	
ADA	 ideological	 scores	 cited	 were	 also	 used	 to	 ensure	 that	 statements	 by	
members	of	congress	were	representative	of	political	ideology.	Fig.	2	shows	the	
shortlist	of	 think	tanks	selected,	with	an	 ideological	score	based	on	a	spectrum	


























The	 institutes	 selected	 are	 well	 known	 and	 Groseclose	 and	 Milyo’s	 study	
calculated	that	they	were	all	within	the	top	20%	most	cited	institutes	(including	





of	 six	 Washington	 D.C.	 think	 tanks	 and	 used	 this	 data	 as	 a	 rough	 proxy	 for	
institutional	 capacity.	 Two	 especially	 prolific,	 large	 and	 influential	 think	 tanks	
were	 then	 selected	 from	 the	 shortlist:	 Brookings	 and	 the	Heritage	 Foundation.	
These	 organisations	 reported	 the	 second	 and	 fourth-highest	 levels	 of	
expenditure	 of	 any	 US	 think	 tank	 in	 2008;	 and	 produced	 more	 texts	 on	 the	
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subject	of	transatlantic	relations	than	any	of	the	other	organisations	sampled.34	
It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 while	 there	 was	 a	 balance	 between	 liberal	 and	
conservative	 camps	 in	 the	 corpus	 of	 unofficial	 texts,	 these	 two	 institutes	were	
over-represented	 vis	 a	 vis	 their	 peers,	 within	 their	 respective	 ideological	
groupings.	In	addition	to	these	texts,	opinion	articles	published	by	foreign	policy	
analysts	 in	 leading	 newspapers	 were	 analysed.	 To	 control	 for	 political	





This	 study	was	 carried	out	using	qualitative,	 in-depth	documentary	analysis	of	
texts	 produced	 between	1992	 and	2012,	 addressing	EU	 external	 action	 in	 two	
settings:	
1. Conventional	Security	(Institutional	reform	of	CSDP)	
2. Internal	 Security	 Cooperation	 (Counter-terrorism	 cooperation	 and	 the	
PNR	agreement).	
	
Within	 these	 two	policy	domains,	 the	 texts	addressed	Europe,	EU-US	 relations,	
NATO-EU	 relations	 and	 the	 transatlantic	 relationship	 more	 generally.	 It	 is	
important	to	bear	in	mind	that	US	foreign	policy	discourse	builds	a	space	which	
groups	diverse	European	actors	in	many	different	contexts	together,	making	the	
task	 of	 identifying	 texts	 as	 either	 exclusively	 “NATO-related”	 or	 “EU-related”	
problematic.	 Many	 policy	 memos	 on	 security	 matters,	 for	 instance,	 addressed	
both	organisations	in	the	same	text.	In	these	cases,	authors	examined	European	
security	 cooperation	 in	 both	 contexts	 with	 arguments	 generalized	 to	 apply	 to	
“Europe”	 or	 “Europeans”.	 Further	 complicating	 matters	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 when	
reviewing	CSDP	for	 instance,	analysts	often	examine	national	defence	spending	
by	 individual	European	member	states	as	constitutive	elements	of	CSDP	power	






capabilities	 are	 constituted	 by	 national	 defence	 resources	 pooled	 for	 specific	
missions	(Howorth	2007).	It	would	be	unreasonable	to	exclude	texts	that	made	
reference	 to	 national	 factors	 when	 the	 author’s	 intention	 is	 to	 make	 a	 point	
about	European	defence	more	generally,	and	CSDP	as	a	key	element	of	that.	
	
However,	 this	 does	 not	 prevent	 the	 researcher	 from	 being	 selective	 within	
individual	 documents	 as	 to	which	 units	 of	 analysis	 (phrases	 or	 sentences)	 are	
relevant	and	which	are	not.	Statements	on	individual	countries	were	excluded	as	
the	 focus	 is	 on	 these	 states	 only	 when	 they	 are	 considered	 as	 part	 of	 a	
“European”	group	–	accepting	 the	 terms	 set	by	 the	discourse	 itself.	 Statements	
explicitly	regarding	NATO	activities	or	capacities	were	also	excluded.	 In	almost	
every	project	employing	qualitative	content	analysis,	 the	scholar	must	exercise	
his	 interpretive	 faculties;	 what	 matters	 is	 that	 he	 is	 transparent	 about	 the	





setting	 of	 the	 text	 must	 be	 borne	 in	 mind.	 Conventions	 of	 international	
diplomacy	require	official	actors	to	moderate	their	comments	to	take	account	of	
the	 public	 nature	 of	 the	 discourse.	 Actors	 in	 think	 tanks,	 or	 indeed	 former	
officials	 now	 in	 think-tank	 settings,	 can	 be	more	 frank	 than	 their	 government	
counterparts	 in	 their	 discussions	 regarding	 European	 allies.	 Indeed,	 when	
discussing	EU-US	cooperation	on	counter-terrorism	in	2004,	the	Chairman	of	the	
Senate	 Subcommittee	 on	 European	 Affairs,	 Senator	 Allen,	 explicitly	 asked	




that	 it	 is	 not	 made	 public	 because	 it	 might	 harm	 somebody’s	
sensibilities	 [emphasis	 added].	 There	 is	 a	 sense	 that	 appeasement	 or	






Discussing	 the	 2004	 National	 Security	 Strategy,	 then	 Secretary	 of	 State	 Colin	
Powell	 also	 underlined	 the	 limits	 decision-makers	 place	 on	 what	 they	 will	
express	in	public	documents:	
	
Of	 course,	 a	 public	 strategy	 document	 cannot	 be	 entirely	 frank	





We	 should	 therefore	 expect	 significant	 differences	 in	 style	 and	 emphasis	
between	 public	 and	 private	 official	 texts	 and	 between	 official	 and	 non-official	
actors,	 with	 the	 latter	 more	 likely	 to	 employ	 explicitly	 critical	 terms.	
Nevertheless,	 it	was	still	possible	to	code	official	sources	according	to	the	same	
themes	 and	 sub-themes	 identified	 in	 unofficial	 sources.	 The	 embedded	 case	
comparison	 sections	 in	 forthcoming	 chapters	will	 explore	 how	 the	wording	 of	









significant	 corpus	of	 texts	 to	be	established,	 from	a	wide	variety	of	actors.	The	
advantages	 of	 this	 time	 frame	 were	 several;	 firstly,	 the	 period	 includes	 both	
Republic	and	Democrat	White	House	administrations,	allowing	for	a	longitudinal	
comparison	that	spanned	both	parties’	periods	in	office	(See	Fig.	4.4).	Secondly,	
the	 twenty-year	 timeframe	 allowed	 for	 personnel	 changes	 within	 the	 sub-
groups,	 so	 that	no	 institution’s	 texts	came	solely	 from	one	particular	European	
expert	(but	also	included	successors/predecessors	in	the	same	job).	Thirdly,	the	
timeframe	 allowed	 for	 the	 source	 selection	 to	 capture	 texts	 produced	 by	
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significant	 individuals	 over	 the	 course	 of	 their	 career	 –	 often	 spanning	 official	
and	unofficial	roles.	For	instance,	texts	produced	by	Philip	Gordon,	a	Brookings	
Institution	 fellow	 and	 subsequently	 State	 Dept	 official,	 were	 included	 in	 the	
analysis	and	divided	into	two	separate	sub-groups	(official	and	unofficial	liberal)	
depending	on	the	position	held	at	the	time.	By	employing	a	20-year	timeframe,	
the	 study	 can	 analyse	 how	 views	 expressed	 by	 key	 members	 of	 the	 elite	 are	
expressed	 as	 they	 move	 across	 the	 sub-groups	 within	 the	 elite.	 Finally,	 the	
timeframe	 spans	 the	 development	 of	 the	 EU’s	 common	 foreign	 and	 security	
policy	 from	 its	 inception	 with	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Maastricht,	 through	 several	
institutional	 reforms,	 ending	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	
reforms	 to	 EU	 external	 actions.	 It	 also	 captures	 a	 significant	 period	 of	
institutional	 evolution	 in	 the	AFSJ	domain,	 as	well	 as	 the	September	11th	2001	
terrorist	 attacks,	 a	 landmark	 event	 in	 EU-US	 counter-terrorism	 cooperation.	
Thus	the	timeframe	allows	for	a	longitudinal	analysis	of	events	during	the	most	
significant	period	of	EU	security	policy	 integration.	The	 timeframe	 is	 restricted	
enough	 however,	 to	 provide	 a	 bounded	 study	 that	 addresses	 specific	 policy	
domains	and	key	milestone	events,	as	opposed	to	a	longue	durée	study.	
	
This	 section	 has	 outlined	 the	 choices	 made	 in	 the	 source	 selection	 strategy,	
which	 sets	out	 to	build	 a	 transparent,	 robust	 and	 replicable	 corpus	of	 texts	on	
elite	discourse	on	EU	security	action	in	two	specific	cases.	The	strategy	employed	
to	 ensure	 a	 bounded	 corpus	 of	 texts,	 representative	 of	 the	 full	 ideological,	
political	and	institutional	diversity	of	the	US	foreign	policy	community	has	been	













As	 discussed,	 Summative	 QCA	 provides	 several	 general	 advantages	 over	 other	
qualitative	or	quantitative	approaches.	With	particular	reference	to	the	texts	for	
this	 study,	 the	 interpretive	 nature	 of	 Summative	QCA	 allows	 us	 to	 deal	with	 a	
number	 of	 issues:	 Firstly,	 official	 evaluations	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 an	 actor	 may	 be	
worded	obliquely	–	to	conform	with	diplomatic	niceties	for	instance.	This	means	
that	 the	 coder	will	 be	 required	 to	 code	 for	 ambiguous	 statements,	 rather	 than	
clear-cut	 binary	 policy	 positions.	 Strictly	 quantitative	 approaches	 or	 a	 priori	
coding	schemes	would	undoubtedly	miss	out	on	many	of	these	subtleties	(Holsti,	
1969).	 Secondly,	 the	 texts	 themselves	will	 be	 quite	 heterogeneous:	 transcripts	
from	 congressional	 hearings,	 public	 speeches,	 opinion	 articles	 and	 research	





In	 contrast	 to	 a	 Classical	 Content	 Analysis	 approach	 –	 where	 decisions	 on	 all	
variables,	 their	 measurement,	 and	 coding	 rules	 must	 be	 made	 before	 the	
observations	 begin	 –	 the	 thesis	 employed	 a	 preliminary	 exploratory	 content	
analysis	 to	 identify	 the	most	 salient	 topics	 of	 discussion.	 This	was	 done	 using	
NVivo	Coding	software.	
	















co	 occurrence,	 with	 an	 analysis	 of	 which	 co	 occurrences	 were	 more	 common	
among	particular	sources	and	in	particular	years.	
	
The	 analysis	 revealed	 which	 issues	 and	 topics	 were	 most	 salient	 among	 the	
group	at	large	and	among	each	individual	source.	The	clustering	of	certain	terms	





A	 second,	more	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 the	 texts	was	 undertaken	 to	 excavate	 the	
themes	of	the	articles,	reflecting	the	author’s	beliefs	regarding	the	EU’s	external	
action.	The	exploratory	analysis	helped	to	guide	this,	as	it	gave	clues	as	to	which	
topics	 these	 authors	 believe	 are	 most	 salient	 in	 a	 global	 power	 analysis	 and	
which	 themes	 are	 most	 important	 to	 particular	 sources.	 NVivo	 was	 also	 the	
primary	 software	 tool	 used	 during	 this	 stage.	 This	 software	 is	 a	 tool	 for	 the	
researcher	 but	 is	 not	 in	 itself	 a	 method.	 The	 important	 decisions	 about	 text	
selection,	 coding	 categories	 and	 themes	must	 be	made	 by	 the	 researcher	who	














capabilities,	 in	 the	 two	 selected	 cases	 were	 coded.	 Once	 the	 initial	 coding	
categories	 had	 been	 identified	 the	 coding	 process	 continued,	 using	 a	







software	provides	several	 tools	 to	 identify	dominant	codes	or	double	coding	of	
phrases	 with	 repeated	 patterns	 (ie:	 “military	 weakness”	 and	 “low	 military	
spending”).	This	process	is	the	main	phase	of	deducing	meaning	and	conclusions	
about	the	texts.	It	is	a	qualitative	analysis	and	therefore,	to	an	inevitable	degree,	
requires	 interpretation.	 In	order	 to	 increase	 the	reliability	and	 transparency	of	






with	 the	 more	 quantitative	 first	 phase	 providing	 clues	 or	 signposts	 about	
concepts	that	repeat	throughout	the	corpus	before	the	researcher	then	moves	to	
an	inductive,	qualitative	analysis	of	the	texts,	sentence-by-sentence.	This	second	
phase	allows	 for	both	 the	nuance	and	context	of	each	unit	 to	be	considered,	as	
well	 as	 allowing	 an	 ongoing	 revision	 of	 the	 coding	 scheme	 in	 light	 of	 new	































units	 of	 coding	 overlapped	 –	 indicating	 related	 themes	 –	 and	 how	 often	 each	
thematic	 node	 was	 recorded.	 This	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 themes,	
indicates	some	relationships	between	them	and	also	tells	us	which	themes	occur	
within	each	embedded	case	(ie:	official,	unofficial	liberal.	etc.)	The	analyst	must	
then	 exclude	 marginal	 themes,	 where	 only	 single	 references	 occur	 and	 group	




of	discursive	 strategies	employed	within	 the	 text;	 recurrent	 imagery,	 analogies	
and	rhetorical	tools	are	noted,	to	discern	any	clearly	identifiable	discursive	tools	
used	 by	 the	 sources	 (Wodak,	 2002).	 Prominent	 discursive	 strategies	 include	




relation	 to	 the	 subjects	 at	 hand	 in	 order	 to	 build	 “ethos”	 (ie	 credibility	 or	
proximity	 to	 the	 audience),	 and	 argumentation;	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 source	
connects	 arguments	 to	 their	 conclusions	 through	 selective	use	 of	 data	 (Wodak	
2002a:	 74).	 These	 are	 then	 examined	 and	 discussed	 in	 the	 case	 chapters	 to	








to	 the	 embedded	 case	 they	 relate	 to	 (ie:	 liberal	 unofficial,	 conservative	
unofficial,	etc.)	
	
3. A	 list	 of	 preliminary	 themes	 are	 created	 derived	 from	 a	 reading	 of	







as	 a	 security	 actor,	 noting	 descriptions	 of	 its	 capabilities,	 salient	









8. Marginal	 thematic	 nodes	 (those	 with	 only	 single	 occurrences)	 are	
excluded.	
	
9. Discursive	 strategies	 are	 identified	 among	 the	 units	 of	 analysis,	 with	
particular	attention	to	perspectivation,	argumentation	and	imagery	used.	
	
10. Themes	 and	 sub-themes	 are	 interpreted	 and	 grouped	 into	 coherent	
descriptions	 or	 “narratives”	 which	 use	 common	 reference	 points	 to	
construct	 images	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 security	 actor.	 The	 outputs	 forms	 the	
basis	 for	 an	 interpretive	 analysis	 –	 presented	 in	 the	 case	 study	 and	
comparative	 chapters	 –	 of	 how	 various	 factors	 influenced	 the	 nature	 of	
the	discourse	and	how	this	discourse	may	have	influenced	policymaking.	
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This	 section	 has	 presented	 the	 primary	 method	 by	 outlining	 its	 distinctive	
advantages	 within	 the	 broader	 family	 of	 content	 analysis.	 The	 text	 selection	
strategy	 and	 each	 stage	 of	 the	 coding	 process	 were	 outlined	 to	 provide	 a	
transparent	summary	of	the	method	employed.	The	next	section	will	present	the	






Interviews	 provide	 a	 valuable	 secondary	 method	 by	 which	 this	 project	 can	
access	 US	 elite	 views	 on	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 security	 actor.	 The	 interviewees	 are	 not	
expected	to	either	confirm	or	falsify	the	results	of	the	QCA,	rather	they	act	as	a	
means	 to	 “triangulate”	 our	 initial	 results;	 complementing	 the	 QCA	 findings,	




number	 of	 additional	 interviews,	 arranged	 to	 suit	 interviewee	 schedules,	were	




• To	 assess	 the	 opinions	 of	 interviewees	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 an	
international	actor.	
• To	ascertain	the	interviewees’	reflexive	opinions	as	to	how	discourse	on	
the	 EU	 varies	 across	 political,	 ideological	 and	 organizational	 cleavages	
within	the	US	Foreign	Policy	community.	






The	 selection	 of	 interviewees	 was	 conducted	 with	 the	 same	 principles	 of	
representativeness	that	were	employed	with	the	selection	of	texts.	Analysts	from	
across	 the	 ideological	 spectrum	were	 interviewed,	 as	were	 official	 actors	 from	






interviewee	 by	 name	 and	 their	 anonymity	 is	 guaranteed.	 The	 interview	 is	 not	
normally	 recorded	 so	 as	 to	 encourage	more	 fluid	 and	 comfortable	 discussion,	
though	this	requires	constant	note	taking	by	the	interviewer.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 reluctance	 to	 participate,	 there	 is	 also	 the	 risk	 –	 as	 with	
interview	 subjects	 in	 any	 social	 science	 research	 –	 that	 the	 subject	 may	
misrepresent	 views	 or	 indeed	 facts	 so	 as	 to	 present	 themselves	 or	 their	
organization	 in	 a	 favourable	 light.	 As	Howarth	 and	Torfing	 (2005:	 339)	 put	 it:	
‘we	 are	 confronted	 with	 the	 difficulty	 of	 validating	 and	 corroborating	 what	 is	
said	in	interviews	(...)	and	of	accessing	information	that	remains	deliberately	or	
unintentionally	 hidden’.	 While	 the	 process	 depends	 to	 a	 large	 degree	 on	 the	
reliability	 of	 the	 interviewees,	 this	 remains	 a	 risk.	 However,	 given	 that	 the	





































7. Do	you	 think	 there	are	different	perceptions	and	approaches	 to	 the	EU	among	
the	different	departments	of	Federal	Government?	
8. Do	 differences	 also	 exist	 between	 different	 ideological/political	 groupings	 in	
Washington?	
9. What	 about	 your	 own	 organisation,	 what	 do	 you	 think	 affects	 the	 kind	 of	
analysis	produced	on	EU-related	matters?	
Future	Trends:	






account	 of	 the	 same	 categories	 of	 beliefs	 and	 opinions	 analysed	 in	 the	 QCA,	





solo	 writing	 endeavours.	 When	 writing	 a	 speech,	 policy	 analysis	 or	 briefing	
paper,	 a	member	 of	 the	 US	 foreign	 policy	 elite	 is	 able	 to	 autonomously	 select	
particular	 real-life	 events	 or	 concepts	 to	 explore	 in	 a	 certain	 ideas	 and	 serve	
their	particular	purposes.		
	
By	 contrast,	 in	 an	 interview,	 this	 autonomy	 is	 limited	 by	 an	 outline	 structure	




These	 reflections	may	deepen	our	understanding	of	 the	 concepts	uncovered	 in	
the	QCA,	point	to	further	avenues	of	enquiry	and	test	certain	 interpretations	of	
written	 texts.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 coding	 or	 interpretation	 of	 interview	








by	 a	 representative	 sample	 of	 the	US	 foreign	 policy	 community	 on	 the	 chosen	
subject.	It	has	further	indicated	measures	to	ensure	transparency	and	robustness	
in	 this	 process	 and	 a	 secondary	method	 –	 semi-structured	 interviews	 –	which	
seek	 to	 “triangulate”	 the	 initial	 findings,	 probing	 their	 plausibility	 and	 further	







further	 steps	 are	 needed.	 An	 in-depth	 interpretive	 analysis	 of	 the	 embedded	
cases	will	 be	 performed	 to	 compare	 the	 narrative	 pattern	 discovered	with	 the	
sub-groups	 participating	 in	 the	 discursive	 arena	 (official	 public/private,	
unofficial	liberal/conservative).	To	what	extent	do	clear	differences	in	narratives	
align	with	 ideological	or	 institutional	 cleavages?	Are	differences	 in	evaluations,	
assessments	 and	 portrayals	 of	 the	 EU’s	 role	 aligned	 with	 the	 sub-group	
cleavages?	 This	 comparison	 is	 made	 possible	 by	 the	 initial	 coding	 of	 texts	
according	 to	 source-type.	 It	 will	 be	 clearly	 visible	 if	 a	 large	 number	 of	 texts	
constructing	 the	 EU’s	 role	 in	 a	 particular	 model	 –	 either	 effectiveness	 or	
weakness,	for	example	–	are	predominately	produced	by	actors	from	a	particular	
sub-group.	A	finding	of	this	kind	would	indicate	a	competitive	discursive	arena,	
where	 competing	 elite	 sub-groups	 seek	 discursive	 dominance	 by	 establishing	
their	narratives	as	authoritative	evaluations	of	the	EU.		
	
Or	do	 certain	discursive	 constructions	of	 the	EU	 crosscut	 the	 embedded	 cases,	
indicating	a	level	of	consensus	on	the	EU’s	role	which	might	approach	dominance	
within	 overall	 elite	 discourse?	 Are	 significant	 differences	 in	 discursive	
constructions	 of	 the	 EU	more	 closely	 aligned	with	 the	 EU’s	 policy	 competence	
level	 –	 as	 indicated	 by	 the	 case	 selection?	 In	 which	 case,	 the	 findings	 would	
suggest	that	factors	external	to	the	US	foreign	policy	community,	and	internal	to	
the	EU	itself	–	its	policy	competences	–	are	more	significant	determinants	of	how	
it	 is	 constructed	 in	 discourse.	 Further	 interpretive	 analysis	 will	 examine	 how	
constructions	 of	 the	 EU	 have	 changed	 over	 the	 timeframe	 of	 the	 cases	 (1992-
2012).	 Do	 certain	 lessons	 or	 evaluations	 of	 the	 EU	 become	 more	 or	 less	
prominent	 over	 time,	 in	 response	 to	 certain	 landmark	 events	 or	 learning	
processes?	
	
A	 final	 analysis	 considers	whether	 it	 can	 be	 plausibly	 argued	 that	 “lessons”	 or	
consensus	 points	 derived	 by	 the	 community	 within	 this	 timeframe	 and	
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embedded	 in	 discourse	 shaped	 policy	 responses;	 by	marking	 out	 the	 limits	 of	
reasonable	 responses	 to	particular	 issues	 or	 by	 setting	parameters	 to	 the	EU’s	
value	 or	 effectiveness	 as	 a	 security	 partner.	 In	 light	 of	 the	 methodological	




causal	 inference	 as	 to	 how	 certain	 ideas,	 expressed	 in	 narratives,	 shaped	 the	
decision-making	 approach	 of	 policymakers.	 In	 drawing	 these	 conclusions,	 the	






selected	 corpus	 of	 texts	 can	 present	 a	 rich	 output	 of	 discursive	 themes	 that	
illustrate	the	contours	of	discourse	on	a	chosen	topic.	To	ensure	the	findings	are	
robust	however,	and	not	vulnerable	to	challenges	of	interpreter	or	selection	bias,	
a	 number	 of	 measures	 will	 be	 taken	 to	 ensure	 credibility,	 transparency	 and	
robustness:	




quotes	 from	 texts	 to	 render	 the	 interpretive	 process	 transparent	 to	 the	
reader.	
• QCA	findings	are	presented	alongside	select	quotes	from	the	two	batteries	
of	 interviews	 conducted	 with	 members	 of	 the	 US	 foreign	 policy	
community	 in	 April	 2011	 and	 June	 2013.	 Where	 relevant,	 the	
interviewees’	 reflexive	 comments	 on	 features	 of	 US	 elite	 discourse	 are	
also	presented.		
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the	 nature	 of	 discourse	 on	 this	 topic,	 employing	 transparent,	 reliable	 and	
credible	methodology.	 The	project	 does	 not	 propose	 a	 simplified	 causal	model	
explaining	what	 variables	 determine	 particular	 results	 in	 discourse	 but	 rather	
seeks	 to	 explain	 how	differing	 factors	within	 each	 case	produce	 the	pattern	 of	
discourse	 revealed	 and	 how	 this	 discourse	 influences	 the	 response	 of	
policymakers	to	security	cooperation	with	the	EU.	
	
Having	outlined	 the	 research	design	and	methodology	 intended	 to	 address	 the	
research	 questions	 in	 line	 with	 the	 overall	 theoretical	 framework,	 the	 next	
chapter	begins	part	two	of	this	thesis	by	presenting	the	findings	of	the	first	case	














This	 chapter	presents	 the	 results	of	 the	 first	 of	 two	 case	 studies	 examining	US	
Elite	Discourse	on	the	EU	as	a	Security	Actor.	The	case	relates	to	elite	discourse	
on	Common	Security	and	Defence	Policy	 (CSDP)	 in	 the	period	1992-2012.	This	
policy	 field	 approximates	most	 closely	 to	 “conventional	 security”	 as	 defined	 in	
the	conceptual	 framework.	The	key	questions	 for	 the	analysis	were:	how	 is	EU	
case	1	portrayed	in	elite	discourses?	What	are	the	main	discursive	strategies	and	




The	 analysis	will	 show	 that	 elite	 narratives	 diverged	 considerably	 in	 this	 case	
and	 that	 ideology	 and	 institutional	 context	 provide	 a	 useful	 interpretive	
framework	to	explain	this	diversity	of	ideas.	While	all	actors	shared	–	to	varying	
degrees	 of	 emphasis	 –	 a	 view	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 economically,	 politically	 and	
demographically	 weak	 and	 in	 decline,	 liberal	 and	 official	 actors	 were	 more	




menacing	 to	 US	 interests.	 The	 themes	 and	 language	 revealed	 in	 the	 analysis	
echoes	some	of	 the	 long-running	concerns	of	US	discourse	 in	 the	post-war	era:	
low	 expenditure	 on	 military	 capabilities,	 a	 lack	 of	 conviction	 or	 credibility	 in	




the	Atlantic	at	 the	 time,	as	analysts	 clashed	over	whether	 institutional	 reforms	
would	lead	to	significant	evolution	of	EU	foreign	policy	and	the	emergence	of	the	
EU	as	an	effective	security	actor36.	More	than	any	other	topic	related	to	Europe	
and	 security	 (including	 negotiations	 with	 Iran,	 Balkans	 crises,	 Iraq	 War	 or	
individual	 CSDP	 missions),	 the	 debate	 over	 the	 significance	 of	 institutional	








CSDP	 (6.1).	 A	 review	 of	 the	 institutional	 reforms	 introduced	 since	 the	 Lisbon	
Treaty	in	this	area	will	be	presented	with	particular	attention	given	to	the	policy	




















from	 the	 legal	 and	 policy	 context	 of	 the	 other	 case	 -	 and	 also	 demonstrate	 its	
salience	as	a	central	topic	of	US	elite	discourse	on	the	EU	as	a	security	actor.		
	
The	 second,	 third	 and	 fourth	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	 present	 each	 of	 the	
three	narratives	discovered	by	the	QCA	(5.2,	5.3,	5.4).	Each	section	will	analyse	
the	thematic	representation	of	the	EU’s	conventional	security	action	in	the	texts	






changed	 over	 time	 and	 the	 key	 differences	 in	 content	which	 create	 discursive	
borders	between	 these	narratives.	Quotations	 from	two	batteries	of	 interviews	
will	 be	 used	 where	 appropriate:	 to	 provide	 a	 richer	 insight	 into	 particular	
themes;	 or	 where	 the	 interviewees	 themselves	 reflexively	 noted	 discursive	
boundaries	in	perceptions	of	the	EU	as	security	actor.	
	
The	 conclusions	 will	 review	 the	 findings,	 highlighting	 the	 key	 differences	 and	
trends	 to	 be	 analysed	 more	 deeply	 in	 chapters	 6,	 7,	 and	 8.	 The	 variation	 in	
discourse	across	the	cases	(that	is,	the	way	in	which	discourse	varies	according	
to	the	“internal	dimension”:	policy	competence	exercised)	and	variation	between	
the	 embedded	 cases	 (how	 discourse	 varies	 according	 to	 the	 “external	










Conventional	 security	 is	 taken	 to	 refer	 to	matters	 related	 to	 traditional	 foreign	
policy	 and	 the	 security	 of	 states:	 what	 are	 generally	 viewed	 as	 “high	 politics”	
matters,	usually	the	preserve	of	sovereign	states	(Keukelaire	and	MacNaughtan,	
2008).	 CSDP	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 sub-field	 within	 conventional	 security,	
encompassing	 joint	 civilian	 and	 military	 missions	 conducted	 by	 EU	 member	
states	abroad	(Howorth,	2007).	The	institutional	context	for	CSDP	is	one	where	
decision-making	 is	 monopolised	 by	 member	 states	 operating	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
unanimity	 and	 where	 the	 autonomy	 of	 common	 institutions	 is	 constrained.	
CSDP’s	institutional	context	is	the	most	intergovernmental	of	EU	policy	domains;	
reflected	in	its	status	as	a	“special”	competence,	as	distinct	from	an	exclusive	or	




the	 EU’s	 security	 action	 has	 been	 reviewed	 in	 some	 detail	 in	 the	 introductory	
chapter	of	 this	 thesis,	 this	 section	will	 take	 the	 reforms	of	Lisbon	Treaty	as	 its	
starting	point.	
	
CSDP	 is	described	by	 the	Treaties	as	 “…an	 integral	part	of	 the	common	foreign	
and	 security	 policy,”38	Accepting	 this	 legal	 definition	 of	 the	 place	 of	 CSDP	 as	 a	
core	component	part	of	CFSP,	we	must	therefore	relate	the	development	of	CSDP	
to	 the	 broader	 movements	 in	 EU	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy.	 Indeed,	 the	
repetition	of	the	words	“common”	and	“security”	in	both	fields	indicate	a	similar	
level	of	ambition	and	of	substantive	policy	concern.	Because	this	 field	and	sub-
field	are	difficult	 to	 isolate	from	each	other	 in	policy	discourse	and	because	we	







The	original	 objective	of	CFSP	and	CSDP,	 as	 stated	 in	 the	Treaties,	was	 for	 the	
Union	 to	 “assert	 its	 identity	 on	 the	 international	 scene”39.	 The	 treaties	 further	
declare	 an	 ambition	 that	 the	 policies	 would	 lead	 to	 a	 “common	 defence”	 and	
announce	 that	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 these	 policies,	 the	 objective	 of	 the	
member	states	is	“…that	the	Union	is	able	to	assert	its	interests	and	values….”40	
These	 treaty	 excerpts	 reveal	 CSDP	 as	 a	 field	 with	 multiple	 purposes;	 both	
practical	 and	 ideational.	 As	 its	 title	 implies,	 CSDP	 aims	 to	 progressively	
strengthen	 modes	 of	 cooperation	 between	 member	 states	 on	 security	 and	
defence	 matters,	 leading	 ultimately	 to	 a	 common	 defence41.	 But	 the	 treaty	
articles	also	mark	out	CSDP	as	one	of	 the	central	 tools	employed	 for	 the	EU	 to	
project	 a	 role	 for	 itself	 internationally.	 Scholars	 have	 identified	 the	 cognitive	
function	 of	 foreign	 policy;	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 create	 or	 transform	 national	 identity.	
Foreign	policy	pronouncements	therefore	constitute:	“processes	changing	sense	
of	 self	 and	 an	 evolving	 set	 of	 intersubjective	 beliefs.”	 (Tonra	 2007;	 2).	 This	
intersubjective	 identity-construction	 function	 is	 explicitly	 acknowledged	 in	 the	




international	 actors	 could	 engage	with.	 The	 policy	 is	 presented	 as	 the	 Union’s	
own	contribution	to	global	discourse	on	its	security	identity.	The	question	arises:	





of	 “common”	 foreign	 policy	with	 resolute	 action	 had	 led	 scholars	 to	 critique	 a	
capability-expectations	 gap”	 (Hill,	 1993).	 Despite	 reforms	 in	 the	 Maastricht,	








further	 institutional	 engineering	 in	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 to	 address	 the	
disappointing	 performance	 of	 EU	 efforts	 in	 foreign	 policy	 and	 security.	 The	
Treaty	 made	 no	 fewer	 than	 twenty-five	 amendments	 dealing	 with	 CFSP	 and	
CSDP	(of	a	total	of	sixty-two)	to	the	Treaties	(Howorth,	2012).	Once	fully	ratified	
in	 2009,	 the	 Treaty	 boosted	 the	 position	 of	 High	 Representative,	 making	 the	
holder	a	vice-president	of	the	Commission	as	well	as	chair	of	the	Foreign	Affairs	
Council	 (FAC).	 This	 double-hatting	 of	 the	 position	 as	 High	 Representative	 for	
Foreign	 Affairs	 and	 Security	 Policy	 and	 simultaneously	 Vice-President	 of	 the	
European	Commission	(HRVP)	was	designed	to	ensure	seamless	coordination	of	
foreign	 and	 security	 policy	 between	 the	 European	 institutions,	 as	 the	 Council	
remained	 in	 full	 control	 of	 CFSP	 and	 CSDP,	 while	 the	 Commission	 retained	
control	 of	 external	 policies	 such	 as	 enlargement,	 development	 aid	 and	 the	
neighbourhood	policy	 (Helwig,	2012).	The	HRVP	gains	 the	 right	of	 initiative	 in	
CFSP	 (Article	18.	 2,3	TEU),	 represents	CFSP	externally	 and	 also	participates	 in	
the	 European	 Council.	 The	 HRVP	 was	 allocated	 resources	 to	 create	 an	 EU	
diplomatic	corps,	known	as	the	European	External	Action	Service	(EEAS).		
	
In	 defence	 matters	 –	 narrowly	 defined	 -	 there	 are	 three	 significant	 reforms	
included	in	the	Lisbon	Treaty	(Verola	2010:	47,	48):	
	
1. The	 use	 of	military	 as	well	 as	 civilian	means	 is	 now	 foreseen	 in	 the	
pursuit	of	the	Petersberg	Tasks.	
2. Following	a	unanimous	vote,	a	sub-group	of	states	can	take	on	a	larger	





In	 addition	 to	 rebranding	 ESDP	 as	 the	 Common	 Security	 and	 Defence	 Policy	
(CSDP),	 the	 Treaty	 also	 reaffirms	 a	 number	 of	 general	 principles	 such	 as;	
obligations	 to	 the	United	Nations	(Art.	3;5,	21;1,	TEU),	 the	specific	character	of	
member	state	defence	policies	(Art.	42;7)	and	national	responsibility	for	defence	
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In	 spite	 of	 institutional	 revisions	 to	 EU	 security	 policy	 in	 Maastricht	 (1990),	
Amsterdam	 (1999)	 and	 Lisbon	 (2009)	 the	 treaty	 provisions	 have	 been	
consistent	 in	 stating	 that	 CFSP	 and	 CSDP	 (the	 rebranded	 ESDP)	 are	 not	
“common”	in	the	sense	of	“first	pillar”	communitarian	policies,	rather	EU	security	
action	 takes	 place	 within	 its	 own	 “special”	 form	 of	 competence	 (Bindi,	 2009).	




1. Policy	measures	 are	 defined	 and	 implemented	by	 the	European	Council	
and	Foreign	Affairs	Council	(composed	of	member	state	representatives)	
rather	 than	 by	 supranational	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 European	
Commission.	 In	more	communitarian	policy	areas	 (such	as	Trade	or	 the	
Common	 Commercial	 Policy)	 the	 Commission	 has	 the	 exclusive	 right	 of	
initiative.		
2. The	dominant	decision-making	 rule	 in	 the	European	Council	 and	FAC	 is	




CFSP	 and	 CSDP.	 The	 European	 Parliament	 is	 consulted	 periodically	 and	
must	 consent	 to	 international	 agreements.	 The	 Treaties	 prohibit	 the	
European	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (ECJ)	 from	 ruling	 on	most	matters	 related	 to	
CFSP	or	CSDP,	 or	 the	 application	of	 the	 “flexibility	 clause”	 to	matters	 in	
this	area.	(Verola	2010:	47).	
	
These	 three	 factors	 mark	 out	 CSDP	 as	 among	 the	 least	 integrated	 and	 most	
intergovernmental	of	EU	policy	fields.	The	Treaty	provisions	reveal	the	desire	of	
member	 states	 to	 retain	 a	 large	 degree	 of	 control	 over	 security	 action	 and	 a	
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determination	to	prevent	any	form	of	competence	creep	on	the	part	of	European	
institutions	 in	 this	 domain.	 The	 lack	 of	 autonomy	on	 the	part	 of	 supranational	
institutions	 and	 the	 unanimity	 requirement	 in	 decision-making	 have	 acted	 as	
brakes	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	 truly	 effective	 and	 responsive	 European	 security	
action	 (Peterson,	 Byrne,	 Helwig	 2012).	 The	 essentially	 intergovernmentalist	
nature	of	CFSP	and	CSDP	 is	 clearly	acknowledged	by	scholars	 in	 the	 field,	who	
note	 that	 this	 policy	 domain	 is	 “…clearly	 subject	 to	 different	 rules	 and	
procedures	 from	 the	 other	 activities	 of	 the	 EU.	 It	 therefore	 remains	 a	 second	
pillar	as	it	was	before.”	(Piris	2010;	260).		
	
Much	 of	 the	 institutional	 redesign	 appeared	 to	 have	 complicated	 matters.	 As	
neither	an	institution,	nor	a	Commission	agency,	the	EEAS	became	an	arena	for	
turf-battles	 and	 institutional	 wrangles.	 Confronted	 by	 the	 Commission’s	
prerogatives	 in	 the	 communitarian	 fields	 of	 external	 relations	while	 CFSP	 and	
CSDP	 remain	 intergovernmental,	 the	 HRVP	 found	 her	 capacities	 limited	 by	
bureaucratic	 politics	 and	 the	 reluctance	 of	 member	 states	 to	 cede	 authority.	
After	over	forty	years	of	 institutional	experimentation,	concerted	foreign	policy	
action	 remained	 constrained:	 “reducing	 the	 capability-expectations	 gap	 is	 now	
mainly	 a	 matter	 of	 Member	 States’	 political	 will	 to	 use	 the	 potential	 of	
institutional	innovation”	(Helwig	2013,	241).		
	
CSDP	also	appeared	 to	be	hampered	by	a	 “political	 and	strategic	ambiguity”	at	
the	heart	of	 its	construction	(Bickerton	2011;	61).	Critics	noted	that	 in	spite	of	
general	 aspirations,	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 CSDP	 had	 never	 been	 spelled	 out;	 “a	
studied	 imprecision	about	 the	eventual	destination	has	…	been	essential	 to	 the	
process	of	ESDP”	(Heisbourg,	2000;	5).	This	ambiguity	was	identified	by	some	as	
the	reason	behind	disappointing	performance:	 “ESDP	was	 launched	without	an	
agreed	 concept,	without	 any	open	discussion	on	 the	 threats	 to	be	 faced	or	 the	
appropriate	 actions	 to	 be	 taken”	 (Wallace,	 2005:	 5).	 One	 prominent	 US	 think	
tank	 analyst,	 who	 later	 became	 an	 assistant	 secretary	 of	 state	 for	 European	
affairs,	 also	 noted	 the	 absence	 of	 shared	 strategic	 goals	 and	 enabling	 political	




Scholars	 have	 therefore	 identified	 a	 number	 of	 shortcomings	 in	 CSDP’s	
development:	unwieldy	and	complex	institutional	structures,	strategic	ambiguity	
and	 divergent	 political	 interests.	 Although	 successive	 treaty	 revisions	 have	
endeavoured	 to	 reengineer	 institutional	 structures	 to	 boost	 performance,	 the	
persistence	 of	 political	 and	 strategic	 deficiencies	 appears	 to	 have	 precluded	
effective	EU	responses	to	many	real-life	security	crises.		
	
In	 spite	 of	 these	 difficulties	 and	 shortcomings,	 the	 Union	 had	 some	 success	
stories	within	these	fields.	 	 In	CSDP,	well	over	20	missions	were	 launched	over	
the	 course	 of	 10	 years,	 across	 three	 continents	 -	 although	most	 of	 these	were	
civilian	 in	 nature	 (Grevi,	 Helly	 and	 Keohane,	 2009).	 These	 missions	 were	 not	
confined	 to	 the	European	continent,	with	CSDP	missions	deployed	 in	Chad,	DR	
Congo,	 Somalia,	 Libya	 and	 Afghanistan	 (Peterson,	 Byrne	 and	 Helwig,	 2012).	
Scholars	noted	that	CSDP	had	emerged	as	a	surprisingly	successful	asset	 in	the	
EU’s	foreign	policy	toolkit,	describing	it	as	“One	of	the	rare	recent	success	stories	



















community	 in	 April	 2011	 and	 June	 2013.	 Where	 relevant,	 the	
interviewees’	 reflexive	 comments	 on	 features	 of	 US	 elite	 discourse	 are	
also	presented.	
The	analysis	of	the	seventy-four	texts	in	this	corpus	reveals	three	distinct	public	
narratives.	 The	manner	 in	 which	 different	 cleavages	map	 onto	 this	 pattern	 of	
discourse	provides	us	with	an	interesting	picture	of	the	competing	domestic	sub-
groups,	 each	 vying	 to	 advance	 a	 particular	 vision	 of	 CSDP.	 The	 concepts	were	




















































conflicting	 perceptions	 of	 the	 EU,	 which	 diverged	 along	 ideological	 and	
bureaucratic	 cleavages	 within	 the	 corpus	 of	 texts,	 the	 first	 narrative	 was	
prevalent	–	to	varying	degrees	-	among	all	source	sub-groups.	This	 is	a	notable	




actors	 hold	 to	 be	 “accepted	 knowledge”	 or	 “common	 sense,”	 that	 sets	 the	
parameters	for	policy	responses	deemed	plausible	or	acceptable.	
The	comparative	chapter	will	analyse	variation	in	the	discourse	according	to	the	
embedded	 cases	 or	 “external	 variables”:	 conservative/liberal	 analysts,	
official/unofficial	actors,	public/private	official	discourse	as	well	as	between	the	
two	 cases	 themselves	 –	 the	 “internal	 variable”:	 policy	 competence	 level.	 The	
purpose	of	the	following	sections	is	to	present	the	ideational	content	of	each	of	







largely	 an	 American	 protectorate,	 with	 its	 allied	 states	 reminiscent	 of	 ancient	
vassals	and	tributaries.”	
		 	 	 	
-	Zbigniew	Brzezinski,	former	US	national	security	advisor.42	
	
The	 dominant	 narrative	 within	 this	 case	 presents	 the	 EU	 as	 growing	
progressively	 weaker	 in	 several	 dimensions;	 decision-making	 structures,	
leadership,	 economic	 prospects,	 social	 models,	 demographics,	 military	






















The	National	 Intelligence	 Council’s	 “Global	 Trends”	 surveys	 in	 2000	 and	 2010	
introduce	 the	 notion	 of	 internal	 weakness	 as	 the	 source	 of	 shortcomings	 in	
external	 foreign	 policy	 impact.	 Furthermore,	 the	 NIC’s	 analysis	 suggests	 this	
weakness	may	even	precipitate	the	dissolution	of	the	EU	itself.	The	NIC’s	report	
in	 2000	 suggests	 that	 demographic	 trends	 and	 “the	 welfare	 state”	 will	
undermine	the	EU’s	ability	to	assert	itself	internationally	by	2020:	
	
Either	 European	 countries	 adapt	 their	 work	 forces,	 reform	 their	 social	
welfare,	education,	and	tax	systems,	and	accommodate	growing	immigrant	




The	 report	 describes	 European	 social	 welfare	 models	 as	 “unsustainable”	 and	
likely	 to	 come	 under	 further	 pressure	 arising	 from	 “the	 lack	 of	 any	 economic	
revitalization”.	These	negative	trends	are	directly	linked	with	the	likely	failure	of	
the	 EU	 to	 pursue	 its	 goals	 in	 international	 politics:	 “these	 could	 lead	 to	 the	
splintering	or,	 at	worst,	 disintegration	of	 the	European	Union,	 undermining	 its	
ambitions	 to	play	 a	heavyweight	 international	 role”	 (ibid).	Ten	years	 later,	 the	
NIC’s	 group	 of	 analysts	 expressed	 similar	 expectations	 for	 Europe’s	 “relative	
decline”	by	2030.	
	
Analysts	 in	 liberal	 think	 tanks	 also	 share	 a	 concern	 for	 the	 EU’s	 economic	
weakness.	In	an	interview	about	the	EU’s	role	in	security	matters	in	2013,	Fiona	




see	 the	 political	 elements	 of	 European	 weakness	 as	 longstanding	 and	 cite	
important	historical	events	as	evidence	for	these	tendencies.	As	a	senior	 fellow	
in	 the	Brookings	 Institution	 in	 1997,	 Philip	Gordon	published	 an	 article	 in	 the	
journal	 “International	 Security”	 entitled	 “Europe’s	 Uncommon	 Foreign	 Policy”	
where	he	outlined	institutional	shortcomings	and	policy	disappointments	in	the	
early	 years	 of	 CSDP	 and	 concluded	 that	 the	 EU	 would	 remain	 a	 weak	 and	
subordinate	partner	of	the	US43.	
	
Mr	 Gordon’s	 examples	 of	 European	 political	 and	 institutional	 weakness	 are	
drawn	mainly	from	the	period	of	the	Clinton	administration,	when	he	served	as	
Director	 for	 European	 Affairs	 at	 the	 National	 Security	 Council.	 His	 account	 of	
elite	perceptions	of	the	EU	under	the	Clinton	presidency	provides	an	important	





In	 a	 description	 of	 President	 Clinton’s	 leading	 role	 in	 negotiating	 a	 peace	
agreement	 for	 former	 Yugoslavia,	 Mr	 Gordon	 cites	 what	 he	 says	 was	 a	
commonly-held	 view	 expressed	 by	 one	 senior	 official	 at	 the	 time:	 "Unless	 the	
United	States	is	prepared	to	put	its	political	and	military	muscle	behind	the	quest	
for	solutions	to	European	instability,	nothing	really	gets	done."	That	same	official	
is	 later	 quoted	 during	 another	 Clinton-led	 intervention	 in	 a	 European	 security	
crisis	-	 this	time	in	the	Aegean	–	saying	that	Europeans	were	"literally	sleeping	
through	the	night"	as	President	Clinton	mediated	the	dispute	on	the	phone.	Mr	
Gordon’s	 descriptions	 suggest	 that	 the	 administration	 was	 becoming	




















Mr	 Gordon’s	 assessment	 acknowledges	 the	 EU’s	 effectiveness	 in	 trade	 and	
humanitarian	 aid	 policies	 but	 points	 to	 a	 foreign	 policy	 that	 is	 “weak	 and	
fragmented	 …	 dependent	 on	 US	 leadership”	 and	 exercising	 “vastly	
underdeveloped	military	 force	projection	 capability”	 as	 cause	 for	 scepticism	of	
any	claims	of	foreign	policy	ability.	According	to	Mr	Gordon,	these	shortcomings	
mean	 the	EU	will	 continue	as	 “a	 relatively	minor	diplomatic	actor	 in	 the	wider	
world,	and	unable	to	deal	with	security	crises	even	on	its	own	periphery.”	(Ibid)	
Mr	Gordon	cites	a	“culture	of	security	dependency”	as	a	cause	for	the	EU’s	lack	of	









Officials	 in	Republican	administrations	also	expressed	similar	concerns	 in	 later	









as	 liberal).	The	context	 for	Mr	Haass’	article	 is	not	 the	Clinton	administration’s	
disappointment	with	CFSP	 in	 the	1990s	but	 the	 failure	 of	 European	 leaders	 to	
halt	the	financial	crisis	which	began	in	2009.	
	
The	 European	 project	 is	 foundering.	 Greece	 is	 the	 most	 pronounced	
problem,	 one	 brought	 about	 by	 its	 own	 profligacy	 and	 a	 weak	 EU	
leadership	that	permitted	it	to	live	beyond	its	means	and	violate	the	terms	
under	which	 the	 euro	was	 established.	 But	 the	 crisis	 was	made	worse	 by	





Mr	 Haass	 criticises	 an	 elite	 preoccupation	 with	 institutional	 reform	 in	 the	






The	 combination	 of	 structural	 economic	 flaws,	 political	 parochialism	 and	
military	limits	will	accelerate	this	transatlantic	drift.	A	weaker	Europe	will	
possess	a	smaller	voice	and	role	…	rarely,	 if	ever,	will	the	US	look	to	either	
Nato	 or	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 whole.	 Even	 before	 it	 began,	 Europe's	 moment	 as	 a	
major	world	power	in	the	21st	century	looks	to	be	over.		
	




military	 capability”	 (Kupchan,	 2007).	 A	 2004	 report	 for	 the	 CFR	 by	 several	
former	 senior	 officials	 warned	 that	 the	 task	 of	 forging	 a	 common	 European	
security	policy	and	the	assets	required	would	be	sidelined	by	the	need	to	absorb	
ten	 new	 member	 states.	 (Kupchan,	 Kissinger,	 Summers,	 2007).	 The	 recurrent	




Finally,	 a	 concern	 with	 economic	 weakness	 and	 decline	 led	 some	 analysts	 to	
speculate	that	the	resulting	political	tensions	would	have	a	“negative	impact	on	





the	 light	 of	 the	 negative	 trends	 in	 economics,	 demographics,	 politics	 and	





While	 there	are	many	sides	 to	 the	narrative	of	European	weakness	–	economic	
performance,	 declining	 demographic	 trends,	 struggling	 welfare	 systems	 –	










by	 officials	 in	 Democratic	 and	 Republican	 administrations,	 in	 public	 and	 in	
private.	 The	 theme’s	 prominence	 across	 all	 cleavages	 examined	 is	 a	 notable	
finding	 but	 the	 conclusions	 that	 sources	 derive	 from	 these	 observations	 often	
diverge	–	this	will	be	explored	subsequently	in	the	comparative	chapter.	
	
Writers	 in	 conservative	 think	 tanks	 use	 particularly	 dismissive	 language	 to	
emphasise	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 CSDP	 missions	 in	 resources	 and	 size.	 CSDP	
missions	 are	 described	 as	 “pathetic”	 (Carpenter	 and	 Tupy,	 2010),	 “laughable”	
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(Hulsman	 and	 Gardiner,	 2004)	 “lacklustre”	 (McNamara,	 2010)	 or	 “a	 flop	 …	 a	
complete	 failure”	 (Ibid).	 Luke	 Coffey	 at	 the	 Heritage	 Foundation	 refers	
specifically	 to	 the	CSDP	training	mission	 for	Malian	armed	forces	(EUTM	Mali):	
“In	 Mali,	 European	 countries	 have	 been	 able	 to	 scrape	 together	 only	 150	
instructors	 to	 train	 the	 Malian	 military.”	 (Coffey,	 2013).	 The	 same	 author	
contrasts	the	scale	of	EUTM	Mali	with	NATO’s	mission	in	Afghanistan:	“Every	12	
hours,	 NATO	 spends	 the	 same	 amount	 training	 the	 Afghans	 that	 the	 EU	 will	
spend	 all	 year	 on	 training	 the	 Malian	 Army.”	 (Ibid.).	 In	 testimony	 before	 the	
House	Committee	on	Foreign	Affairs,	one	Heritage	Foundation	analyst	described	




Perhaps	 in	 recognition	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 CSDP	 capabilities	 are	 a	 function	 of	
member	 state	 decisions	 to	 allocate	 military	 resources	 between	 NATO,	 CSDP	
missions	and	elsewhere,	the	criticism	of	European	weakness	is	broadened	out	to	
include	European	defence	 capabilities	 in	 general.	 In	his	 lengthy	article	 entitled	
“EU	 Defense	 Integration:	 Undermining	 NATO,	 Transatlantic	 Relations,	 and	
Europe’s	 Security”,	 Luke	 Coffey	 criticises	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 European	
countries	 who	 “were	 literally	 running	 out	 of	 munitions”	 during	 the	 NATO	 air	
campaign	in	Libya	(Ibid).			European	countries	participating	in	the	NATO	mission	
in	 Afghanistan	 are	 described	 as	 “running	 for	 the	 exit”	 (Ibid).	 These	 individual	
disappointments	 are	 seen	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 poor	 investment	 decisions	 and	
inflexible	armed	forces,	made	by	a	Europe	which	is	“not	pooling	its	weight”:	
	
European	 countries	 collectively	 have	 more	 than	 two	 million	 men	 and	




These	 shortcomings	 echo	 complaints	 about	 low	 defence	 spending	 which	 –	 as	
outlined	 in	 the	 literature	 review	 chapter	 –	 have	 dominated	 US	 discourse	 on	
European	security	 since	 the	end	of	 the	war.	The	 twin	problems	of	 low	defence	





credibility	 and	 military	 capacity	 is	 a	 recipe	 for	 disaster	 and	 an	 invitation	 to	
provocation.”	(McNamara,	2010)	
	
Europe’s	 defence	 expenditure	 is	 viewed	 as	 an	 inadequate	 and	 rapidly	
diminishing	 pool	 of	 resources.	 In	 this	 context,	 spending	 on	 CSDP	 missions	 is	
portrayed	as	wasteful	and	contrary	to	the	US	objective	of	sharing	the	burden	of	
defence	 more	 equally	 within	 NATO:	 “The	 CSDP	 has	 not	 resulted	 in	 greater	
defense	resources	or	more	troops,	however.	Rather,	 it	has	allowed	EU	member	
states	to	further	reduce	defense	spending	on	the	grounds	that	pooled	resources	










Official	 sources	 are	 only	 marginally	 less	 critical	 than	 conservative	 analysts	 of	
European	defence	spending,	although	not	since	the	late	1990s	have	any	officials	
identified	 CSDP	 per	 se	 as	 a	 direct	 threat	 to	 NATO.	 In	 a	 much	 remarked	 upon	
speech	 delivered	 in	 Brussels	 shortly	 before	 the	 end	 of	 his	 term	 in	 2010,	 US	
Secretary	for	Defence	Robert	Gates,	warned	of	“a	dim,	if	not	dismal	future	for	the	





Secretary	 Gates’	 speech	 was	 primarily	 related	 to	 the	 future	 of	 NATO	 but	 the	
central	 issue	 was	 low	 defence	 spending	 and	 what	 this	 means	 for	 European	
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security.	 Several	 interviewees	 referred	 to	 the	Gates	 speech	as	an	expression	of	
widely	 felt	 frustration	 at	 Europe’s	 unwillingness	 to	 spend	 more	 on	 defence	
(McNamara,	 Kamgar,	 Doherty,	 Wierichs).	 Secretary	 Gates’	 successor,	 Leon	
Panetta,	described	the	speech	as	“a	strong	message	to	Europe	about	the	need	to	
boost	its	commitment	to	defense	and	more	equitably	share	the	security	burden	
with	 the	 United	 States”	 (Panetta,	 2011).	 One	 conservative	 analyst	 said	 the	





to	 the	 undeniable	 consensus	 in	 Washington	 that	 Europe	 was	 not	 investing	
appropriately	 in	 its	defence	and	that	 its	weakness	made	 it	a	burden	on	 the	US.	
Clara	 O’Donnell	 at	 the	 Brookings	 Institute	 warned	 that	 “The	 latest	 wave	 of	
European	military	spending	cuts	is	swelling	the	ranks	of	Americans	who	believe	
that	 Europeans	 are	 not	 contributing	 enough	 to	 global	 security”	 (O’Donnell,	
2012).	 In	 a	 subsequent	 interview	 for	 this	 thesis,	 Ms	 O’Donnell	 confirmed	 that	
this	 belief	 was	 viewed	 as	 the	 primary	 challenge	 for	 European	 security	
integration	 within	 US	 foreign	 policy	 circles	 (Interview,	 2013).	 Former	 official	
Richard	Haass,	now	at	the	Council	on	Foreign	Relations,	repeated	the	criticisms:	
“Few	European	states	are	willing	 to	devote	even	2	per	cent	of	 their	budgets	 to	













credibility	 of	 CSDP	 missions:	 	 “EU	 member	 states	 simply	 do	 not	 have	 the	
	 140	
personnel	 and	military	 assets	 needed	 to	 undertake	 a	 substantial	 expansion	 of	
their	missions	abroad.”	(Kupchan,	2008)	
	
Without	 exception,	 all	 analysts	 and	 policymakers	 identified	 low	 defence	
spending	as	an	obstacle	to	an	effective	EU	security	role	and	few	saw	any	prospect	
of	 this	 changing.	One	 senior	 state	department	official	 said	 the	key	obstacles	 to	
“better	 defense	 spending”	 were	 “outmoded	 procurement	 rules,	 protectionism	
and	competing	industrial	interests”	in	the	European	defence	market.	(Interview	
no.	 14,	 2013).	 The	 consistency	 of	 American	 criticism	 of	 Europe’s	 “inadequate”	
defence	spending	is	striking	across	the	timeframe	of	this	study.	It	is	hard	to	find	
substantial	 differences	 in	 tone,	 content	 or	 argumentation	 between	 Secretary	
Gates’	speech	and	that	of	Philip	Gordon,	writing	 in	the	 late	1990s:	“There	 is	no	
sign,	 moreover,	 that	 Europeans	 are	 prepared	 to	 do	 very	 much	 about	 their	
military	dependence	on	the	United	States.”	 (Gordon,	1997).	The	message	 is	 the	
same	 from	officials	 in	Republican	 and	Democrat	 administrations.	 Colin	 Powell,	
Secretary	of	State	during	the	George	W.	Bush	administration,	remarked	in	2001:	
“There	has	been	too	much	of	a	reduction	in	European	defense	budgets	in	recent	




The	 third	 constitutive	 sub-theme	 for	 the	 narrative	 of	 European	 weakness	
describes	the	EU	as	unable	to	overcome	internal	divisions	and	act	decisively	on	
CSDP	matters.	 EU	member	 states	 are	 seen	 as	 divided	 along	 a	 number	 of	 lines:	
large	and	small,	old	and	new	and	generally	composed	of	varying	factions,	unable	
to	agree	on	responses	to	security	questions	and	unwilling	to	integrate	further	in	
this	area.	 Institutional	 innovations	 introduced	by	the	Lisbon	Treaty	are	seen	as	
failing	 to	 meet	 expectations,	 and,	 according	 to	 some,	 making	 decision-making	
more	difficult	to	understand.	
	






during	 the	 Iraq	 crisis	 is	 a	 major	 landmark	 event	 for	 the	 theme	 of	 disunity.	













Throughout	 the	2000s,	conservative	analysts	regularly	pointed	to	 the	 Iraq	War	
split	 as	 evidence	 of	 Europe’s	 chronic	 disunity:	
	





A	 year	 later,	 the	 same	 writers	 used	 almost	 identical	 language	 –	 describing	 a	
“complete	lack	of	coordination”	on	“the	fundamental	issue	of	the	past	few	years”	
(Hulsman	and	Gardiner,	2005).	These	conservative	writers	argued	that	strategic	
unity	 was	 impossible	 without	 unity	 among	 the	 larger	 member	 states:	 “The	
notion	 that	Europe	has	one	voice	or	 is	united	 in	outlook	 is	a	myth	…	 the	great	
European	powers	rarely	agree”	(Ibid).	
	
Much	analysis	of	 the	EU’s	effectiveness	 in	security	matters	 from	the	 late	2000s	
onwards	related	to	the	reforms	contained	within	the	Lisbon	Treaty.	The	impact	
of	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 reforms	 to	 CFSP	 and	 CSDP	 was	 a	 major	 topic	 within	 all	
narratives.	The	difference	in	opinion	over	the	effectiveness	in	Lisbon	is	therefore	
a	 major	 dividing	 line	 between	 the	 narratives.	 During	 a	 panel	 session	 at	 the	
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Brookings	 Institution,	 Justin	 Vaisse	 summarised	 the	 frustrated	 expectations	 of	
liberal	analysts	regarding	the	Lisbon	reforms:	
	
In	 the	years	 leading	 to	 the	Lisbon	Treaty	and	after	 the	Lisbon	Treaty	was	





Mr	Vaisse	 observed	 that	 the	External	Action	 Service	 had	not	 had	 “a	 very	 good	
year”.	 He	 noted	 that	 the	 High	 Representative	 had	 been	 criticised	 for	 “her	
personal	lack	of	interest	in	all	security	issues	and	pushing	forward	CSDP,”	(ibid).		
Many	 interviewees	 said	 that	 promises	 of	 a	 “leap	 forward”	 in	 the	 EU’s	
international	capacity	had	not	materialised	after	the	Lisbon	Treaty	was	ratified	
and	 added	 that	 this	 disappointment	 had	 created	 a	 sense	 of	 resignation	 about	
Europe’s	 “decline”.	 One	 former	 assistant	 secretary	 of	 state	 in	 a	 Republican	
administration	described	the	disappointment	in	an	interview:	
	
“I’m	 surprised	 [the	Europeans]	aren’t	more	embarrassed	by	how	 little	has	
been	achieved.	You	know	everyone	was	going	around	saying	‘Oh	the	Lisbon	
Treaty	 is	 coming,	 everything	 is	 going	 to	 get	 better,	we’re	 going	 to	 have	 a	
stronger	 voice.’	 And	 you	 know,	 clearly	 very	 little	 of	 that	 has	 actually	
happened.	“	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Interview	18,	2013.	
	
More	than	just	a	disappointment,	one	senior	advisor	in	the	State	Dept	under	the	
Obama	 administration,	 said	 Lisbon	 had	made	 the	 EU	 a	more	 complicated	 and	
confusing	security	partner:	“Lisbon	has	made	things	worse;	 the	 institutions	are	
harder	 to	 figure	out	now,	 it’s	more	complicated,	 it’s	more	difficult	 to	pin	down	
where	responsibility	lies.”	(Interview	15,	2011)	
	
Conservative	 analysts	 echoed	 this	 private	 statement	 by	 a	 democrat	 appointee,	
arguing	that	Lisbon	exacerbated	the	EU’s	disunity	on	security	questions;	“Lisbon	
delivered	bureaucratic	confusion	rather	than	continental	clarity	…	Ashton	found	
herself	 limited	 both	 by	 the	 demands	 of	 member	 governments	 and	 the	 newly	
empowered	 European	 Parliament”	 (Bandow,	 2010).	 Much	 of	 the	 conservative	
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criticism	of	the	EU’s	post-Lisbon	security	capabilities	was	directed	at	Catherine	
Ashton,	who	 faced	 criticism	 for	 her	 “lack	 of	 stature”	 and	 inexperience	 on	both	
sides	 of	 the	 Atlantic	 (McNamara,	 EUFP,	 2010).	 The	 same	 writer	 describes	 EU	
decision-making	 on	 CSDP	 matters	 as	 an	 area	 where	 “confusion	 remains	 rife”	
(McNamara,	 Congressional	 testimony,	 2010).	 The	 Treaty	 had	 created	 “an	











of	 contact	 at	 political	 level.	 The	 new	 structures	 had	 not	 ended	 what	 some	
Americans	perceived	as	a	European	preoccupation	with	style	over	substance.	In	
an	 interview,	one	senior	advisor	described	 in	detail	President	Obama’s	 “anger”	









Following	 the	 incident,	 the	President	did	not	attend	 the	next	 traditional	EU-US	
bi-annual	 summit	 in	 Spain,	 citing	 scheduling	 commitments.	 According	 to	 the	
senior	 advisor,	 the	 lack	 of	 policy	 substance	 at	 the	 Portugal	 Summit	 gave	
President	 Obama	 the	 impression	 than	 an	 inability	 to	 agree	 on	 matters	 of	







in	 a	 language	 shared	 with	 conservatives	 (See	 Fig.	 5.1).	 But	 holding	 these	 two	
views	may	 not	 be	 as	 contradictory	 as	 it	might	 seem.	 Zbigniew	 Brzezinski,	 the	
former	 national	 security	 advisor,	 who	 was	 quoted	 in	 section	 5.2	 criticising	




Acting	 separately,	 America	 can	 be	 preponderant	 but	 not	 omnipotent;	
Europe	can	be	rich	but	impotent.	Acting	together,	America	and	Europe	are	
in	effect	globally	omnipotent.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Brzezinski,	Z.	2004.	
	
Although	Mr	Brzezinski	wrote	these	remarks	in	2004,	arguably	in	the	twilight	of	
America’s	 “unipolar	moment,”	his	optimism	 for	 transatlantic	 synergies	appears	
to	 be	 one	 in	 a	 long-standing	 strand	 of	 liberal	 American	 discourse.	 American	
transatlanticists	 in	 this	 vein	 have	 long	 complained	 of	 European	 weakness	 –
particularly	 in	defensive	 terms	–	while	still	endorsing	a	partnership	with	other	
values	 –	 including	 legitimacy,	 shared	 liberal	 values	 and	 economic	 ties	 (Kagan,	
2004;	 150).	 While	 both	 conservatives	 and	 liberals	 adopt	 a	 common	 starting	
point	 in	 lamenting	 European	 weakness	 and	 disunity,	 they	 diverge	 on	 the	












The	QCA	 identified	a	 second	narrative	within	 this	 corpus	 -	primarily	 identified	
with	liberal	analysts,	democrat	administrations	and	the	second	George	W.	Bush	
term:	the	EU	as	a	valued	partner.	This	narrative	contains	many	similar	themes	to	











referencing	 this	 background	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 their	 speeches,	 officials	 are	
establishing	ethos	with	their	audience.	As	a	discursive	strategy,	ethos	makes	an	
appeal	from	the	speaker’s	character	–	establishing	the	locus	standi	of	the	US	as	a	
historical	 sponsor	 of	 integration	 and	 a	 trusted	 partner	 (Leith	 2012;	 47).	 This	




typical	 example	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 appeal:	
	
In	 the	democracies	of	Europe,	we	 find	countries	with	shared	strategic	and	







Two	 years	 previously,	 Jeremy	 Shapiro,	 a	 senior	 advisor	 appointed	 to	 the	 State	
Dept	 under	 the	 Obama	 administration	 told	 an	 audience	 at	 the	 Brookings	




to	 reassure	 audiences	 that	 US	 commitment	 to	 European	 integration	 was	 not	
waning.	Both	President	Obama	and	President	Bush	stood	accused	of	ignoring	or	
disregarding	 Europe	 respectively	 in	 their	 first	 terms;	 President	 Obama	 was	
accused	of	prioritising	Asia	while	President	Bush’s	commitment	was	put	in	doubt	
by	 the	 Iraq	 crisis.	 (Levy,	 Pensky	 and	 Torpy,	 2005).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 official	
discourse	is	characterised	by	a	“second	term	juncture”	–	common	to	Presidents	
of	both	parties	 -	where	officials	work	 to	 convince	European	partners	 that	 they	
are	valued	by	the	White	House.	As	has	been	noted	by	John	Peterson	and	Roland	
Dannreuther,	 the	 second	 Bush	 term	 “showed	 fresh	 interest	 in	 cooperative	
engagement,	particularly	with	the	European	Union,”	(Dannreuther	and	Peterson,	
2006;	4).	As	 former	assistant	secretary	of	state	Kurt	Volker	noted:	 “It	 is	not	an	
accident	 that	President	Bush’s	 first	 trip	 in	his	 second	 term	was	 to	Europe,	and	
the	same	is	true	for	Secretary	of	State	Rice.”	(Volker	2005)	
	
In	 her	 European	 tour	 soon	 after	 the	 inauguration	 of	 George	W.	 Bush’s	 second	
term,	 Secretary	 of	 State	 Condoleeza	 Rice	 sought	 to	 “open	 a	 new	 chapter”	 in	





shared	 values,	 of	 shared	 sacrifice	 and	 of	 shared	 successes.	 So,	 too,	 will	 be	 our	
shared	future,”	[emphasis	added]	(Ibid).	The	triple	repetition,	or	tricolon,	 in	the	
use	 of	 “shared”	 uses	 a	 common	 rhetorical	 tool	 to	 establish	 a	 sense	 of	
commonality	 and	 community	 in	 the	 audience’s	 mind.	 Finally,	 the	 fourth	
repetition	 of	 “shared”	 in	 the	 final	 sentence	 places	 additional	 emphasis	 on	 “the	















Obama’s	 second	 term	 juncture	was	marked	not	 by	disagreement	 over	war	but	
rather	 European	 suspicions	 regarding	 his	 stated	 aim	 of	 an	 “Asia	 Pivot”	 –	
described	 as	 realigning	 “the	 center	 of	 gravity	 for	 U.S.	 foreign	 policy,	 national	
security,	 and	economic	 interests	…	 towards	Asia,”	 and	 the	conviction	 “that	U.S.	
strategy	 and	 priorities	 need	 to	 be	 adjusted	 accordingly,”	 (Manyin,	 2012).	
Officials,	 in	 particular	 Secretary	 Clinton,	 would	 repeatedly	 state	 that	 the	 “Asia	
pivot”	 was	 not	 a	 pivot	 away	 from	 Europe	 and	 that	 US	 support	 for	 European	
integration	 remained	 strong.	 In	 a	 speech	 with	 striking	 similarities	 in	 ethos	 to	
Secretary	Rice’s	speech	seven	years	earlier,	Secretary	Clinton	opened	a	seminar	
by	 referencing:	 “shared	 strategic	 and	 economic	 interests,”	 and	 “a	 long	 history,	
deep	cultural	ties,	and	cherished	values.”	(Clinton,	2012.)	
	
This	 general	 statement	 of	 affinity	 with	 “Europe”	 and	 “European	 countries”	 is	
almost	 identical	 in	 content	 to	 the	 introductions	 of	 speeches	 on	 transatlantic	
relations	made	 in	official	US	texts	over	all	 three	administrations.	The	emphasis	
on	commonality	and	the	description	of	a	“natural”	partnership	implies	that	both	






Secretary	 Clinton	 directly	 addresses	 concerns	 about	 shifting	 US	 priorities,	
saying:	“let	me	be	clear:	Our	pivot	to	Asia	is	not	a	pivot	away	from	Europe.	On	the	
contrary,	we	want	Europe	to	engage	more…”	(Ibid).	She	references	her	visits	to	
Europe	 as	 a	 reflection	 of	 commitment	 to	 Europe:	 “38	 visits	 to	 Europe	 is	
something	that	I	have	been	delighted	to	do	because	of	the	importance	we	place	
on	these	relationships,”	(Ibid).45	Liberal	analysts	speaking	at	a	conference	on	EU-








Expressions	 of	 commitment	 and	 general	 sentiments	 of	 commonality	 in	 official	
speeches	 are	 usually	 the	 prelude	 to	more	 detailed	 endorsements	 of	 European	
integration	and	an	explicit	welcome	for	the	reforms	to	CSDP	in	the	Lisbon	Treaty.	







practise	 however,	 the	 NSS	 serves	 a	 number	 of	 goals	 including	 communicating	
priorities	 to	 foreign	constituencies,	select	domestic	audiences,	creating	 internal	
consensus	on	issues	within	the	executive	and	shaping	the	President’s	approach	
in	 both	 substance	 and	messaging.	 (Snider,	 1995).	 As	 such,	 this	 document	 is	 a	
landmark	statement	of	strategy,	which	 is	drafted	as	part	of	multi-departmental	









As	early	as	2002,	 the	NSS	expresses	support	 for	European	security	 integration.	




We	welcome	our	European	allies’	 efforts	 to	 forge	 a	 greater	 foreign	policy	













“pressing	 issues	 of	 mutual	 concern,”	 although	 these	 remained	 unspecified.	
According	to	at	least	two	interviewees,	the	diluting	of	explicit	support	for	CSDP	





repeatedly	 emphasised	 her	 support	 for	 the	 newly	 appointed	 HRVP,	 Catherine	
Ashton.	 Several	 interviewees	 said	 that	 the	 Secretary	 wished	 to	 bolster	 the	
HRVP’s	 position	 in	 the	 face	 of	 bitter	 attacks	 against	 Ms	 Ashton	 by	 many	
European	 diplomats	 and	 commentators	 (Interviews	 7,	 8,	 12,	 15).	 According	 to	
these	sources,	the	discourse	of	support	for	HRVP	was	part	of	a	policy	to	support	




Let	me	 add	what	 a	 pleasure	 it	 has	 been	working	with	 Cathy	 Ashton.	 Not	
only	 is	she	a	great	diplomat	and	a	personal	 friend,	but	 it	 is	exciting	to	see	
the	EU	becoming	a	more	cohesive	voice	in	world	affairs.	




close	 relationship	 with	 Ashton	 and	 described	 the	 EU	 as	 “an	 invaluable	 and	




(Ibid).	 These	 sentiments	 were	 reiterated	 by	 the	 Secretary’s	 deputy,	 Philip	





Catherine	 Ashton,	 including	 Baroness	 Ashton’s	 visit	 to	 Washington,	 D.C.,	
where	 she	 spent	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 time	with	 the	 Secretary	 and	 her	
other	counterparts,	and	again	in	London	this	week.	And	we	look	forward	to	





pointed	 to	 Clinton’s	 personal	 support	 of	 Ashton	 as	 evidence	 that	 the	 US	 was	
committed	 to	 engaging	 with	 the	 EU	 and	 supporting	 it	 in	 its	 efforts	 to	 be	 an	
effective	 global	 actor.	 This	 strategy	 is	 best	 described	 by	 Justin	 Vaisse	 in	 an	
interview	 in	 2010:	 “Hillary	 Clinton	 has	 already	 granted	 Catherine	 Ashton	







I	wouldn’t	 underestimate	 the	 increasing	weight	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 the	world	…	
Over	 time	 the	European	Union	 as	 an	 institution	 has	 gained	 an	 increasing	
voice	-	you’ve	seen	the	way	that	Secretary	Clinton	and	High	Representative	
Ashton	work	together		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Gordon,	2013.	
	
Gordon	described	 the	pair’s	coordination	on	 topics	 including	 Iran,	Afghanistan,	
Pakistan,	Middle	 East,	 Israel	 and	 Egypt	 before	 telling	 his	 audience	 of	 the	 EU’s	
potential	 for	 a	 global	 role:	 “When	Europeans	 put	 their	 resources	 together	 and	
have	a	 collective	decision-making	 function	 they	end	up	playing	a	major	 role	 in	
the	 world,”	 (Gordon,	 2013).	 Throughout	 his	 comments	 to	 the	 British	 press,	
Assistant	Secretary	Gordon	expressed	support	for	the	EU	as	“an	institution	which	
has	 an	 increasing	 voice	 in	 the	 world”	 and	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	
continued	British	membership:	“We	value	a	strong	European	Union	…	the	EU	in	
particular	 is	 such	 a	 critical	 partner	 for	 the	United	 States	 on	 all	 of	 these	 global	
issues...”	(Ibid)	
	
The	 language	used	by	senior	officials	on	 this	 topic	can	often	be	vague	–	 the	US	
values	a	“strong	Europe”	which	plays	a	“major	role”.	Comments	about	“Europe”	
can	refer	to	the	EU	or	to	NATO	or	to	member	states.	But	in	detailed	discussions	
at	 the	Brookings	 Institution	 in	2010,	 State	Dept	 senior	 advisor	 Jeremy	Shapiro	
confirmed	 that	 the	 Obama	 administration	 supported	 the	 EU’s	 security	 and	
defense	policies:		
	
“On	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 United	 States	 is	 encouraging	 -	 would	
encourage	a	common	European	-	by	which	I	take	it	you	mean	European	Union	-	
defense	policy,	and	the	answer	is	an	unequivocal	yes.”	 	 	 	 	
	




that	 the	 US-EU	 partnership	 extended	 beyond	 “soft”	 foreign	 policy	 issues:	 “We	




Even	 opponents	 of	 European	 integration	 are	 agreed	 that	 the	 Obama	
administration	supports	the	development	of	CSDP	–	also	speaking	in	2010,	Sally	
McNamara	 of	 the	 Heritage	 Foundation	 said:	 “The	 Obama	 Administration	 has	
given	its	full	backing	not	just	to	economic	integration	-	a	long-standing	U.S.	policy	
-	 but	 also	 to	 the	 centralization	 of	 defense	 and	 security	 policies,”	 (McNamara,	
2010).	 Based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 statements	 by	 the	 Clinton	 and	 Bush	
administrations,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 public	 support	 for	 European	 security	
integration	 expressed	 by	 the	 Obama	 administration	 is	 not	 the	 departure	 from	
long-standing	 US	 policy	 discourse	 that	 McNamara	 suggests	 it	 is.	 But	 several	
analysts	 described	 a	 gradual	 shift	 in	 perceptions	 -	 throughout	 the	 1992-2012	
period	–	from	official	fears	of	European	integration	as	threatening	to	NATO,	to	a	




there	 was	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 fear	 in	 the	 US	 at	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	 United	 States	 of	
Europe.	That	seems	so	far-fetched	now,”	(Hill,	2013).	Hill	suggested	the	Obama	
administration	was	more	concerned	by	the	prospect	of	“the	EU’s	disappearance”	
(Ibid).	 But	 this	 shift	 in	 thinking	 took	 place	 gradually	 over	 the	 twenty	 years	
covered	by	the	QCA,	most	notably	during	the	Republican	administration	where	





In	public,	 senior	officials	 conceded	 that	US	elite	 attitudes	 to	European	 security	
integration	had	changed	from	the	era	of	“Europhobia”.	 In	2003,	Secretary	Colin	
Powell	described	how	 the	early	days	of	ESDI	 led	 “some	observers”	 to	 fear	 that		
the	 US	 and	 the	 EU	 “would	 even	 end	 up	 on	 a	 collision	 course”	 (Powell	 2003).	
Instead,	 security	cooperation	had	grown:	 “never	has	our	common	agenda	been	













Yet	 the	 added	 value	 of	 CSDP	 missions	 was	 not	 unanimously	 accepted	 by	
members	of	 the	US	 foreign	policy	 community,	who	would	disagree	–	mostly	 in	
private	–	about	whether	CSDP	missions	were	effective,	good	value	for	money,	or	





The	 third	 –	 and	 least	 prominent	 –	 aspect	 of	 this	 narrative	 describes	 the	
effectiveness	 of	 CSDP	 in	 detail.	 Few	 sources	 discuss	 specific	 CSDP	missions	 in	
any	 detail	 in	 public	 comments	 or	 texts.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 public	 speeches	 about	
European	security	 tend	 to	abstraction	and	avoid	detail,	given	 the	audience	and	
purpose	 of	 such	 pronouncements.	 However	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 that	 even	
European	specialists	in	the	US	foreign	policy	community	are	simply	unaware	of	
these	missions	 or	 consider	 them	 insignificant.	When	 asked	 in	 semi-structured	
interviewees	to	name	specific	CSDP	missions	they	thought	were	effective,	only	a	
minority	 of	 respondents	 named	 a	 specific	 mission	 by	 name,	 region	 or	 task.	
However,	when	officials	or	 liberal	 analysts	mention	 specific	CSDP	outcomes	or	
missions	in	public	pronouncements,	they	are	described	in	positive	terms.		
	
In	 the	 Gulf	 of	 Aden,	 an	 EU	 naval	 force	 protects	 vulnerable	 boats	 from	
pirates,	including	the	World	Food	Programme	vessels	which	deliver	food	to	
Somali	people.	 In	 the	months	 to	 come,	 the	EU	will	 deploy	 civilians	 to	help	
the	 government	 in	 Niger	 reform	 its	 security	 sector	 (a	 country	 where,	







Interviewees	 gave	more	 candid	 and	 usually	 less	 positive	 impressions	 of	 CSDP	
missions.	 One	 State	 Dept	 official	 described	 her	 experience	working	 to	 agree	 a	
Framework	Participation	Agreement	(FPA)	with	the	EU,	providing	the	legal	and	
political	basis	for	contributing	US	civilian	personnel	to	CSDP	missions.	This	was	
the	 first	attempt	at	 such	a	personnel	 transfer	and	as	US	military	personnel	are	
prohibited	 from	 serving	 under	 foreign	 command,	 a	 US	 civilian	 personnel	
contribution	 was	 a	 highly	 significant	 and	 sensitive	 step	 in	 EU-US	 security	
cooperation.	According	to	the	interviewee,	officials	differed	over	whether	it	was	
valuable	for	the	US	to	cooperate	directly	with	CSDP	missions	and	were	“divided”	





did	 send	 civilian	 personnel	 to	 EUPOL	 RD	 Congo	 but	 the	 interviewee	 said	 the	
experience	did	not	improve	perceptions	of	CSDP	in	general:	
	
“The	 entire	 process	 of	 agreeing	 the	 memorandum	 –	 and	many	 of	 the	 delays	
were	on	our	own	side	I	might	add,	because	there	was	a	 lot	of	scepticism	from	
some	 quarters	 about	 what	 this	 would	 mean	 –	 this	 process	 was	 extremely	





“not	 on	 people’s	 radar	 here,”	 (Interview	 19).	 The	 same	 respondent	 said	 there	
was	 little	 interest	 in	 CSDP	 among	 the	 US	 foreign	 policy	 community	 in	





seen	 as	 “soft	 security	 –	 things	 like	 police	 training”	 rather	 than	 conflict	
engagement	(Volker).	One	liberal	analyst	summed	up	the	view:	“When	it	comes	
to	European	defence,	the	only	thing	people	are	interested	in	is	defence	spending.	
Talk	 about	 ‘the	 comprehensive	 approach’	 just	 doesn’t	 cut	 it	 around	 here,”	
(Interview	 19).	 Another	 senior	 research	 fellow	 said	 that	 there	 were	 limited	
career	 opportunities	 within	 think	 tanks	 for	 someone	 specialised	 in	 CSDP	
missions,	or	even	European	security	more	generally,	if	they	did	not	have	broader	
interests	and	expertise	(Interview	20).	It	would	appear	then,	that	while	officials	






“For	 years,	 the	 EU's	 common	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy,	 and	 particularly	 the	





The	 third	 and	 final	 discourse	discovered	during	 the	QCA	differs	 radically	 from	
the	narrative	of	the	EU	as	a	valued	and	effective	actor	on	security	policy.	Instead	
it	 argues	 that	 security	 integration	 in	 general,	 and	 CSDP	 in	 particular,	 pose	 a	
threat	 to	 American	 interests.	 The	 coherence	 and	 compatibility	 of	 the	 range	 of	















hostile	 to	 American	 interests	 and	 the	 NATO	 alliance.	 As	 with	 the	 previous	
discourses	analysed,	 the	 sources	 composing	 this	discourse	do	not	all	 share	 the	
same	 threat-level	 perception	 of	 CSDP	 and	 indeed,	 some	 welcome	 its	
development.	 The	 texts	 have	 been	 grouped	 together	 within	 this	 narrative	









overriding	 concern	 for	 the	 primacy	 of	 NATO	 as	 the	 forum	 for	 the	 conduct	 of	
transatlantic	security.	This	appears	unsurprising,	as	the	US	is	a	member	of	NATO,	
and	 not	 a	 member	 of	 the	 EU.	 NATO	 has	 a	 long	 track	 record	 of	 dealing	 with	




In	 a	 speech	 given	 just	 a	 few	months	 earlier,	 entitled	 “The	 Future	 of	 European	
Security”,	 Secretary	 of	 State	 Hillary	 Clinton	 cautioned	 that	 EU	 military	
capabilities	 “should	 not	 supplant	 NATO”,	 advising	 that	 “smarter	 military	
expenditure	means	using	the	systems	we	already	have	in	place”	(Clinton	2010).	
While	 extreme	 right-wing	 actors	 appear	 to	 depict	 the	 EU	 threat	 to	 NATO	 in	







The	 concern	 regarding	 NATO’s	 primacy,	 and	 the	 threat	 which	 European	












Albright’s	 three-point	caution,	 issued	 just	days	after	 the	Franco-British	St	Malo	
Declaration	 -	 reveals	 a	 concern	 that	 ESDI	 might	 be	 wasteful	 at	 best,	 and	
threatening	 to	 NATO,	 at	 worst.	 In	 an	 interview	 for	 this	 thesis,	 one	 former	
Assistant	Secretary	of	State	described	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 fear	of	ESDI	 in	official	





Secretary	of	 State.	We	put	out	 this	 speech	 you	know	about	 the	3Ds.	Don’t	
duplicate,	you	know,	don’t	screw	this	up.	We	were	very	concerned	about	it	in	










both	 in	Washington	and	 in	Europe	 is	now	 ‘Please	God,	more	ESDI.	Please,	
more	European	defence.	Please,	more	European	activity	on	defence,’	I	think	











a	 gruesome	 threat:	 “Like	 a	 vampire,	 European	 federalist	 efforts	 to	 establish	 a	
European	defense	 identity	that	 is	separate	 from	and	in	competition	with	NATO	
continue	 to	 rise	 from	 the	dead”	 (Hulsman,	2003).	The	 following	year,	Heritage	
echoed	the	“3	Ds”	terminology	used	by	Albright	(McNamara,	2004)	and	another	
nine	years	 later,	despite	widespread	disappointment	 in	other	sectors	about	the	





While	 some	 liberal	 analysts	 expressed	 disappointment	 that	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	
had	failed	to	deliver	more	effective	and	coherent	EU	action	on	security	matters	
(See	 5.2),	 conservative	 analysts	 drew	 the	 opposite	 conclusions.	 According	 to	
analysts	at	the	Heritage	Foundation,	“the	supranationalization	of	defense	policy	
took	 its	 greatest	 leap	 forward	 to	 date	with	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty.”	
(McNamara,	2011	“Undercuts”).	Commentaries	from	the	conservative	think	tank	
between	2010	–	2013,	suggest	that	the	Lisbon	Treaty	reforms	move	the	EU	very	
significantly	 towards	 “Federal”	 security	 decision-making.	 In	 specific	 terms,	 the	
treaty’s	 provisions	 for	 permanent	 structured	 cooperation	 (Art.	 42.6,	 TEU)	 and	
the	mutual	assistance	clause	(Art	222,	TFEU)	are	highlighted.	More	broadly,	the	
European	 Commission	 gains	 “a	 toehold	 in	 the	 area	 of	 defense	 policy”	 (Coffey,	
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2012,	 “Integration”).	 The	 Treaty	 represents	 “a	 foreign	 policy	 power-grab”	










an	 exact	 moment	 for	 this	 shift	 in	 mainstream	 opinion	 -	 that	 is,	 among	 most	
analysts	and	officials	–	the	beginning	of	the	second	Bush	administration	in	2004	
appears	to	be	a	general	dividing	line.	After	that	point,	warnings	of	the	dangers	of	
CSDP	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 US	 interests	 are	 confined	 to	 a	 marginal	 narrative	 from	
conservative	think	tanks,	most	notably	the	Heritage	Foundation.	In	other	words,	
by	 the	mid-2000s,	 liberal	 analysts	 and	 official	 policymakers	 had	 broken	 away	
from	 the	 discourse	 of	 CSDP	 as	 threatening,	 leaving	 a	 marginal	 group	 of	
conservative	analysts	isolated	in	their	warnings	of	CSDP	as	a	menace	to	NATO.	
	
Analysts	 from	 Heritage	 warn	 that	 CSDP	 represents	 a	 “creeping	 Gaullism”,	 an	
“elite-driven	 centralization	 tendency”	 to	 craft	 Europe	 as	 “a	 counterbalance”	 or	
“rival”	to	the	United	States”	(Hulsman,	2005;	McNamara,	2011).	Although	there	
appears	 to	 be	 a	 contradiction	 between	 conservative	 dismissals	 of	 CSDP	 as	
“pathetic	…	a	joke”	(Coffey,	2013)	and	claims	that	it	is	also	a	credible	attempt	to	










At	 the	 very	 least,	 CSDP	 represents	 an	 ineffective	 use	 of	 diminishing	 European	
defence	spending,	and	as	such,	is	not	in	NATO’s	interests.	In	her	testimony	before	
Congress,	 Sally	McNamara	 told	 representatives	 that	CSDP	 “has	provided	NATO	
with	little	or	no	valuable	complementarity,	and	the	creation	of	an	EU	army	or	a	
permanent	 EU	 military	 headquarters	 can	 only	 come	 at	 NATO's	 expense.”	
(McNamara,	 2010).	 These	 assessments	 lead	 writers	 in	 this	 group	 to	 advocate	
firm	opposition	to	further	European	foreign	policy	integration	in	Washington:	
	





This	narrative	 strand	appears	 restricted	 to	 conservative	analysts,	 and	with	 the	
exception	of	 former	ambassador	 John	Bolton,	was	not	 found	 in	 texts	produced	
by,	 or	 interviews	with,	 any	 former	 officials.	 This	 narrative	 strand	 is	 therefore	
best	 seen	 as	 marginal,	 derived	 from	 the	 broader	 Eurosceptic	 perspective	 of	
analysts	 at	 the	 Heritage	 Foundation.	 Given	 the	 influence	 and	 resources	 of	 the	







case	 is	 a	 highly	 relevant	 area	 of	 discussion,	 encompassing	 the	 attempts	 by	
European	states	to	increase	joint	responses	and	military	cooperation	in	the	most	
conventional	 forms	 of	 state	 security	 –	 often	 the	 most	 controversial	 area	 of	




The	 dominant	 account	 of	 European	 weakness	 was	 found	 in	 texts	 across	 the	
embedded	cases	(officials/analysts,	liberals/conservatives)	–	indicating	a	level	of	
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acceptance	 as	 “common	 knowledge”	 that	 is	 significant.	 Despite	 this	 common	
understanding	 of	 European	 weakness,	 the	 second	 narrative	 explored	 how	
mainstream	liberal	and	official	sources	were	able	to	combine	this	perception	of	
weakness	with	an	optimistic	appeal	to	EU-US	valuable	cooperation,	continuing	a	
long-running	 strand	 in	 liberal	 American	 foreign	 policy	 since	 the	 end	 of	World	
War	 Two.	 Somewhat	 paradoxically,	 although	 liberals	 and	 officials	 decried	
European	weakness,	the	early	years	of	this	case	were	characterised	by	American	





official	 comments	 since	 the	 late	 1990s.	 Regarding	 the	 variation	 in	 discourse	
between	 Republican	 and	 Democrat	 administrations,	 discourse	 varied	 less	










counter-terrorism	 policy.	 As	 will	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 next	 case,	 only	 conservative	
analysts	publicly	depict	EU	security	action	in	counter-terrorism	as	a	threat	to	US	
interests	 and	while	 official	 actors	–	both	Democrat	 and	Republican	–	 criticised	
the	EU	for	being	ineffective	on	occasion,	none	described	EU	action	in	this	domain	
as	 overtly	 threatening.	 Before	 moving	 to	 the	 cross-case	 comparison	 (policy	
competence	level)	in	chapter	7,	the	following	chapter	will	present	the	findings	of	
the	 QCA	 of	 private	 diplomatic	 correspondence,	 enabling	 us	 to	 examine	 how	











In	 this	 chapter,	 private	 official	 discourse	will	 be	 compared	with	 the	 public	 US	
elite	 discourse	 findings	 on	 the	 first	 case	 study,	 as	 outlined	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter.	 Examining	 the	 content	 of	 declassified	 State	Dept	 emails	 and	 classified	
US	 cables	 circulated	 within	 the	 US	 government	 offers	 a	 rare	 opportunity	 to	
contrast	what	diplomats	 say	 in	public	 about	 the	nature	of	 the	EU	as	a	 security	
actor	 and	 how	 they	 discuss	 EU	 policies	 and	 their	 responses	 in	 private.	 Such	 a	
comparison	 opens	 our	 analysis	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 discovering	 discrepancies	
between	 public	 and	 private	 discourse,	 perhaps	 arising	 from	 diplomatic	
convention,	 negotiation	 strategies	 or	 preference	 falsification.	 Examining	
coordinative	texts	exchanged	within	a	closed	network	also	allows	us	to	“lift	the	
lid”	on	policy	discourse	 in	both	 cases	and	explore	 the	 cognitive	and	normative	









within	 the	given	policy	domain.	Cognitive	 ideas	elucidate	 “what	 is	 and	what	 to	
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do,”	 but	 special	 attention	will	 also	 be	 paid	 to	 normative	 ideas,	 which	 indicate	
“what	is	good	or	bad	about	what	is”	in	light	of	“what	one	ought	to	do,”	(Ibid).	The	
cognitive	 and	 normative	 frames	 are	 analysed	 and	 presented	 thematically,	
allowing	 for	 comparison	with	 the	 public	 narratives.	 Combining	 the	 analysis	 of	
private	communications	with	 interview	 testimony	 from	senior	officials	directly	
involved	with	the	policy	domain	and	publicly	available	data	about	the	events,	we	
can	 piece	 together	 the	 US	 official	 policy	 community’s	 cognitive	 and	 normative	
map	of	the	EU	as	a	negotiating	partner	in	each	case.		
	
Strategies:	 Private	 correspondence	 between	 officials	 forms	 the	 basis	 of	 what	
Schmidt	describes	as	“coordinative	discourse”	–	texts	which	are	concerned	with	
the	 creation,	 elaboration	 and	 justification	 of	 policy	 ideas	 and	 strategies	within	
policy	networks	(2008;	311).	The	second	step	presents	an	analysis	of	how	the	US	
government	 developed	 its	 policy	 and	 negotiation	 strategy,	 within	 a	 closed	
discursive	arena,	as	the	cases	developed.	By	incorporating	basic	process	tracing	
with	 the	discourse	analysis,	we	can	assess	how	both	events	and	 they	way	 they	
were	interpreted	and	recorded	through	discourse,	shaped	policy	responses.		
	
As	 part	 of	 this	 step,	 the	 chapter	 will	 assess	 empirical	 findings	 relevant	 to	
research	 on	 EU-US	 cooperation	 in	 each	 of	 the	 policy	 domains.	 In	 particular	
section	6.2,	“CSDP	Strategies”,	will	present	new	evidence	supporting	arguments	
that	 the	 US	 deflected	 discussions	 on	 privacy	 protections	 and	 bypassed	 the	
European	Commission	in	favour	of	national	interlocutors,	to	whom	concessions	–	
in	 particular	 visa	waiver	 scheme	 status	 –	were	 offered	 as	 incentives	 for	 data-
related	counter-terrorism	cooperation	(see	Argomamiz	2010;	127).	 	Section	6.2	
will	 explore	 how	 Secretary	 Clinton	 deployed	 a	 discursive	 strategy	 of	






–	differences	 in	 language,	 themes,	and	strategies	are	discussed.	The	similarities	
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and	differences	between	private	official	discourse	and	 liberal	 and	conservative	
narratives	 are	 also	 assessed	 with	 a	 view	 to	 plausible	 channels	 of	 influence	
between	each	of	the	sub-groups.	
	
This	 chapter	 therefore	 presents	 the	 analysis	 of	 private	 coordinative	 discourse	
among	US	officials,	with	three	objectives	in	mind:		
	
I. To	 understand	 how	 US	 officials	 constructed	 the	 EU’s	 CSDP	 action	 in	 a	
private	 institutional	 context,	 with	 reference	 to	 how	 cognitive	 and	
normative	frames	portrayed	the	EU	thematically.		
II. To	 determine	 how	 the	 coordinative	 discourse	 of	 officials	 in	 this	 case	
adapted	 to	 significant	 events;	 by	 interpreting	 developments	within	 pre-








public	 speeches	 are	 very	 different	 texts.	 It	 would	 be	 unwise	 to	 disregard	 the	
differing	 producers,	 audiences,	 and	 motivations	 at	 play	 (Schmidt	 2008;	 305,	
Habermas	 1989,	 1996).	 Not	 only	 are	 the	 two	 forms	 of	 texts	 formulated	
differently,	 they	 are	 targeted	 at	 different	 audiences.	 Communicative	 texts	 –	
which	 are	 produced	 by	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 presentation,	 deliberation,	 and	
legitimation	of	political	ideas	to	the	general	public	are	more	likely	to	observe	the	
niceties	 of	 diplomatic	 practice	 and	minimise	 policy	 complexity	 (Schmidt	 2008:	
311).	By	 contrast,	 coordinative	 texts	 form	 the	basis	of	policy	development	and	
implementation	 within	 networks	 of	 policy	 actors	 (Ibid,	 311).	 In	 this	 case,	 the	
high	level	of	secrecy	associated	with	these	texts	(each	is	classified	according	to	a	
scale	of	official	secrecy)	means	the	analysis	can	examine	how	officials	create	and	
coordinate	 policy	 responses	 and	 cognitive	 ideas	 within	 a	 closed	 network.	 We	









Before	 applying	 the	 three-step	 analysis	 (themes,	 strategies,	 comparisons)	 to	
private	discourse	on	case	1	(CSDP),	this	section	will	briefly	review	the	initial	QCA	
findings	on	public	discourse	on	the	subject.	In	chapter	5,	the	results	of	the	QCA	of	
public	 elite	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 conventional	 actor	 were	 analysed,	
presenting	a	pattern	of	discourse	as	outlined	in	Fig	6.3.	A	dominant	narrative	of	
European	 weakness	 and	 decline	 was	 strikingly	 evident	 across	 all	 sub-groups	
(liberal/conservative,	 official/analyst).	 Yet	 mainstream	 liberal	 and	 official	
discourse	parted	ways	from	more	conservative	analysts	in	the	implications	they	
drew	about	benefits	or	costs	of	EU	cooperation	(narratives		2	and	3).	While	there	
was	 initial	 concern	about	 the	 implications	of	CSDP	 for	 the	primacy	of	NATO	 in	
many	circles,	by	 the	 late	2000s,	only	marginal	 conservative	analysts	presented	







































But	were	 official	 endorsements	 of	 CSDP	 in	 public	merely	 empty	 rhetoric?	 The	
analysis	 of	 private	 official	 discourse	 reveals	 that	 a	 concern	 for	 the	 primacy	 of	
NATO	vis	a	vis	CSDP	persisted	at	least	as	late	as	2009/2010.	As	will	be	explored,	
these	concerns	suggested	a	view	of	CSDP	as	a	potentially	useful	development,	if	
adequate	 safeguards	 were	 in	 place.	 The	 following	 sections	 compare	 the	 three	
core	narratives	identified	in	chapter	5	with	an	analysis	of	private	cables	to	assess	
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The	 default	 rhetorical	 opening	 references	 to	 “shared	 values,”	 and	 a	 “shared	
history”	 in	 public	 discourse	 on	 CSDP	 are	 conspicuously	 absent	 in	 the	 private	
cables;	 this	 may	 be	 due	 to	 the	 conventions	 of	 diplomatic	 communications.	
Neither	term	is	mentioned	in	any	of	the	17	diplomatic	memos	related	to	this	case	
study,	 although	 “partnership”	 is	 mentioned	 once	 and	 “relationship”	 occurs	 in	
thee	 of	 the	 texts.	 Overall,	 the	 texts	 are	 more	 business-like	 and	 concise,	
underlining	their	purpose	as	succinct	policy	analyses	and	briefing	notes.	
	
Public	 discourse	 in	 both	 cases,	 among	 all	 sub-groups,	 framed	 Europe	 as	
ineffective	 and	 weak;	 politically,	 sometimes	 demographically	 but	 especially	 in	
case	1,	militarily.	Unsurprisingly,	these	themes	are	restated	in	private	discourse,	
but	 in	 starker	 terms.	 In	 the	 year	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 ratification	 of	 the	 Lisbon	
Treaty,	described	by	one	official	as	“not	only	the	most	unambitious	treaty	in	EU	
history,	 but	 also	 the	one	 that	has	 generated	 the	 least	 excitement,”49	a	 sceptical	
tone	was	evident	in	assessments	of	the	latest	institutional	changes	to	CSDP.	The	
underlying	 weakness	 of	 CSDP,	 particularly	 although	 not	 only,	 by	 comparison	
with	NATO,	was	cited	as	the	cause	of	a	widespread	indifference	to	CSDP	among	



















to	make	progress,”	 the	 “bureaucratic	 restructuring”	 associated	with	 the	Lisbon	
Treaty	 would	 not	 result	 in	 any	 rapid	 evolution	 in	 the	 EU’s	 capacity	 for	 crisis	
management:	 “EU	 capabilities	 and	 resources	 in	 these	 areas	 are	 not	






reforms,	 by	 reference	 to	 two	 explanations	 or	 “cognitive	 frames”:	 political	
disunity	 among	member	 states	 and	 “institutional	 stovepiping”	 which	 prevents	
the	 EU	 from	 “holistically	 implementing	 tools.” 52 	Paradoxically,	 the	 Lisbon	
innovations,	ostensibly	designed	 to	 “upgrade”	 the	EU’s	 international	 role,	were	
occasionally	interpreted	as	reaffirming	the	primacy	of	member	state	control;	one	
cable	said	the	UK’s	insistence	that	the	Treaty	acknowledge	that	CSDP	is	subject	
to	 “specific”	 procedures	 and	 the	 unanimity	 requirement	 for	 council	 decisions	















that	 Lisbon	 might	 strengthen	 CSDP:	 “The	 EU	 has	 overpromised	 and	 under-
delivered	 so	 much	 on	 this	 stuff	 that	 there’s	 a	 kind	 of	 a	 jaded	 reaction	 in	
Washington	to	every	new	announcement,”	said	a	policy	planning	advisor	to	the	
Secretary	of	State	(Interviewee	no.	15).	The	same	interviewee	described	the	first	















aren’t	 more	 embarrassed	 by	 how	 little	 has	 been	 achieved.	 You	 know	




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Interviewee	no.	18.	
	
When	 asked	 if	 the	 External	 Action	 Service	 needed	 to	 increase	 briefings	 and	
awareness	in	Washington	regarding	the	expansion	in	CSDP	missions	since	1999,	
one	 official	 was	 dismissive:	 “My	 advice?	 Don’t	 waste	 the	 ink.	 People	 in	
Washington	have	 little	 interest	 in	 the	EU’s	 security	ambitions,	 they	don’t	 think	
it’s	going	anywhere,”	(Interviewee	no.	19).	
	
A	 concern	 with	 European	 weakness	 and	 disunity,	 famously	 described	 by	




similar	 explanations	 of	 a	 public	 aversion	 to	 military	 spending,	 arising	 from	 a	















no	value	 in	 engaging	with	 such	a	politically,	 institutionally	 and	militarily	weak	
association	of	states.	Are	the	public	endorsements	of	the	EU	as	a	security	actor	
merely	empty	rhetoric	designed	to	boost	fragile	European	egos?	The	analysis	of	
cables	 suggests	otherwise.	A	 common	 theme	 in	public	 and	private	discourse	 is	
the	effectiveness	of	EU	sanctions	when	aligned	with	US	objectives54.	While	one	
diplomat	noted	that	“incoherent	organisation,”	and	political	factors	were	leading	


























influence	 and	 reach	 of	 the	 new	 High	 Representative,”	 who	 would	 “grab	 even	
more	 influence	 from	 member	 state	 foreign	 ministers.” 57 	Interviewees	 in	
Washington	echoed	the	interest	in	the	HRVP’s	potential:	“We	are	very	supportive	





At	 the	 very	 least,	 if	 institutional	 innovations	 and	 the	 much	 discussed	
“comprehensive	 approach”	 did	 not	 deliver	 more	 coherent	 EU	 operations,	 one	
official	memo	argued	 the	US	could	 “capitalize	on	Commission	coffers”	and	also	
benefit	from	areas	where	member	states	had	expertise.58	This	“minimalist	view”	
of	 the	 “comprehensive	 approach”	 doctrine	 was	 echoed	 in	 interviews	 with	
Washington	 officials,	 who	 said	 the	 concept	 lacked	 credibility:	 “When	 the	
Commission	comes	over	here	and	talks	about	“the	comprehensive	approach”	no	
one	 takes	 it	 seriously	because	no	one	believes	 there	 are	 real	 resources	behind	
these	 strategies,”	 (Interviewee	 no.	 19).	 But	 other	 officials	 acknowledged	 an	














There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 plausible	 interpretations	 of	 these	 comments:	 they	may	
reflect	divisions	in	the	foreign	policy	elite,	where	diplomats	based	in	Brussels	are	
more	optimistic	than	non-specialists	about	the	EU’s	potential.	The	timing	of	the	
documents,	 before	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 was	 ratified,	 might	 suggest	 this	 early	
optimism	 faded	 into	 the	 disappointment	 and	 treaty-fatigue	 in	 later	 years,	 as	
illustrated	 by	 post-Lisbon	 interview	 quotes	 in	 the	 preceding	 paragraphs.	 Or	
these	 texts	 may	 arise	 from	 a	 balanced	 perspective,	 recognising	 the	 Union’s	
limitations	 but	 cognisant	 that	 an	 empowered	 EU	might	 support	 US	 objectives.		
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 section	 is	 not	 to	 make	 a	 judgment	 on	 which	 of	 these	
interpretations	represent	the	“true”	beliefs	of	US	officials.	But	it	should	be	noted	












a	 public	 marker	 for	 containing	 CSDP,	 but	 according	 to	 interviewees	 for	 this	
project,	 much	 of	 the	 American	 anxiety	 regarding	 EU	 security	 integration	 had	
largely	dissipated	by	the	early	2000s.	Interviewees	said	the	shift	was	especially	
noticeable	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 NATO’s	 1999	 Kosovo	 intervention,	 which	







shortcomings.	 Unfortunately,	 no	 cables	 relating	 to	 the	 pre-2004	 period	 were	
available	 to	 analyse,	 so	we	must	 rely	on	 “on	background”	 interview	comments	
with	retired	US	officials	to	explore	this	further.	The	topic	was	discussed	at	length	
with	a	 former	US	ambassador	 to	NATO,	who	described	an	acute	anxiety	on	the	
part	 of	 Secretary	of	 State	Albright	 and	her	 team	 regarding	 the	development	of	
ESDI	 (see	 p.	 158).	 The	 anxiety	 in	 some	 ways	 echoed	 that	 of	 president	 Nixon,	
recorded	 in	 conversation	 to	 Kissinger,	 that	 European	 economic	 and	 political	
integration	had	created	“a	Frankenstein’s	monster,”	(Interviewee	no.	10).	But	the	
Kosovo	War,	which	revealed	a	continuing	European	security	dependence	on	the	
US	 and	 the	 successive	 failure	 of	 treaty	 changes	 to	 boost	 defence	 spending,	
allowed	 these	 fears	 to	 diminish	 among	 officials,	 instead	 leading	 to	 a	 greater	
openness	 to	 security	 integration,	 in	 the	 hope	 it	 might	 boost	 Europe’s	military	
capabilities	(Interviewee	no.	9).	
	
In	 public	 comments	 analysed	 in	 chapter	 5,	 little	 of	 the	 pre-Kosovo	 anxiety	
around	 CSDP	was	 evident	 in	 later	 years.	 But	 does	 this	 shift	 indicate	 a	 greater	
enthusiasm	for	CSDP,	or	simply	a	diminished	anxiety	about	its	potential,	seen	as	
over-stated?	Are	officials	eager	 supporters	of	EU	security	 integration,	or	 in	 the	
words	of	an	official	quoted	earlier	in	this	section,	merely	“indifferent”?	
	
CSDP	 is	 rarely	 a	 topic	 of	 interest	 to	 most	 of	 the	 foreign	 policy	 officials	 and	
observers,	according	to	analysts	at	the	Brookings	Institution,	one	of	whom	noted	
that	it	would	be	difficult	to	sustain	a	career	with	such	a	narrow	specialist	focus	
(Interviewee	 no.	 20).	 One	 State	 Dept	 official	 said	 that	 the	 scale	 of	 resources	
allocated	 to	CSDP	missions	was	 considered	 so	 insignificant	by	most	 observers,	
that	 it	 rarely	 warranted	 close	 examination	 (Interviewee	 no.	 19).	 A	 recent	
Commission	delegation	initiative	to	raise	awareness	of	the	EU’s	“comprehensive	
approach”	 was	 cited	 by	 multiple	 respondents	 as	 “a	 flop”	 that	 garnered	 scant	
attention	(Interviewees	19,	21).	Only	five	interviewees	were	able	to	mention	any	
specific	CSDP	mission	(by	name	or	mission	location)	when	asked.	These	findings	
undermine	 the	 idea	 that	CSDP	 is	viewed	as	a	 significant	 topic	of	debate	 for	US	




A	 senior	 EU	 specialist	 at	 the	 State	 Dept	 was	 more	 positive	 about	 CSDP’s	
significance,	 noting	 that	 the	 CSDP	mission	 in	Mali	 had	 addressed	 a	 concerning	
situation	 in	 the	 Sahel	 region;	 an	 arena	where	 the	US	 had	 limited	 ability	 to	 act	
(Interviewee	 no.	 7).	 However,	 the	 message	 from	 most	 interviewees	 was	




The	 analysis	 of	 cables	 from	 the	 late	 2000s	 on	 this	 subject	 suggests	 that	 in	 the	
rare	 cases	where	 CSDP	 does	 arise	 as	 a	matter	 of	 interest,	 the	 issue	 is	 usually	
about	ensuring	NATO’s	primacy.	The	record	of	a	meeting	on	CSDP	with	a	Polish	
defence	minister,	 reveals	 this	concern	 lives	on:	 “The	Poles	may	have	embraced	
CSDP	without	fully	anticipating	possible	conflicts	with	NATO,”	an	official	wrote	
in	2009	[emphasis	added].	The	official	probed	the	minister	on	“whether	current	
plans	 for	 CSDP	 would	 preserve	 NATO's	 right	 of	 first	 refusal	 to	 take	 part	 in	 a	
given	security	mission,”	underlining	this	concern	as	an	enduring	consideration.			
	
Interviewees	 confirmed	 that	 while	 fears	 regarding	 CSDP	 had	 eased,	 the	
commandments	of	the	“three	Ds”	are	“still	important”:	“We	are	more	supportive	
of	 the	EU’s	 security	 efforts	 of	 late.	Of	 course	 they	 should	 not	 be	 duplicative	 of	
NATO	 and	 there	 is	 the	 broader	 concern	 about	 defence	 capabilities	 in	 general”	
(Interviewee	no.	7).	Judging	by	these	comments,	the	concerns	around	CSDP	have	
diminished	 rather	 than	 disappeared.	 Many	 officials	 remain	 concerned	 that	 EU	
security	 integration	 risks	 stretching	 an	 ever-diminishing	 pool	 of	 European	
defence	spending	across	more,	potentially	less-effective,	operational	tasks.			
	



















from	 the	QCA	 of	 classified	 cables	 and	 declassified	 internal	 emails.	 This	 outline	
should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 comprehensive	 outline	 of	 the	 US’s	 diplomatic	
approach	 to	CSDP	–	 it	 is	 based	on	 analysis	 of	 the	 available	 evidence;	 a	 limited	
release	 of	 classified	 documents	 and	 email	 correspondence	 with	 secretary	
Clinton.	 The	 timeframe	 for	 these	 documents	 is	 2004-2012	 and	 omits	 many	





































































These	 limitations	 notwithstanding,	 the	 analysis	 reveals	 how	 US	 officials	










The	 first	 objective	 listed	 –	 empowering	 the	 HRVP	 –	 provides	 an	 interesting	
insight	 into	 how	 officials	 pursue	 policy	 goals	 through	 discursive	 means	 and	
allows	 us	 to	 apply	 Schmidt’s	 “foreground	 discursive	 abilities”	 concept	 to	 this	
case.	 As	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 3,	 actors	 rely	 on	 their	 background	 ideational	
abilities,	 mainly	 understanding	 the	 cognitive	 and	 normative	 frames	 in	 a	
discursive	context,	to	make	sense	of	a	given	situation	and	its	ideational	rules.	Yet	
actors	 also	 have	 agency	 in	 shaping	 their	 discursive	 institutions,	 by	 using	 their	
foreground	discursive	abilities	“to	think,	speak,	and	act	outside	their	institutions	
even	as	they	are	inside	them,	to	deliberate	about	institutional	rules	even	as	they	
use	 them,	 and	 to	 persuade	 one	 another	 to	 change	 those	 institutions	 or	 to	
maintain	 them,”	 (Schmidt	 2008;	 314).	 In	 other	words,	 while	 discourses	 act	 as	
structures	that	constrain	action	and	provide	meaning	for	actors,	those	actors	can	
also	 reshape	 those	 institutions,	 through	 purposefully	 introducing	 new	 frames	






Officials	 interviewed	 remarked	 that	 Secretary	 Clinton	 was	 implementing	 a	
carefully	considered	policy	by	publicly	praising	HRVP	Ashton	and	holding	 joint	
press	 conferences	 with	 her	 on	 regular	 occasions	 (Interviewees	 7,	 8,	 12,	 15).	
According	to	the	officials,	these	actions	represented	an	attempt	to	use	discourse	
to	bolster	the	development	of	the	EU’s	security	capabilities,	particularly	the	new	
HRVP	 role,	 a	 position	officials	 hoped	would	 “facilitate	 the	EU’s	 ability	 to	 reach	
consensus”	 (Interviewee	 7).	 This	 purposeful	 use	 of	 discourse	 as	 a	 policy	 tool	
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supports	 the	 discursive	 institutionalist	 model	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 3,	 wherein	




ambitions	 to	 upgrade	 the	 EU’s	 role	 –	 Clinton’s	 public	 embrace	 of	 Ashton	
contrasted	 sharply	 with	 a	 perceived	 coldness	 by	 some	 European	 diplomats.	
Several	 emails	 exchanged	 between	 Clinton	 and	 her	 head	 of	 policy	 planning,	
Anne-Marie	 Slaughter,	 reveal	 their	 concern	 for	 Ashton’s	 standing	 among	 her	
European	 counterparts.	 On	 January	 22nd,	 2010,	 Slaughter	 wrote	 to	 Clinton	 to	
emphasise	 the	 value	 of	working	 closely	with	 Ashton:	 ‘I	 just	want	 to	 underline	
how	valuable	and	important	it	is	for	you	to	be	building	the	relationship	with	her	
that	you	are.’61	Several	other	emails	show	there	was	regular	direct	phone	contact	
between	 Clinton	 and	 Ashton	 on	 a	 range	 of	 issues	 including	 Libya	 sanctions	
preparations,	summit	agendas,	lobbying	European	foreign	ministers	and	broader	
sanctions	on	Iran.	In	an	email	on	January	28th,	2010,	Slaughter	forwarded	a	news	
article	 from	 “The	 Economist”	 magazine,	 outlining	 “efforts	 within	 the	 EU	 to	
discredit	 Ashton,	 particularly	 from	 the	 French.”62	Slaughter	 urged	 Secretary	
Clinton	 to	explicitly	endorse	Ashton	 in	meetings	with	other	ministers,	noting	a	
lack	of	 appreciation	among	Ashton’s	 colleagues	 for	her	 family	obligations:	 “[It]	
wouldn't	hurt	 to	mention	her	positively	with	French	 interlocutors,”	 (Ibid).	The	
emails	and	interviews	conducted	suggest	that	Clinton	developed	a	close	working	
relationship	 with	 Ashton.	 She	 responded	 to	 Slaughter’s	 email	 within	 an	 hour:	













5	 quoted	 from	 press	 briefings	 by	 State	 officials	 who	 noted	 Ashton’s	 close	
working	 relationship	 with	 Clinton	 –	 in	 that	 case,	 the	 target	 audience	 for	
discursive	 action	 was	 the	 media.	 But	 other	 senior	 political	 figures	 were	 also	
targeted	 privately.	 Emails	 from	 Clinton’s	 advisors	 reveal	 that	 the	 objective	 of	
boosting	 the	 profile	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 new	 EU	 “faces”,	 including	 the	 HRVP,	
went	beyond	a	personal	interest	in	Ashton.	Sidney	Blumenthal,	a	close	personal	









third	 rank	 nonentity	 in	 the	 Brussels	 bureaucratic	 mode	 incapable	 of	
realizing	 the	 possibilities	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 office,	 continuing	 the	
feebleness	of	Europe	as	a	political	idea	and	reality.	Of	course,	it	is	in	the	US	
interest	 to	 have	 a	 strong	 Europe—and	 the	 naming	 of	 the	 first	
European	president	might	be	the	most	important	opportunity	for	the	





Clinton’s	 replies	 to	 Blumenthal	 are	 not	 available,	 so	 we	 cannot	 know	 if	 she	
followed	 this	 advice.	 But	 Blumenthal’s	 position	 as	 a	 long-standing	 trusted	
advisor	 is	 well	 established. 64 	His	 advice	 in	 this	 case	 is	 an	 unequivocal	















candidates	 for	 the	 post-Lisbon	 roles,	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 “strengthen	 Europe.”	 Both	
these	comments	and	the	texts	relating	to	Ashton	indicate	a	consistent	strategy	by	
Clinton	 and	 her	 staff	 to	 empower	 the	 post-Lisbon	 CSDP	 actors,	with	 a	 specific	
emphasis	 on	 publicly	 expressing	 support	 for	 high-level	 EU	 interlocutors.	 The	
impact	 of	 Clinton’s	 foreground	 discursive	 exercise	 in	 empowering	 Ashton	 is	
evident	in	the	fact	that	almost	all	official	interviewees	currently	serving	in	their	
posts	 referenced	Clinton’s	 support	of	Ashton	–	 in	 joint	appearances	and	public	






The	 next	 most	 substantially	 elaborated	 objective	 encountered	 in	 the	 private	
correspondence	relates	to	how	CSDP	reforms	might	create	greater	opportunities	
for	 joint	 EU-US	 sanctions.	 At	 a	 minimum	 joint	 sanctions	 “even	 when	 largely	
symbolic,	 demonstrate	 transatlantic	 political	 unity,”65 	although	 “effective	 US	
[government]	 influence	 …	 requires	 early,	 sustained,	 and	 strategic	 outreach	 to	






(1)	 stress	 that	 sanctions	 are	 an	 important	 tool	 of	 foreign	 policy,	 (2)	
encourage	 greater	 EU	 strategic	 planning,	 including	 by	 strengthening	 its	
implementation,	 enforcement,	 analytic,	 and	 intelligence-sharing	
capabilities,	 and	 (3)	 press	 the	 EU	 to	 create	 a	 sanctions	 unit	 within	 the	
nascent	 European	 diplomatic	 service.	 (4)	 We	 should	 continue	 to	 share	
technical	 and	 political	 analysis	 of	 specific	 sanctions	 measures	 where	 we	











institutional	 reforms	 of	 CSDP	 change	 the	 equation	 for	 the	 US,	 there	 is	 little	
discussion,	 although	 a	memo	 from	 the	 US	mission	 in	 Brussels	 opined	 that	 the	
EAS	“should	create	synergies”	for	certain	sectors,	including	sanctions.66	
	
The	 strategic	 analysis	 on	 maximising	 opportunities	 from	 sanctions	 policies	
encapsulates	 the	 view	 of	 the	 remaining	 policy	 measures	 identified	 in	 Fig.	 6.4.	
(instrumentalising	EU	funds,	expertise	and	ensuring	NATO	primacy)	–	all	require	
a	 form	 of	 problem-solving	 approach:	 identify	 relevant	 actors,	 “engage”	
strategically	and	comprehensively,	and	support	like-minded	actors	at	all	levels	of	











The	 specification	 of	 strategies	 in	 the	 available	 documents	 does	 not	 permit	 a	
deeper	analysis	of	how	such	efforts	might	work	 in	practice.	However,	 the	 texts	
analysed	 demonstrate	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 how	 officials	 were	 able	 to	 reconcile	
seemingly	competing	ideas	of	the	EU	in	public	discourse;	a	narrative	of	the	EU	as	
both	 ineffective	 and	 weak	 (discourse	 1,	 liberal	 and	 official)	 and	 the	 EU	 as	 a	
valued	partner	 (discourse	2,	 liberal	 and	official).	 In	 chapter	5,	 these	narratives	
were	 outlined	 separately	 and	 it	 was	 posited	 that,	 despite	 initial	 appearances,	
liberal	 analysts	 and	 officials	may	 be	 able	 to	 combine	 both	 cognitive	 frames	 by	
recognising	that	an	institutionally,	politically	and	militarily	weak	actor	may	still	






discourse	 supports	 this	 hypothesis,	 revealing	 in	 detail	 how	 officials	 analysed	
CSDP	institutional	reforms;	noting	weaknesses	yet	seeking	out	opportunities	for	





social	 proof	 in	 ways	 that	 support	 and	 reinforce	 the	 cognitive	 and	 normative	
frames	that	make	up	its	overall	structure.	 In	this	case,	 the	robustness	of	 liberal	
and	 official	 discourse	 is	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 can	 explain	 both	
European	strength	and	weakness;	the	EU	can	be	both	in	decline	and	yet	deploy	
targeted	 sanctions	 as	 powerful	 tools	 against	 rogue	 elements.	 EU	 institutional	
actors	 appear	 both	 hopelessly	 hamstrung	 by	 institutions	 and	 stealthy	 officials,	
and	yet	 if	 supported,	 they	can	deliver	 important	 results	 in	 talks	with	 Iran.	The	
plasticity	 of	 this	 discourse	 helps	 to	 explain	 its	 endurance	 –	 by	 adapting	 to	
differing	 levels	 of	 performance,	 the	 discourse	 allows	 seemingly	 contradictory	




weaknesses	 and	 values	 in	 this	 domain	 are	 described	 in	 broadly	 similar	 ways,	
although	tone	and	emphasis	vary.	The	rhetorical	tropes	of	“shared	values”	were	
dispensed	with	in	private	cables	but	nevertheless,	the	core	narrative	themes	and	
reference	 points	 (the	 “Three	 ds”	 speech,	 Kosovo	 as	 a	 juncture	 point)	 were	
echoed	in	both	public	and	in	private	communications.		
	
CSDP	 as	 constructed	 in	 private	 discourse	 is	 a	 niche	 policy	 domain	 with	
insignificant	 resources.	 Yet	 the	 EU’s	 CSDP	 was	 viewed	 by	 EU	 specialists	 as	
potentially	useful	in	crisis	management	in	secondary	arenas.	While	the	primacy	
of	 NATO	 remains	 a	 cornerstone	 of	 US	 policy	 towards	 European	 security	
integration,	the	fear	that	CSDP	poses	a	threat	to	the	status	quo	diminished	from	
2000	onwards.	This	analysis	suggests	that	the	significant	cleavage	in	opinion	is	
not	 between	 the	 ideas	 officials	 communicate	 in	 public	 and	 the	 strategies	 they	
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coordinate	 in	 private.	 Instead,	 the	 longitudinal	 dimension	 reveals	 the	 greatest	
shift	–	between	a	high	threat	perception	in	the	 late	1990s	and	early	2000s	and	





Based	 on	 the	 evidence	 available	 and	 arising	 from	 analysis	 outlined	 in	 this	
chapter,	the	divergences	between	public	and	private	discourse	on	this	topic	are	
mostly	in	tone,	rather	than	content.	The	comparative	analysis	of	embedded	cases	
(official	 -	 public,	 official	 -	 private,	 analyst	 –	 liberal,	 analyst	 –	 conservative)	
reveals	 a	 broadly	 dominant	 discursive	 framework	 in	 case	 1	 (CSDP)	 that	
encompasses	 the	 first	 three	 groups.	 This	 discourse	 combines	 the	 liberal	
narrative	of	the	EU	as	a	valued	partner	with	the	narrative	of	the	EU	as	weak	and	




By	 contrast,	 the	 fourth	 sub-group,	 conservative	 analysts,	 was	 aligned	 with	 a	
marginal	 narrative	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 US	 interests.	 Although	 high	 threat	
perceptions	 regarding	CSDP	were	once	more	widely-found,	 the	 analysis	 shows	
these	fears	diminished	among	official	actors	after	2000	and	were	dismissed	out	
of	hand	in	contemporary	interviews.	This	provides	an	interesting	contrast	with	
case	 2	 (PNR),	 where	 conservative	 themes	 were	 echoed	 in	 private	 official	











Scholars	 analysing	 official	 discourse	 are	 sometimes	 confronted	 with	 the	
argument	that	 their	exploration	of	 ideas	 in	discourse	are,	by	definition,	 filtered	
through	 the	medium	of	actors	who	may	 intentionally	misrepresent	opinion	 for	




availed	 of	 the	 opportunity	 to	 probe	 the	 contention	 that	 public	 speech	may	 be	
merely	 empty	 rhetoric,	 sharply	 contrasting	 with	 ideas	 expressed	 in	 private,	
internal	contexts.		
	
The	 empirical	 findings	 of	 this	 chapter,	 subject	 to	 the	 limitations	 of	 available	
sources,	 run	 counter	 to	 this	 contention.	 Instead,	 the	 analysis	 found	 that	
divergences	 between	 public	 and	 private	 discourse	 on	 this	 topic	 are	 mostly	 in	
tone,	 rather	 than	 content.	 The	 analysis	 revealed	 that	 seemingly	 contradictory	
ideas	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 weak	 yet	 also	 offering	 valuable	 partnership	 opportunities,	
were	reconciled	within	a	flexible	cognitive	framework	which	recognised	that	an	
institutionally,	 politically	 and	 militarily	 weak	 actor	 may	 still	 offer	 valuable	
cooperative	 opportunities.	 The	 longstanding	 concern	 for	 NATO’s	 primacy,	 a	
feature	 of	 historical	 US	 discourse	 post-1954	 (see	 chapter	 2)	 persists	 in	 the	
mainstream	today,	although	greatly	diminished.	Conservative	views	of	CSDP	as	
posing	 an	 existential	 threat	 to	NATO	are	 restricted	 to	marginal	 policy	 analysts	




our	 purposes	 -	 highlighted	 how	 the	 Secretary	 of	 state	 employed	 foreground	
discursive	abilities	as	part	of	a	purposeful	attempt	to	bolster	the	position	of	the	
new	 emerging	 post-Lisbon	 institutional	 actors,	 especially	 the	 HRVP.	 Clinton	
leveraged	her	discursive	power	and	institutional	authority	to	frame	the	occupant	
as	 a	 significant	 and	 credible	 partner.	 The	 analysis	 of	 these	 strategies	 supports	
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the	 discursive	 institutionalist	 model	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 3,	 in	 particular	 the	
purposeful	 discursive	 competition	 modification	 this	 dissertation	 proposes.	 In	
Clinton’s	case	however,	the	targets	for	her	communicative	action	are	not	merely	
perceptions	of	Ashton	 in	DC,	but	also	 in	Brussels	and	 in	member	state	capitals.	
The	importance	of	this	strategy	is	evident	not	merely	in	internal	correspondence	
and	 cables	 but	 also	 in	 numerous	 interviewees	 with	 current	 state	 department	
staff	 –	 almost	 all	 of	 whom	 mentioned	 the	 strategy,	 unprompted	 by	 the	
interviewer.		
	
These	 conclusions	 point	 to	 a	 dominant	 longitudinal	 dimension	 in	 shaping	
discourse	 on	 the	 EU	 in	 CSDP.	 The	 learning	 process	 of	 several	 administrations,	
rooted	 in	 key	 landmark	 events	 -	 such	 as	 the	1999	Kosovo	war	 and	 the	Lisbon	
treaty	 changes	 –	 led	 to	 a	 gradual	 reduction	 in	 threat	 perception	of	US	officials	
and	 analysts.	 The	most	 prominent	 cleavage	 shaping	 discourse	was	 ideological;	
































Do	 the	 specific	 competences	 EU	 institutions	 exercise	 in	 a	 given	 policy	 domain	
matter	for	US	assessments	of	the	Union?	Does	a	changed	policy	context	provide	a	
greater	 chance	 for	 consensus	 among	 ideologically	 diverse	 commentators?	 This	
chapter	goes	some	way	to	addressing	these	questions	by	repeating	our	content	
analysis	 experiment	 in	 the	 second	 case	 study,	 which	 is	 marked	 by	 a	 more	
integrated	policy	domain.		
	
The	 case	 relates	 to	 EU-US	 counter-terrorism	 cooperation	 and	 the	 Passenger	
Name	Record	(PNR)	Agreement.	As	a	relatively	recent	 field	of	cooperation,	EU-
US	 cooperation	 on	 counter-terrorism	 presents	 us	 with	 an	 area	 of	 policy	
coordination,	which	has	grown	enormously	since	the	September	11th	attacks	of	
2001	 (Archick	 2013).	 Operating	 under	 the	 Treaty’s	 provisions	 for	 the	 Area	 of	
Freedom,	Security	and	Justice	(AFSJ)67	the	EU	has	successfully	asserted	its	legal	
competence	to	negotiate	on	behalf	of	Member	States	on	a	number	of	cooperative	







the	 US:	 “With	 a	 strong	 agenda	 on	 freedom,	 security	 and	 justice	 …	 the	 EU	 has	
sought	 to	 articulate	 and	 assert	 itself	 as	 a	 security	 actor	 through	 external	
governance”	 (den	Boer	 2011;	 360).	 Examining	US	 elite	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU	 in	
this	area	allows	us	to	examine	discourse	on	a	specific	area	of	cooperation	where	
–	 unlike	more	 conventional	 security	 or	 “high	 foreign	 policy”	 areas	 like	 CSDP	 –	
external	policy	action	is	conducted	within	a	broadly	communitarized	context	and	
the	 Commission	 has	 successfully	 asserted	 a	 position	 as	 the	 pre-eminent	
interlocutor	for	the	US	in	a	number	of	cases.	
	
The	 chapter	 opens	 with	 the	 policy	 and	 legal	 context	 for	 internal	 security	
cooperation	 in	 section	 7.1,	 before	 addressing	 the	 field	 of	 counter-terrorism	
cooperation	and	the	political	process	leading	to	the	PNR	Agreement	in	7.2.	This	
background	 will	 give	 context	 for	 the	 case	 study	 and	 also	 demonstrate	 its	
relevance	as	a	significant	example	of	EU-US	security	cooperation	and	EU	security	
action	more	 broadly.	 In	 7.3	 and	 7.4	 the	 chapter	 will	 present	 and	 analyse	 two	
ideal-type	 narratives	 of	 the	 EU,	 discovered	 during	 the	 QCA.	 Although	 these	
narratives	 have	 blurred	 boundaries,	 and	 one	 dominant	 narrative	 theme	 is	
evident	across	all	sources,	the	analysis	reveals	that	the	liberal	and	conservative	
analyst	 sub-groups	 divide	 relatively	 cleanly	 into	 either	 one	 of	 the	 ideal-type	
narratives.	 The	 official	 public	 sources	 are	 also	 closely	 related	 with	 the	 liberal	
narrative,	 suggesting	 that,	 as	 in	 the	 first	 case	 study,	 the	 internal	 comparative	
dimension	 (embedded	 cases)	 plays	 the	 dominant	 role	 in	 shaping	 public	
discourse	on	the	EU.	
	
The	 final	 step	 in	 the	 analysis	 (7.5)	 draws	 together	 the	 findings	 of	 both	 case	
studies	in	public	discourse,	reviewing	what	evidence	there	is	to	suggest	that	the	
external	comparative	dimension	(policy	competence	level)	shapes	the	pattern	of	






The	 primary	 focus	 of	 this	 chapter	 therefore,	 is	 on	 presenting	 the	 empirical	
findings,	analysing	the	pattern	of	discourse	in	relation	to	sub-groups	within	the	





1. What	 is	 the	 policy	 and	 legal	 context	 for	 EU	 action	 in	 counter-terrorism	
cooperation?	
2. What	are	the	main	narrative	themes	comprising	elite	narratives	of	the	EU	











Intra-European	 counter-terrorism	 cooperation	 has	 its	 origins	 in	 the	
establishment	of	the	police	working	group	on	terrorism	in	1979,	which	sought	to	
share	 intelligence	 and	 expertise	 on	 terrorist	 groups	 within	 the	 Community	
(Keohane,	 2005).	 Since	 then	 the	 institutional	 basis	 for	 counter-terrorism	
cooperation	has	increased	significantly.	The	attacks	of	September	11th	2001	and	








their	 cooperation	 on	 counter-terrorism	matters	 and	 new	measures	 of	 internal	
security	cooperation	have	been	integrated	–	to	varying	degrees	–	in	the	external	
policy	 of	 the	 Union	 (den	 Boer	 2011;	 341).	 Opinion	 has	 been	 divided	 on	 the	
effectiveness	 of	 these	 measures,	 with	 some	 US	 diplomats	 describing	 the	 EU’s	
policy	 response	 to	 the	9/11	attacks	as	 swift	 and	effective	 (Interviewee	no.	14)	
while	 others	 express	 exasperation	 with	 the	 slow	 pace	 of	 policy	 development	
(Rees	2011;	161).	
	
The	 legal	basis	 for	counter-terrorism	cooperation	emerges	 from	the	provisions	
for	AFSJ	and	is	founded	on	Articles	82	and	87	TFEU.	Article	3	TEU	presents	the	
Union’s	 objective	 to	 “offer	 its	 citizens	 an	 area	 of	 freedom,	 security	 and	 justice	




in	 which	 the	 Commission	 has	 a	 normative	 role,	 member	 states	 do	 not	 cede	
responsibility	 for	 their	 internal	security	measures	 (Wessel	et	al	2010;	17).	The	
EU’s	 mandate	 here	 is	 restricted	 to	 cross-border	 criminal	 matters,	 of	 which	
terrorism	 ranks	 highly70.	 	 However	 many	 of	 the	 internal	 security	 measures	
operate	 on	 a	 patchwork	 of	 differing	 legal	 instruments,	 requiring	 extensive	
coordination	 to	 be	 effective.	 This	means	 the	 EU	 operates	 as	 a	 form	 of	 “hybrid	











Union	 to	 protect	 the	 AFSJ.	 After	 the	 9/11	 attacks,	 the	 externalisation	 of	 AFSJ	
measures	 was	 given	 impetus	 and	 the	 Council’s	 2005	 strategy	 on	 the	 external	
dimension	of	AFSJ	stated	that	the	EU	“should	make	JHA	a	central	priority	 in	 its	
external	 relations	 and	 ensure	 a	 coordinated	 and	 coherent	 approach71.	 The	
development	of	the	area	of	freedom,	security	and	justice	can	only	be	successful	if	
it	 is	underpinned	by	a	partnership	with	third	countries.”72	Furthermore,	the	EU	
had	asserted	an	ability	 to	conclude	 international	agreements	with	 third	parties	
and	countries73.	The	Lisbon	Treaty	altered	 these	provisions	 in	some	significant	
ways,	chiefly	by	granting	the	European	Parliament	the	power	to	give	or	withhold	
consent	 to	 such	 agreements,	 through	 co-decision	 making	 with	 the	 Council74.	
Subject	to	Parliament	consent	therefore,	the	Union	has	the	ability	to:	
	
Conclude	an	agreement	with	one	or	more	 third	 countries	or	 international	
organisations	where	the	Treaties	so	provide	or	where	the	conclusion	of	an	
agreement	 is	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 achieve,	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	
Union’s	 policies,	 one	 of	 the	 objectives	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 Treaties,	 or	 is	





A	 final	 innovation	of	 the	Lisbon	Treaty	 that	 should	be	noted	 is	 the	abolition	of	
the	“pillar	system,”	which	split	AFSJ	elements	across	the	first	and	third	pillars.	By	
bring	 the	 police	 and	 judicial	 cooperation	 in	 criminal	 matters	 (PJCC)	 elements	
into	the	community	field,	the	decision-making	procedure	for	AFSJ	matters	is	now	
firmly	 supranational,	 with	 the	 Council	 able	 to	 take	 decisions	 on	 a	 qualified	
majority	basis	–	limiting	the	scope	for	national	vetoes	-	and	the	Commission	free	
to	 conduct	 negotiations	 for	 international	 agreements	 in	 this	 area.	 Unlike	 the	
provisions	for	CSDP,	the	ECJ	can	now	adjudicate	on	legal	matters	related	to	AFSJ.	
The	treaty	provisions	granting	three	supranational	institutions	–	the	Parliament,	














These	 legal,	 institutional	and	political	changes	have	made	transatlantic	 internal	




the	 EU	 with	 third	 countries	 and	 in	 particular	 shaped	 the	 transatlantic	
relationship,”	(den	Boer	2011,	344).	These	changes	have	provided	the	EU	with	a	

















Scholars	 have	 noted	 the	 increased	 role	 for	 the	 EU	 in	 transatlantic	 counter-
terrorism,	with	some	describing	the	phenomenon	as	an	asymmetric	negotiating	
process	in	which	the	US	adopts	a	forceful	norm	promotion	stance,	followed	by	a	
period	 of	 bargaining	 with	 EU	 officials	 and	 ultimately,	 norm	 mirroring	 and	
imitation	by	EU	authorities	(Argomaniz,	2010).	For	Den	Boer	and	Monar	(2002:	
25)	 the	EU’s	 role	 in	 the	 immediate	aftermath	of	9/11	was	merely	 to	provide	a	
	 192	
legal	 basis	 for	 the	 application	 of	 US-developed	 measures:	 “the	 latest	 anti-
terrorist	 policies	 are	 directed	 by	 the	USA	 and	merely	 co-produced	 by	 the	 EU.”	
Argomaniz	 (2010)	 argues	 that	 the	 US	 exploited	 a	 first-mover	 advantage	 that,	
together	 with	 coercive	 measures	 and	 a	 logic	 of	 appropriateness	 favouring	 US	
cooperation	within	EU	discourse,	allowed	Washington	to	 impose	 its	preference	
for	 “unconstrained	 and	 extra-territorial	 action”	 on	 counter-terrorism	 security	
measures,	 even	 when	 they	 applied	 to	 EU	 citizens.	 The	 dynamic	 led	 to	 an	
“impression	 among	 EU	 officials	 of	 being	 rushed	 into	 counter-terrorism	






in	 this	partnership	and	have	 stymied	 several	measures,	 including	PNR	and	 the	
Terrorist	Financing	and	Tracking	Program	(TFTP),	which	sought	data	 from	the	
SWIFT	 banking	 system	 based	 in	 Belgium75 .	 Partially	 as	 a	 result	 of	 these	
difficulties	and	also	arising	from	more	general	US	diplomatic	strategies,	the	CRS	
acknowledges	that	“…at	times,	the	United	States	continues	to	prefer	to	negotiate	




















respectful	 of	 our	 law	 and	 system	 here	 …	 The	 USA	 knows	 perfectly	 well	 that	
there	are	some	things	you	come	to	Brussels	to	talk	about.	
	
	 	 	 	 -	Jonathan	Faull,	DG	Home	Affairs,	Feb.	14	200876	
	
It	 appears	 that	 in	 internal	 security	 cooperation,	 the	 legal	 and	 institutional	
context	 for	 EU	 action	 is	 neither	 completely	 constrained	 –	 as	 in	
intergovernmental	 settings	 –	 nor	 completely	 autonomous,	 as	 in	 a	 fully	
communitarian	policy	context.	 Instead,	EU	action	 in	 this	 field	has	evolved	 from	
the	 tentative	 steps	 of	 the	 1970s,	 to	 a	 level	 of	 significance	 and	 prominence	 in	
2001,	that	won	praise	for	its	cooperative	spirit	from	US	officials	and	criticism	for	
uncritical	acceptance	of	US	security	norms	 from	some	scholars.	Latterly,	 in	 the	
post-Lisbon	 context,	 the	 Union	 has	 demonstrated	 a	 number	 of	 institutional	
enhancements,	 which	 provide	 its	 institutions	 with	 a	 significant	 level	 of	
responsibility	and	autonomy	in	internal	security	matters,	derived	from	its	status	
and	form	as	a	shared	competence	field.	And	yet,	the	relationship	has	experienced	
difficulties,	 derived	 from	unanticipated	objections	 from	other	European	actors.	
This	chapter	focuses	on	one	such	controversy.		
	
For	 the	 purposes	 of	 comparison,	 it	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 preceding	 section	 that	 in	
contrast	with	CSDP,	policy	 action	 in	 this	 area	 enjoys	 a	 level	 of	 integration	 that	
gives	the	Commission	and	parliament	significant	authority	and	decision-making	
power	that	can	be	exercised	independently	from	the	member-states.	In	a	multi-
level	 policy	 making	 system	 of	 this	 kind	 however,	 the	 US	 can	 operate	 as	 a	
negotiating	 partner	 that	 engages	 players	 at	 all	 levels	 (supranational,	 national,	
sub-national),	deploying	valuable	coercive	measures	 in	order	to	obtain	a	policy	
outcome	 that	 most	 closely	 approximates	 its	 preferences.	 These	 differing	












The	 purpose	 of	 this	 section	 is	 to	 provide	 context	 for	 the	 PNR	 case	 study.	
Outlining	 the	 nature	 of	 PNR	 data	 collection	 and	 the	 prolonged	 negotiation	






2. The	 arguments	made	 by	 US	 and	 EU	 officials	 in	 favour	 of	 an	 agreement	
support	the	position	that	PNR	data	sharing	is	viewed	by	these	actors	as	a	
major	 element	 of	 transatlantic	 security	 cooperation	 and	 a	 high	 priority	
policy	matter.	
3. Finally,	this	contentious	debate	provides	the	study	with	a	large	corpus	of	




security	 cooperation.	 The	 case	 involves	 a	 particularly	 high-profile	 debate,	
offering	 frank	 and	 often	 contentious	 arguments	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 EU-US	
cooperation	on	counter-terrorism	measures.	The	agreement	itself	was	one	of	the	
most	 high	 priority	 areas	 of	 US	 transatlantic	 diplomatic	 strategy	 in	 the	 last	 ten	
years,	and	is	one	of	the	most	important	external	counter-terrorism	policies	of	the	
EU	(Eeckhout	2011;	325).	The	negotiation	process	and	the	accompanying	debate	
can	be	 seen	as	a	major	 case	of	 the	EU’s	 self-representation	as	a	 security	actor.		
Reviewing	 the	background	 to	 the	2012	agreement	on	EU-US	PNR	Data	 sharing	








to	 coordinate	 its	 counter-terrorism	 activities	 and	 to	 cooperate	 with	 third	
countries,	in	particular	the	US,	on	combatting	international	terrorism.	Measures	
taken	by	 the	Belgian	Presidency	of	 the	Council	 to	promote	 intelligence	 sharing	
and	 the	 appointment	 of	 a	 counter-terrorism	 coordinator	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	
attacks	greatly	increased	confidence	among	senior	State	Department	officials	in	
the	 value	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 counter-terrorism	 partner	 (Interview	with	 Official	 at	
Under-Secretary	of	State	level,	June	2013).	For	the	US,	the	advantages	of	dealing	
with	 the	EU	centrally,	 rather	 than	with	27	differing	police	and	 judicial	 systems	
appeared	 strong.	 A	 whole	 series	 of	 formal	 counter-terrorism	 cooperative	
agreements	 were	 negotiated	 during	 the	 2000s;	 the	 EU–US	 agreements	 on	
extradition	 and	mutual	 legal	 assistance77	(Wessel	 2010;	 282),	 two	 agreements	
on	 operational	 cooperation	 between	 Europol	 and	 the	 US,	 the	 Eurojust	 -	 US	
Department	of	Justice	2006	agreement	for	information	sharing	between	EU	and	
US	 prosecutors	 on	 terrorism	 and	 cross-border	 criminal	 cases,	 the	 Container	
Security	Initiative,	visa	document	security,	SWIFT	banking	data	sharing	and	the	
PNR	data	 sharing	 agreement	 itself	 (Faull	 and	 Soreca	 2008;	 396	 –	 420,	 Pawlak	











Among	the	 initiatives	 launched	after	9/11	by	 the	newly	created	Department	of	










new	 tool	 in	 the	 US’s	 counter-terrorism	 efforts	 (Byrne	 2012).	 Although	 data	
collection	 is	 far	 less	 extreme	 than	 measures	 to	 detain	 and	 interrogate	 terror	
suspects,	 the	 practice	 remains	 controversial	 because	 it	 subjects	 millions	 of	









data	 transfers,	 in	 part	 due	 to	 rulings	 by	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (ECJ)79.	
Opposition	from	politicians	and	NGOs	in	Europe	has	been	forceful	(Byrne,	2012).	
Even	with	a	 fully-fledged	PNR-sharing	system	 in	operation,	 individuals	already	
known	to	the	US	as	terror	suspects	have	been	allowed	to	book	tickets	under	their	
real	 names,	 board	 planes	 and	 undertake	 attacks	 despite	 a	 system	 designed	 to	
detect	exactly	such	behavior	(Ibid).	
	
Notwithstanding,	 DHS	 officials	 claim	 that	 PNR	 has	 been	 crucial	 in	 thwarting	
potentially	 devastating	 attacks.	 Official	 secrecy	 on	 the	 details	 of	 terrorist	
monitoring	and	arrests	makes	any	analysis	of	the	effectiveness	of	PNR	as	a	tool	
























PNR	 data	 includes	 all	 data	 registered	 by	 airline	 companies	 or	 travel	 agencies	
when	 a	 traveler	 makes	 a	 booking:	 the	 name	 of	 the	 person,	 seat	 number,	
travelling	route,	booking	agent,	credit	card	payment	details,	IP	address,	physical	
address,	 phone	 numbers,	 etc.	 (Brouwer	 2009;	 3).	 The	 2007	 interim	 PNR	
Agreement	between	the	EU	and	the	US	allowed	for	19	of	these	data	elements	for	
all	 travelers	 being	 automatically	 “pushed”	 to	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Homeland	






What	 distinguishes	 PNR	 agreements	 from	 other	 forms	 of	 data	 sharing	 is	 that	
firstly	all	 individuals,	regardless	of	whether	they	have	had	any	interaction	with	
police	 authorities	 or	 not,	 have	 their	 data	 recorded.	 Secondly,	 the	 data	 is	more	




















used	 to	 prevent	 a	 crime,	 watch	 or	 arrest	 persons	 before	 a	 crime	 has	 been	







of	 those	 suspected	 of	 criminal	 offences	 or	 those	 who	 have	 been	 flagged	 as	
potential	 risks.	 This	makes	 it	 possible	 to	 identify	 suspects	 and	 their	 associates	
well	in	advance	of	their	travel	to	or	from	a	country.	
	
3.	 Pro-actively:	 The	 criteria	 for	 “suspicious	 behaviour”	 can	 be	 constantly	
















Efforts	 to	 establish	 a	 permanent	 legal	 basis	 for	 the	 automated	 transfer	 of	 PNR	
data	 on	 passengers	 from	 the	 EU	 to	 the	 US	 have	 faced	 several	 hurdles	 to	




much	 high-level	 engagement,	 including	 an	 address	 by	 US	 Homeland	 Security	
Secretary	Michael	Chertoff	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council	subsequently	
approved	a	new	agreement	on	a	different	legal	basis	in	2007;	this	addressed	the	
objections	 of	 the	 ECJ	 but	 opposition	 among	 NGOs	 and	 MEPs	 remained.	 PNR	





its	 vote	 for	 consent	 for	 conclusion	 of	 this	 agreement85.	 Proponents,	 including	
Home	 Affairs	 Commissioner	 Cecilia	 Malmström,	 argued	 that	 the	 new	 draft	
agreement	 concluded	 in	 November	 2011	 to	 replace	 the	 2007	 Agreement	
included	a	number	of	amendments	to	address	civil	liberties	concerns.86	The	new	
draft	was	the	result	of	extended	negotiations	between	the	Commission	and	DHS,	
the	 fourth	 such	 round	 of	 negotiations	 on	 this	 topic	 in	 ten	 years.	 Despite	 the	
recommendation	 of	 the	 EP	 Civil	 Liberties	 Committee	 rapporteur,	 Sophie	 in	 ‘t	






















that	a	 rejection	of	 the	Agreement	would	 lead	 to	a	significant	political	and	 legal	
crisis.	The	process	received	a	high	level	of	media	and	political	scrutiny	in	the	US,	
provoking	 resolutions	 in	 the	 US	 Senate	 and	 House	 of	 Representatives	 urging	
swift	 conclusion	 of	 the	 agreement88.	 The	 delays	 also	 provoked	 a	 substantial	
diplomatic	 push	 by	 the	 US	 to	 press	 for	 a	 European	 agreement,	 evidenced	 by	
records	of	intensive	bi-lateral	lobbying	of	member	state	officials	by	the	DHS	and	
the	Department	of	State,	as	well	as	 lobbying	at	 the	highest	cabinet	 level89.	This	
included	unprecedented	addresses	to	the	European	Parliament	by	the	Secretary	
for	Homeland	Security,	and	regular	references	by	the	US	Secretary	of	State	to	the	
necessity	 of	 reaching	 an	 agreement	 in	 virtually	 all	 public	 pronouncements	 on	







agreements,	 each	 with	 differing	 provisions	 and	 qualifications,	 leading	 to	 a	
massively	 increased	 regulatory	 burden	 for	 an	 already	 overburdened	 DHS.	 For	















lengthy	 negotiation	 process,	 the	 costs	 of	 bilateral	 arrangements	 would	 have	





citizens,	 a	 patchwork	 outcome	 would	 mean	 unequal	 levels	 of	 data	 protection	
depending	 on	 country	 of	 origin.	 For	 all	 major	 stakeholders,	 an	 EU-US	 PNR	
Agreement	 was	 seen	 as	 the	 optimal	 outcome	 in	 terms	 of	 costs,	 regulatory	
burden,	effectiveness	and	simplified	data	protection	requirements.			
	
This	 section	has	outlined	 the	emergence	PNR	as	a	major	 controversy	 in	EU-US	
counter-terrorism	 cooperation	 and	 a	 major	 topic	 of	 transatlantic	 security	
discourse.	Senior	US	officials	explicitly	marked	out	PNR	as	a	policy	priority	 for	
the	 period	 in	 question	 and	 the	 agreement	 is	 a	 significant	 example	 of	 the	 large	
and	 growing	 number	 of	 transatlantic	 cooperative	 initiatives	 in	 counter-
terrorism.	 The	 complex	 political	 and	 legal	 questions	 exercised	 during	 the	
agreement’s	ratification	illustrate	differing	views	of	the	appropriate	forms	such	
cooperation	should	take	and	the	nature	of	the	EU	as	a	security	actor	in	this	field.	
Having	 provided	 policy	 and	 legal	 context	 for	 both	 EU	 counter	 terrorism	
















A	 summative	 qualitative	 content	 analysis	 was	 performed	 on	 thirty-five	 texts	
produced	by	the	US	foreign	policy	community,	which	related	to	the	EU’s	role	as	a	
partner	in	counter-terrorism	cooperation,	with	particular	reference	to	the	EU-US	
Agreement	 on	 the	 sharing	 of	 passenger	 name	 record	 data94.	 The	 texts	 can	 be	
divided	 into	 five	 source	 sub-groups	 along	 the	 internal	 comparative	 dimension	
(see	overview	of	sources	in	Fig	6.2,	next	page),	covering	private	and	public	texts	
produced	 by	 official	 actors	 in	 the	 State	 Department	 and	 Department	 of	
Homeland	 Security	 (DHS)	 and	 unofficial	 policy	 analysts	 from	 two	major	 think	
tanks;	 the	 Heritage	 Foundation	 (a	 conservative	 body)	 and	 the	 Brookings	
Institution	(a	 liberal	body).	The	fifth	group	consists	of	political	sources	derived	
from	 congressional	 hearings	 related	 to	 PNR.	 Although	 there	 is	 no	 comparable	












cooperation	 and	 the	 sharing	 of	 PNR	data,	 derived	 from	 the	qualitative	 content	
analysis	 of	 texts	 in	 this	 case	 study.	The	QCA	process	began	with	 a	word	 count	
analysis	 of	 recurring	 terms	 and	 relationships	 between	words	 using	 the	 NVivo	
analysis	 software.	 This	 guided	 the	 in-depth	 qualitative	 analysis	 process	 by	
highlighting	 terms	 that	 appeared	 to	 recur	 in	 the	 text.	 A	 total	 of	 21	 themes	 or	

















narratives	 as	discovered	by	 the	QCA	 in	 this	 case.	 	 The	 first	 narrative	 is	 clearly	
central	 to	 the	 public	 communicative	 discourse	 of	 official	 actors	 from	 the	 State	











with	 access	 to	 official	 channels	 of	 communication	 and	 governmental	 influence	
over	 mass	 media	 (Lebow	 2006).	 Secondly,	 this	 narrative	 is	 confined	 to	 the	





In	 spite	 of	 its	 association	 with	 an	 explicitly	 ideological	 think	 tank	 outside	 of	
Government	 however,	 some	 sub-themes	 within	 this	 narrative	 reappear	 in	
language	employed	by	members	of	congress,	suggesting	channels	of	influence	to	
conservative	 legislators.	 As	 will	 be	 assessed	 in	 chapter	 8,	 several	 narrative	
themes	from	conservative	discourse	are	also	evident	in	private	official	discourse,	
suggesting	this	narrative	is	not	completely	restricted	to	analysts	at	the	Heritage	
Foundation.	 Private	 coordinative	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU	 –	 the	 texts	 exchanged	






Most	 official	 pronouncements	 and	 public	 texts	 produced	 by	 actors	 from	 the	
“Official”	sub	group	begin	with	references	to	the	valued	partnership	the	US	has	
with	the	EU,	in	similar	language	to	that	found	in	case	1.	There	are	three	themes	
composing	 this	narrative,	 each	of	which	applies	 cognitive	or	normative	 frames	












In	 speeches,	 public	 comments	 or	 policy	 analysis,	 officials	 often	 sought	 to	
establish	 their	 ethos	 with	 a	 European	 audience	 by	 firstly	 making	 familiar	
references	 to	 a	 common	 transatlantic	 cultural	 experience:	 the	 shared	 values,	
history,	 experiences	 of	 a	 western	 community.	 This	 theme	 holds	 European	
audiences	 in	a	 rhetorical	 embrace,	 establishing	 the	US	government’s	ethos	 as	a	





seek	 action	 by	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	 European	 Council,	 and	 the	




- Michael	Chertoff,	Secretary	 for	Homeland	Security.	Address	 to	
the	European	Parliament,	2007.		
	
The	relationship	 is	one	rooted	 in	common	historical	experience:	 “After	20	plus	
years	of	post-Cold	War	history	the	resilience	of	the	transatlantic	bond	should	not	
be	 underestimated,”	 (Kupchan	 2012).	 Speaking	 in	 Paris	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 the	












proud	 to	 stand	 and	 to	 work	 together	 in	 the	 face	 of	 common	 threats.”97	This	
shared	 history	 of	 cooperation	 is	 presented	 as	meaningful	 or	 relevant	 because,	
according	to	several	official	sources,	it	means	that	the	EU	and	the	US	“share	the	
same	basic	values,”	 “shared	 fundamental	principles,”	and	 “shared	values	we	all	
have	 in	 liberty	 and	 privacy.”98		 In	 his	 remarks	 before	 a	 European	 Parliament	
Committee,	 Secretary	 Chertoff	 referenced	 “shared”	 values,	 principles	 or	 ideas	
nine	 times.	 Curiously,	 the	 repetition	 of	 this	 phraseology	 echoes	 the	 verb	 often	
chosen	 to	 describe	 PNR	 data	 transfers	 –	 “data	 sharing,”	 –	 despite	 the	 fact	 the	
transfers	are	unidirectional	(ie:	not	reciprocal).	The	choice	of	this	particular	verb	




making	 “Europe”	 –	 broadly	 defined	 –	 a	 unique	 partner,	 without	 equal	 in	 its	
ideational	 proximity	 to	 American	 values:	 “We	 don’t	 have	 any	 partner	 in	 the	
world	that	is	as	militarily	capable,	as	prosperous	that	shares	our	values	and	that	
shares	our	 agenda	as	we	do	 in	Europe.”	 (Shapiro	2010).	This	 shared	historical	
experience	 is	 interpreted	 as	 an	 intergenerational	 collective	 project	 based	 on	
shared	values:	“Our	partnership	will	not	only	endure	but	it	will	thrive	and	grow	
stronger,	 and	 that	 we	 will	 carry	 forward	 the	 work	 of	 every	 generation	 of	
Europeans	and	Americans	alike	–	 to	build	a	more	 just,	more	prosperous,	more	
peaceful,	free	world.”	(Clinton	2012).	This	theme	echoes	somewhat	the	notion	of	
a	 transatlantic	 security	community	described	by	Deutsch	et	al	and	reviewed	 in	

















of	 Europe.	 He	 was	 supposed	 to	 be	 a	 post-Atlanticist.”	 (Kupchan	 2012).	 The	
President’s	attention	was	said	to	be	elsewhere:	“He	was	paying	more	attention	to	
the	rise	of	Asia.	But	over	 time,	he	has	come	to	appreciate	Europe.”	 (Hill	2013).	








during	 this	 early	 period:	 “I	 think	 that	 Europhobia	was	 there	 in	 the	 early	 Bush	
years,	 the	George	W.	Bush	 years.	 I	 think	 that’s	 gone”	 (Ibid).	 Initial	 fears	 of	 the	
threats	of	European	integration	in	the	late	1990s	diminished:	“I	think	these	sort	
of	days	of	saying	all	of	Europe,	don’t	get	too	strong,	those	are	over.”	(Ibid)	This	
leads	 most	 of	 the	 commentators	 within	 this	 group	 to	 endorse	 continued	
“strengthening”	of	Europe:	“a	strong	and	united	Europe	is	 in	the	interest	of	the	
United	States	and	is	a	stronger	partner	for	the	United	States.”	(Shapiro,	2010).		
One	 interviewee	 told	 the	 author	 that	 the	 second	 Bush	 term	 was	 more	
accommodating	 of	 EU	 requests	 for	 coordination	 and	 consultation	 on	 counter-
terrorism	matters,	in	part	because	the	sense	of	emergency	eased	somewhat	after	
9/11,	 when	 there	 were	 no	 significant	 follow-on	 attacks	 on	 US	 soil.	 This	









	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Interviewee	no.	5.	
	
The	EU	as	a	source	of	policy	opportunities.	
The	 increased	 engagement	with	 Brussels	 by	Washington	 on	 counter-terrorism	
cooperation	after	9/11	appears	to	indicate	a	growing	acceptance	of	the	value	of	




before	 9/11,	 the	 EU	 was	 simply	 not	 seen	 as	 a	 security	 actor	 and	 counter-
terrorism	cooperation	was	exclusively	 “nationally	based”:	 “In	 the	1990s,	 in	 the	
pre-9/11	era,	 I	don’t	 think	 the	EU	was,	 I	mean,	 there	were	 trade	 issues	but	on	
security	 issues	 it	wasn’t	much	of	 a	 big	 deal.”	 (Ibid).	A	 senior	 state	department	
















on	 the	EU	at	 large.	Accounts	of	 counter-terrorism	cooperation	 itself	 emphasise	
the	 importance	of	 the	policy	opportunities	 that	 cooperation	with	 the	EU	offers	
and	 the	 important	 results	 that	 such	 activity	 has	 already	 delivered:	 “I	 want	 to	
emphasise	 …	 the	 tremendous	 cooperation	 that	 we	 in	 the	 United	 States	 have	
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received	 from	 our	 European	 colleagues	 on	 many	 fronts	 in	 dealing	 with	 this	
challenge	of	terrorism	in	the	21st	century,”	(Chertoff	2007).	This	cooperation	is	
not	merely	useful	 –	 it	 regularly	 averts	potentially	 fatal	 catastrophes:	 “We	have	
worked	together	to	disrupt	terrorist	plots	both	in	Europe	and	the	United	States,”	










Secretary	 Napolitano	 also	 made	 reference	 to	 numerous	 EU-US	 policy	
cooperation	 initiatives	 as	 evidence	 of	 a	 productive	 relationship.99	This	 form	 of	
cooperation	is	presented	in	stark	terms,	the	success	and	failure	of	such	activity	
determines	the	fate	of	ordinary	people:	“It	is	fundamental	to	the	security	of	our	
citizens	 that	 we	 cooperate”	 (Shapiro	 2010).	 This	 theme	 creates	 a	 compelling	
normative	 frame	 for	 EU	 cooperation	 with	 US	 requests	 on	 counter-terrorism	






for	 this	 discourse	 are	 exclusively	 drawn	 from	 liberal	 analysts	 and	 officials,	
providing	 evidence	 of	 a	 strong	 relationship	 between	 these	 ideological	 and	
institutional	 sub-groups	 and	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 valued	 partner.	 This	
narrative	mirrors	that	found	in	the	first	case	on	conventional	security,	suggesting	









increased	 engagement	 with	 Brussels	 on	 counter-terrorism	 cooperation	 in	 the	
aftermath	of	9/11	was	tempered	towards	the	end	of	the	2000s	by	the	prolonged	
negotiation	 process	 required	 to	 achieve	 an	 agreement	 on	 PNR.	 Public,	 private	
and	 interview	 statements	 by	 officials	 suggest	 that	 the	 PNR	 negotiations	
represent	 another	 significant	 juncture	 point	 in	 US	 elite	 discourse	 on	 the	 EU.	
Although	 an	 agreement	 was	 eventually	 reached,	 the	 effort	 required	 and	 the	
difficulties	encountered	by	US	officials	dimmed	enthusiasm	 for	EU-US	counter-
terrorism	 cooperation,	 leading	 to	 frustration	 and	 the	 development	 of	 a	
competing	 discourse	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 ineffective	 and	 obstructionist.	 This	 shift	 in	
discourse	 will	 be	 described	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 following	 sections	 –	 where	
conservative	analysts	expressed	much	more	critical	views.	The	shift	in	attitudes	
























association	between	 the	narrative	of	 the	 “EU	as	 Ineffective	Obstructionist”	 and	
the	 Heritage	 Foundation	 is	 the	 strongest	 relationship	 between	 a	 source	 and	
themes.	This	finding	is	supported	by	the	auxiliary	quantitative	content	analysis.	








this	 source	 expressed	 a	 small	 number	 of	 ideas	 in	 a	 highly	 consistent	 manner	




with	Heritage	 and	 the	 closely	 related	 them	 of	 “disunity”	 is	 strongly	 correlated	
















This	 theme,	 or	 cognitive	 frame,	 is	 most	 forcefully	 articulated	 by	 conservative	
analysts.	 It	 begins	with	 its	 claim	 that	 the	 tools	 and	 institutions	 of	 EU	 counter-
terrorism	efforts	are	poor,	 in	part	because	of	 the	EU’s	complex	structures:	 “the	
EU	 is	 often	 a	 complicating	 factor	 in	many	areas	 and	 the	multilateral	 forum	 for	
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intelligence	 sharing	 is	 suboptimal,”	 (McNamara	 2007).	 Institutional	 actors	 are	
seen	 as	 pre-occupied	 with	 bureaucratic	 turf-wars	 and	 interests,	 rather	 than	
substantial	 action:	 “Europol	 and	 Eurojust	 are	 EU	 agencies	 looking	 for	 roles	 to	
justify	 their	 budget	 lines	 rather	 than	 significantly	 contributing	 to	 counter-
terrorism,”	 (Ibid),	 “While	 some	 policies	 have	 aided	 the	 fight	 against	 global	
terrorism,	 many	 have	 advanced	 unnecessary	 EU	 programs	 and	 created	








Although	 this	 theme	 fits	 most	 clearly	 within	 a	 narrative	 labelled	 as	 broadly	
conservative,	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 EU’s	 internal	 security	 policymaking	 as	 an	
arena	 for	 inter-institutional	wrangling	and	turf	wars	was	widely	shared	among	
officials	 and	analysts	 from	both	 sides	of	 the	 ideological	 divide.	 In	 an	 interview	
exploring	 this	 theme,	 one	 state	 department	 official	 presented	 the	 process	 as	 a	
learning	experience	and	 identified	the	newfound	prominence	of	 the	parliament	




post-Lisbon	 period	 and	 so	we	 had	 to	 figure	 out	 how	 to	manage	 that	 new	
structure.	 It	 was	 a	 major	 undertaking,	 engaging	 with	 MEPs	 directly	 in	
Brussels,	 addressing	 their	 concerns	 through	our	mission	 there	 and	also	 in	
national	capitals.	We’re	still	in	the	process	of	figuring	that	out	–	how	to	deal	
with	the	parliament”	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Interviewee	No.	7.	
	
But	another	senior	official	directly	 involved	 in	 the	PNR	talks	was	more	critical,	
saying	 that	when	negotiating	with	 the	Commission	 and	parliament	 the	US	had	
been	 “caught	 in	 an	 institutional	 issue	 in	 Europe	 in	which	we	were	 essentially	








to	 send	 a	 message	 to	 member	 states	 than	 because	 they	 cared	 about	 the	
actual	issue	with	us.	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Interviewee	no.	5.	
	
While	 analysts	 and	 officials	 varied	 in	 their	 assessment	 of	 the	 severity	 of	 this	
institutional	 ineffectiveness	–	all	agreed	 that	 the	Lisbon	 treaty	 innovations	had	
not	helped	matters.	Rather,	the	reforms	had	exacerbated	institutional	confusion	
and	 unproductive	 competition	 between	 European	 bureaucratic	 actors:	 “Lisbon	
has	made	things	worse.	The	institutions	are	harder	to	figure	out	now,	it’s	more	
complicated,	 it’s	 more	 difficult	 to	 pin	 down	 where	 responsibility	 lies.”	
(Interviewee	no.	15).	
	
Officials	 in	 interviews	 spoke	 openly	 of	 their	 “frustration”	 with	 the	 additional	
“bureaucratic	 layer”	 that	 “diffuse”	 EU	 institutions	 embodied	 in	 the	 process	 of	
gaining	 access	 to	 European	 passenger	 data.	 Not	 only	 did	 one	 official	 believe	


















is	 the	 central	 issue	 within	 this	 narrative,	 which	 was	 not	 found	 in	 any	 liberal	
sources.	Across	all	texts,	 it	 is	argued	that	the	ostensible	reason	for	reluctance	–	
concerns	 over	 civil	 liberties	 –	 is	 unreasonable,	 even	 dishonest:	 “The	 European	
Parliament	 continues	 to	 challenge	 the	 EU–U.S.	 PNR	 deal	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
unfounded	 concerns	 about	 U.S.	 data	 protection	 standards.”	 (McNamara	 2011).	





merely	 confined	 to	 the	 PNR	 issue	 however.	 In	 separate	 testimony	 before	 the	




Many	 EU	 policies	 have	 obstructed	U.S.	 counterterror	 efforts.	 For	 example,	
Brussels	has	long	opposed	U.S.	renditions	policy	and	has	even	threatened	to	
sanction	member	states	for	hosting	CIA	sites	in	Europe.	The	EU	also	refuses	
to	 designate	 Hezbollah	 as	 a	 Foreign	 Terrorist	 Organization,	which	would	
deny	 the	 terrorist	 entity	 a	 primary	 fundraising	 base.	 And	 the	 European	
Parliament	 has	 legally	 stalled	 two	 vital	 data-transfer	 deals—the	 SWIFT	
data-sharing	 agreement	 and	 the	 EU–U.S.	 Passenger	 Name	 Records	 (PNR)	
Agreement.	 Overall,	 the	 EU–U.S.	 counterterrorism	 relationship	 has	 been	
marked	as	much	by	confrontation	as	it	has	by	cooperation.	
	 	





member	 states’	 borders.”	 (McNamara	 2007).	 It	 combines	 this	 theme	 with	 a	
broader	 assertion	 that	 the	 EU	 is,	 by	 its	 nature,	 aggressively	 anti-American	 by	
employing	physiological	 references	 that	anthropomorphise	 the	EU’s	 tendencies	
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“the	 EU’s	 instinctively	 aggressive	 reflex	 …	 the	 EU’s	 combative	 attitude	 …	 its	
animosity	 toward	 the	 United	 States”	 (Ibid).	 These	 pseudo-human	 tendencies	
lead	 to	 an	 inevitable	 conclusion:	 “The	 political	 reality	 is	 that	 the	 European	
Parliament	 is	 a	 bastion	 of	 anti-American	 sentiment,	 determined	 to	 obstruct	
America’s	 war	 on	 terrorism	 rather	 than	 make	 a	 meaningful	 contribution	 to	
transatlantic	security,”	(Ibid).	
	
Not	 all	 who	 described	 the	 institutions	 (both	 parliament	 and	 commission)	 as	
obstructionist	 believed	 that	 this	 tendency	 arose	 from	 the	 reflexive	 anti-
Americanism	portrayed	by	McNamara.	When	officials	were	asked	whether	anti-
American	sentiment	played	a	significant	role	in	the	resistance	to	PNR	in	Brussels,	
all	 demurred	 from	 such	 an	 assessment.	 Instead,	 officials	 pointed	 to	 the	
institutional	 ineffectiveness	 outlined	 previously,	 misunderstandings	 about	 US	





you	 know,	 some	of	 it	was	more	an	 ideological,	 real	 issue	 you	 know	about	
privacy,	 particularly	 for	 the	 Germans,	 There	 were	 some	 libertarians,	 you	
know	we	have	some	of	those	in	the	US	too.”	
	 	 	 	 	 	





argues	 that	 the	EU’s	attempts	 to	enhance	 its	role	 threaten	US	security:	 “full	EU	
integration	 and	 supranationalization	 is	 not	 in	 America’s	 long-term	 interests.”	
(McNamara,	2007).	The	 idea	of	 integration	as	a	 threat	arises	 from	the	sources’	
broad	 objections	 to	 supranational	 decision	 making,	 but	 more	 specifically	
integration	in	AFSJ	is	seen	by	these	analysts	as	“leading	the	European	Parliament	














These	 cognitive	 and	normative	 frames	 lead	 to	 the	policy	 recommendation	 that	
the	US	 should	 avoid	 negotiating	 counter-terrorism	 initiatives	 directly	with	 the	












with	member	 states:	 “the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 EU	 is	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	United	
States’	 long-standing	bilateral	 relationships	with	 the	sovereign	countries	of	 the	
EU”	(Rosenzweig	2011).	The	EU’s	ineffectiveness,	its	obstructionism	and	its	anti-
American	 instincts	 mean:	 “The	 U.S.	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 achieve	 its	 political	
objectives	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	 traditional	 friends	 than	 by	 working	 with	 the	
new	 EU	 institutions,”	 (Ibid).	 British	 analysts	 within	 Heritage	 draw	 special	
attention	to	“the	contrast	between	the	U.K.’s	cooperative	and	workable	approach	







by	 a	 remarkable	 consistency	 among	 conservative	 authors	 across	 a	 5-year	
timeframe.	All	the	texts	produced	by	Heritage	in	this	period	refer	to	the	four	sub	
themes	 to	 varying	 degrees,	 often	 using	 identical	 phrases	 in	 different	 settings,	
suggesting	 a	 conscious	 communications	 strategy	 to	 focus	 on	 a	 core	 set	 of	
compelling	 ideas.	 The	 texts	 are	 clearly	 aimed	 at	 influencing	 executive	 and	
legislative	 actors	 –	 this	 is	 indicated	 by	 the	 inclusion	 of	 direct	 policy	
recommendations	to	the	White	House	in	the	texts	as	well	as	the	fact	that	several	
of	 the	 texts	 are	 transcripts	 of	 testimony	 given	 before	 the	 US	 House	 of	
Representatives.	Retired	senior	State	Dept	officials	in	interviews	confirmed	they	
would	 regularly	 telephone	 senior	Heritage	 staff	 to	 seek	 their	 views	 on	 foreign	
policy	matters	 (Interviewees	No.	9,	18).	Although	 this	narrative	 seems	entirely	
divorced	from	official	public	discourse	and	liberal	analysis	of	the	role	of	the	EU	
as	 a	 security	 actor,	 elements	 of	 the	 discourse	 are	 evident	 in	 private	 official	
coordinative	discourse	in	secret	cables	(see	chapter	8)	and	resolutions	issued	by	
the	House	and	Senate.	The	mirroring	of	elements	of	this	discourse	in	the	private	
correspondence	 of	 officials	 and	 the	 public	 utterances	 of	 members	 of	 congress	
suggests	that	the	views	of	the	EU	as	ineffective	and	obstructionist	are	not	merely	






thinking.	 Evidence	 supporting	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 EU	 as	
ineffective	and	obstructionist	informs	congressional	views	is	found	in	a	number	
of	 clauses	 in	 Senate	Resolution	 174,	 introduced	 in	May	 2011100.	 The	 following	

















The	 implication	here	 is	 clear:	 the	EU’s	negotiators	are	pursuing	a	 strategy	 that	
may	 damage	 US	 security	 interests.	 This	 appears	 to	 draw	 upon	 some	 themes	
identified	 in	 the	 conservative	 narrative	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 obstructionist	 and	
ineffective.	 Furthermore,	 clause	 4	 suggests	 that	 the	 EU	 may	 attempt	 to	
“interfere”	with	 broader	 counter-terrorism	measures	 the	US	 adopts	with	 third	




…(4)	 opposes	 any	 effort	 by	 the	 European	 Union	 to	 interfere	 with	





the	 Conservative	 narrative	 on	 the	EU,	 particularly	 those	 included	 in	 testimony	
before	Congress	from	the	Heritage	Foundation,	it	seems	plausible	to	suggest	that	
the	particular	 legislators	 in	question	are	drawing	directly	 from	remarks	by	 the	
Conservative	 think	 tank.	 Even	 if	 the	Heritage	 texts	were	 not	 the	 origin	 of	 this	












and	 7.4.	 Analysis	 of	 public	 discourse	 in	 this	 case	 shows	 a	 clear	 dichotomy	
between	conservative	analysts	on	the	one	hand	and	liberal	analysts	and	officials	
on	the	other.	Although	the	QCA	did	not	set	out	to	analyse	the	content	of	the	texts	
with	an	a	priori	 classification	method	derived	 from	the	case	variation	model	 in	
Fig.	 7.2,	 the	 ideal-type	 narratives	 discovered	 mirrored	 closely	 the	 embedded	
cases	of	ideological	and	institutional	sub-groups.	This	indicates	that,	when	both	






















that	 ideologically	 divergent	 sub-groups	 constructed	 the	 EU	 in	 discourse	 by	
employing	 consistent	 and	 competing	 narratives.	 These	 narratives	 remained	
consistent	 in	 the	 cognitive	 and	 normative	 frames	 they	 applied	 to	 EU	 action,	
assessing	 the	 EU	 in	 much	 the	 same	 ways,	 despite	 important	 variations	 in	 the	
policy	context	for	action.	Whether	assessing	EU	action	in	the	intergovernmental	
CSDP	domain	 or	 the	more	 communitarized	AFSJ	 domain,	 the	 conservative	 and	
liberal	narratives	were	mostly	unchanged	in	their	core	narrative	themes.	Liberal	
analysts	and	officials	speaking	in	public	portray	the	EU	as	an	institutionally	sub-
optimal	 but	 valued	 partner,	 with	 whom	 the	 US	 shares	 a	 common	 cultural	
background.	 Conservative	 analysts	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 portray	 the	 EU	 as	
ineffective,	obstructive	and	threatening.	The	similar	pattern	of	discourse	in	both	









US.	 This	 pre-eminence	 was	 demonstrated	 by	 illustrating	 the	 legal	 provisions,	
policy	 developments	 and	 the	 communicative	 and	 coordinative	 discourse	 of	
official	actors	in	the	US	Government.	These	policy	characteristics	make	the	PNR	





the	 counter-terrorism	 case	 as	 a	 valued	 partner	 and	 the	 EU	 as	 ineffective	 and	
obstructionist.	The	divergence	of	 these	two	narratives	was	closely	aligned	with	






Although	 officials	 specified	 a	 greater	 number	 of	 specific	 and	 technical	
cooperative	 initiatives	 in	 this	 policy	 domain,	 arguably	 acknowledging	 a	 more	
substantial	 body	 of	 cooperative	 work,	 there	 was	 little	 evidence	 that	 the	
community	 competences	 exercised	 by	 supranational	 institutions	 in	 this	 field	
shaped	 the	 public	 discourse	 in	 significant	 ways.	 Longitudinally,	 officials	 noted	
9/11	 as	 a	 historical	 juncture,	 marking	 an	 expansion	 in	 counter	 terrorism	
cooperation.	 However	 mainstream	 commentators,	 analysts	 and	 scholars	
generally	 apply	 this	 cognitive	 frame	 to	 all	 counter-terrorism	 endeavours,	
multilateral	 or	 otherwise,	 making	 this	 finding	 insignificant.	 The	 Lisbon	 treaty	




were	addressed	 to	European	audiences,	meaning	 that	 speakers	may	have	been	
reluctant	 to	 express	 more	 critical	 views.101	US	 officials	 were	 conducting	 an	
intensive	communications	campaign	to	win	support	for	PNR	among	Europeans,	
so	 we	 might	 expect	 a	 greater	 divergence	 between	 official	 communicative	 and	
coordinative	 discourse	 in	 this	 case	 than	 in	 the	 previous	 one.	 To	 address	 this	
hypothesis,	 the	 following	 chapter	 will	 explore	 whether	 private,	 coordinative	
discourse	between	officials	was	closer	to	the	conservative	narrative	on	this	and	
other	themes	–	or	whether	the	views	of	conservative	analysts	are	as	marginal	as	
they	 appear	 from	 the	 preceding	 analysis.	 Chapter	 8	 presents	 the	 final	


















This	 chapter	 compares	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 examination	 of	 public	 and	 private	
discourse	in	the	second	case	study	(PNR).	As	in	chapter	6,	the	analysis	follows	a	
three-step	 process:	 themes,	 strategies	 and	 comparisons.	 The	 chapter	 explores	
the	 themes	 outlined	 within	 internal	 correspondence	 in	 this	 case,	 revealing	 a	
significant	divergence	between	public	and	private	discourse	that	contrasts	with	
case	 1.	 The	 analysis	 reveals	 how	 officials	 coordinated	 a	 strategy	 of	 denial	 and	
deflection	 in	 countering	 European	 data	 privacy	 concerns	 and	 also	 pursued	 bi-
lateral	 channels	 for	 counter	 terrorism	 cooperation.	 The	 sections	 will	 explore	
how	 public	 and	 private	 texts	 on	 this	 topic	 diverged	markedly	moreso	 than	 in	
case	1.	This	analysis	will	raise	questions	about	the	dominance	of	the	ideological	
framework	as	 an	explanatory	 framework	 for	US	elite	discourse	on	 the	EU	as	 a	










and	Home	Affairs	 in	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	may	 prove	more	 significant	 than	 other	
reforms:	“Justice	and	Home	Affairs	(JHA)	will	remain	a	major	avenue	for	further	
EU	 integration	 over	 the	 next	 decade	 …the	 next	 frontier	 is	 JHA.” 102 	More	
specifically,	 the	 cables	 confirm	 that	 reaching	 agreement	 on	 PNR	 was	 a	 major	
priority	for	the	US	in	its	dealings	with	European	partners.	Records	from	cabinet-







extreme	 importance	 of	 data	 sharing	 in	 providing	 security	 for	 Americans	 and	
Europeans	alike:		
	









These	 events	 suggest	 the	 need	 to	 intensify	 our	 engagement	 with	 German	
government	interlocutors,	Bundestag	and	European	parliamentarians,	and	
opinion	 makers	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 U.S.	 has	 strong	 data	 privacy	
measures	in	place.	
	

















The	 Secretary	 and	 Ashton	 agreed	 to	 work	 closely	 on	 data	
sharing/protection	 to	 conclude	 a	 binding	 agreement	 on	 the	 Terrorist	
Finance	Tracking	Program	(TFTP),	and	secure	the	passenger	name	record	
(PNR)	agreement.	The	Secretary	said	it	was	important	to	get	the	word	out	







throughout	 the	 State	 Dept	 that	 the	 PNR	 agreement	 was	 a	 major	 diplomatic	
priority.	 This	 evidence	 of	 the	 high	 priority	 given	 to	 the	 US-EU	 PNR	 talks	
underlines	the	emergence	of	the	EU	as	a	significant	internal	security	actor	within	
US	official	discourse.	Although	many	of	the	encounters	related	in	the	cables	are	
with	 national	 officials	 (see	 “Bi-lateral	 preference”	 section	 below)	 the	 cables	









member	 state	 ministers	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 sense	 of	 frustration	 with	 the	 pace	 of	









objections	 to	 the	 PNR	 agreement.	 This	 tone	 is	 increasingly	 evident	 from	 2008	
onwards,	 as	 talks	 on	 replacing	 the	 interim	 2007	 PNR	 Agreement	 stalled	 and	
negotiators	complained	publicly	about	difficulties	encountered	in	the	process108.	
This	 renewed	 sense	 of	 urgency	 followed	 on	 from	 the	 enactment	 of	 an	 interim	
PNR	agreement	in	2007	and	coincided	with	the	launch	of	the	ratification	process	
for	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty,	 which	 would	 soon	 grant	 the	 European	 Parliament	 an	
effective	 veto-power	 over	 international	 agreements	 –	 including	 any	 new	 PNR	
Agreement	–	concluded	by	the	Union.109	Therefore,	for	much	of	2008	and	2009,	
when	most	of	 the	 relevant	 cables	were	written,	 the	US	was	operating	within	a	
narrowing	window	of	opportunity	during	which	time	the	European	parliament’s	
approval	for	international	agreements	was	not	yet	formally	necessary.	Although	
the	 ratification	 of	 Lisbon	 was	 delayed	 by	 the	 failure	 of	 a	 referendum	 on	 the	
treaty	 changes	 in	 Ireland,	 one	 cable	 in	 August	 2009	 correctly	 noted	 that	 the	




Janet	 Napolitano	 and	 the	 Irish	 ministers	 for	 transport	 and	 justice,	 circulated	
among	 US	 diplomats	 concerned	 with	 European	 affairs,	 the	 Secretary’s	
impatience	with	the	EU	process	is	clear:	
	
“Napolitano	 stressed	 that	 the	 USG	 is	 moving	 forward	 with	 bilateral	

















Secretary	Napolitano’s	 comments	 reveal	 a	preference	 for	bi	 lateral	 agreements	
and	an	explicit	insistence	that	EU	talks	should	not	delay	such	deals.	This	message	
should	 be	 interpreted	 as	 having	 two	 audiences;	 the	 ministers	 present	 in	 the	
meeting	but	also	the	US	officials	who	were	sent	the	notes	of	the	meeting.	This	bi	
lateral	preference	 appears	 to	 conflict	with	 senior	Commission	official	 Jonathan	
Faull’s	 claim	 in	 late	2007/	early	2008	 that	US	officials	had	accepted	 the	added	
value	of	negotiating	directly	with	the	Commission,	rather	than	with	27	different	
member	states.	The	counter-terrorism	partnership	was	so	effective,	in	fact,	that	
Washington	was	 “therefore	happy	 to	work	with	Brussels,”	he	wrote	 (Faull	 and	
Soreca	2008;	420).	However,	we	now	know	 from	Mr	Faull’s	 subsequent	public	
comments	that	frustration	with	the	Commission	led	the	US	to	shift	its	strategy	by	
early	 2008	 and	 as	 the	 Dublin	 cable	 reveals,	 the	 US	 government	 was	 actively	
seeking	counter	terrorism	cooperation	on	a	bi-lateral	basis	with	member	states	
instead,	 even	 on	 matters	 he	 considered	 to	 be	 within	 the	 Commission’s	
purview.112	For	our	purposes,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	addressee	“tags”	on	





A	 2009	 cable	 from	 USEU	 provides	 insight	 into	 the	 motivations	 behind	 this	
tactical	shift,	and	reveals	a	narrative	constructing	EU	data	privacy	standards	as	
threatening	 to	 US	 objectives:	 “European	 privacy	 and	 data	 protection	 concerns	
continue	 to	 jeopardize	 our	 commercial,	 law	 enforcement,	 intelligence	 and	
foreign	 policy	 objectives,”113	The	 cable	 noted	 that	 EU	 privacy	 standards	 were	

















The	 recipients	 for	 this	 memo	 included	 officials	 in	 15	 different	 government	
departments	and	agencies	–	from	this	we	can	infer	the	memo’s	purpose	to	alert	
actors	 in	 all	 relevant	 fields	 of	 the	 US	 government	 of	 these	 dangers.114		 While	
European	 officials	 insisted	 they	 were	 seeking	 to	 protect	 European	 citizens’	
privacy	rights,	the	cables	suggest	that	US	officials	were	interpreting	these	efforts	
as	a	form	of	policy	imperialism115.	Although	the	frustration	had	been	building	for	
some	 time,	 the	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 2008	 marked	 a	 hardening	 of	 the	 US	
position	and	a	tactical	shift	to	bypassing	the	Commission	and	engaging	member	
states	directly.	This	shift	came	soon	after	the	2007	interim	PNR	agreement	came	






actors	 in	 the	negotiating	process	was	discussed	extensively	 in	an	 interview	 for	






























This	 interviewee	 described	 the	 EU	 –	 in	 particular,	 Commission	 officials	 -	 as	
unable	to	reach	“deals”	on	the	PNR	agreement	without	consulting	member	states	
or	 other	 institutional	 actors.	 According	 to	 the	 official,	 Commission	 negotiators	
would	 reach	 incremental	 agreements	 with	 US	 interlocutors	 and	 then	 ask	 the	




















for	 results,	 which	 created	 a	 sense	 of	 frustration	 on	 our	 part	…	 The	 other	







US	 side,	 gained	 the	 impression	 that	 even	 the	 directly	 elected	 European	
Parliament	 was	 operating	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 “power	 disconnected	 from	
responsibility.”	Unlike	members	of	congress,	for	instance,	MEPs	appeared	willing	








	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Ibid.	
	
	
The	official	 expounded	at	 length	on	possible	motivations	 for	EU	 institutions	 to	
exercise	 power	 to	 delay	 or	 obstruct	 the	 PNR	 agreement,	 despite	 its	 potential	
security	enhancing	provisions.	The	responses	outlined	the	cognitive	 frames	the	
official	and	relevant	staff	applied	to	interpret	the	behaviour	of	EU	interlocutors	
in	 the	 negotiating	 process.	 The	 official	 portrayed	 the	 majority	 of	 objections,	
requests	 or	 delays	 as	 the	 result	 of	 factors	 external	 to	 the	policy	 itself,	 US	data	
standards	or	any	directly	 related	considerations.	 Instead,	objections	were	 seen	
as	 arising	 from	 a	 dysfunctional	 institutional	 dynamic	 wherein	 EU	 actors	
competed	 for	 supremacy.	While	 the	official	 acknowledged	 that	 for	 some	MEPs,	
data	 privacy	 objections	 were	 sincerely	 held,	 for	 most	 (s)he	 argued	 the	
motivations	were	derived	 from	 institutional	 turf-wars	and	bureaucratic	battles	











	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -	Ibid		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 [emphasis	added]	
	
It	 is	 striking	 that	 this	 cognitive	 frame	 forecloses	 the	 possibility	 for	 successful	
engagement	 with	 many	 institutional	 actors	 on	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 policy	
proposals.	 If,	 to	 adopt	 this	 cognitive	 frame	 for	 interpreting	 the	 objections,	 the	
difficulty	 is	 not	 related	 to	 PNR,	 or	 the	 US’s	 proposals,	 then	 the	 solutions	 to	
objections	 lie	 outside	 the	 negotiating	 framework.	 The	 manner	 in	 which	 this	
interpretation	 deflects	 principled	 objections	 and	 undermines	 arguments	 for	
substantial	 revisions	 to	 the	PNR	proposals	will	 be	discussed	 further	 in	 section	
8.2.	
	
A	 senior	 career	 officer	 in	 the	 state	 department	 shared	 a	 degree	 of	 frustration	
with	 the	 role	 of	 the	 parliament,	 in	 particular:	 “On	 PNR,	 we	 found	 the	
unpredictability	 of	 the	 EP	 hard,”	 (Interviewee	 No.	 7).	 Not	 all	 officials	 were	 as	
critical	 of	 “institutional	 politics”	 as	 the	 DHS	 official	 was	 –	 one	 official	 said	




most	 senior	 level	 on	 the	 US	 negotiating	 team	 identified	 inter-institutional	
rivalries	 and	 perceived	 democratic	 shortcomings	 within	 EU	 structures	 as	
primary	 causes	 for	 the	 delays	 in	 the	 PNR	 negotiations.	 Given	 this	 individual’s	








“Objections	 are	 misguided”	 –	 coordinating	 a	 strategy	 of	 denial	
and	deflection.	
	
Other	 officials	 interviewed	 for	 this	 study	 placed	 more	 emphasis	 on	 the	
misapprehensions	about	US	data	privacy	standards	described	in	earlier	sections	
as	 explanations	 for	 European	 resistance.	 Many	 officials	 noted	 a	 sincerely	 held	
“ideological”	 aversion	 among	 some	 MEPs	 to	 wholesale	 data	 exports.	 But	 this	
view	was	 often	 dismissed	 –	 in	 interviews	 and	 cables	 –	 as	 being	misguided	 or	
based	 on	 “misconceptions,”	 “myths,”	 or	 “misunderstandings,”	 about	 US	 data	
privacy	standards116.	According	to	one	memo	produced	by	USEU	and	distributed	
to	multiple	departments	and	agencies,	including	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency,	
Dept	 of	 Defense	 and	 Dept	 of	 Homeland	 Security,	 US	 government	 actors	 were	
instructed	 to	 deploy	 a	 communications	 strategy	 with	 a	 primary	 objective	 to	
“correct	mistaken	perceptions	of	U.S.	privacy	protection	 in	both	 the	public	and	
private	sectors.”117	The	document	identified	nine	high	level	transatlantic	events	
at	which	 the	message	 could	be	promoted.	The	document	 instructed	officials	 to	
address	privacy	concerns	in	public	events	and	in	private	bi	laterals	with	decision	
makers	 and	 opinion-formers	 by	 attributing	 principled	 objections	 to	 PNR	 to	
misunderstandings	or	 a	 lack	of	 knowledge	on	 the	part	of	 objectors.118	In	many	
public	 forums,	 the	complexities	of	data	protection	equivalence	were	difficult	 to	












discussion	 of	 specific	 provisions	 and	 attributing	 objections	 to	
misunderstandings,	 the	 strategy	 effectively	 forestalled	 discussion	 of	
compromises	on	data	protection	standards.	
	
One	 diplomatic	 cable	 reported	 that	 a	 Belgian	 interior	 minister	 rejected	 the	




Baekelandt	 opined	 that	 the	 issue	 on	 data	 privacy	 for	 Europeans	 was	 not	




as	 the	 “Article	 29	 Working	 Party”	 –	 made	 up	 of	 national	 data	 protection	
supervisors	 -	 there	 is	 no	 indication	 that	 US	 officials	 entertained	 the	 idea	 that	
objectors	had	well-founded	privacy	objections	to	the	PNR	agreement.	In	internal	
communications,	 US	 officials	 portrayed	 objectors	 like	 “Article	 29”	 as	 “acting	
outside	their	formal	competence”	and	complained	that	their	approach	of	“giving	
primacy	 to	 civil	 liberties-based	 approaches”	 in	 law	 enforcement	 matters	 had	
“gone	unchallenged”	by	the	Commission.120	Elsewhere,	officials	portrayed	some	
of	 these	objections	as	arising	 from	a	peculiarly	European	mindset	–	 suggesting	
that,	 in	Europe,	 respect	 for	privacy	 is	 fundamental	 value	which	has	 a	different	
status	 than	elsewhere:	 “Privacy	 is	also	a	political	 issue,	 connected	 in	European	
minds	with	respect	for	fundamental	democratic	values.”	(Ibid).	The	statement	is	










The	analysis	of	 coordinative	discourse	 in	 this	section	makes	clear	 that,	 in	 their	
response	to	the	unexpected	and	enduring	resistance	to	data-sharing	measures	in	
Europe,	 US	 officials	 did	 not	 consider	 a	 self-critical	 examination	 of	 US	 data	
protection	standards.	Nor	did	officials	consider	developing	significant	new	data	
protection	 safeguards	 to	 reassure	 European	 allies121.	 Instead,	 internal	 memos	
provided	 a	 clear	 cognitive	 frame,	 which	 bracketed	 European	 data	 privacy	















The	 discourse	 of	 an	 obstructionist	 and	 institutionally	 unresponsive	 Brussels	
bureaucracy	 appeared	 to	 be	 more	 widespread	 among	 US	 officials	 than	 the	
analysis	 of	 public	 discourse	 would	 suggest.	 According	 to	 several	 sources,	 this	
frustration	 led	 to	 a	 new	 policy	 of	 applying	 pressure	 to	 policymakers	 on	 the	















on	 visa	 regulations.	 The	 sections	 below	 will	 analyse	 how	 this	 strategy	 was	
communicated	 within	 official	 discourse.	 It	 will	 also	 assess	 evidence	 from	 the	
cables	that	the	US	successfully	exported	border	security	norms	by	bypassing	the	
EU	 institutions	 and	 striking	 side	 bargains	 with	 national	 governments,	 thus	















[emphasis	added]	 	 	 	 	 	
	 -	Interviewee	No.	5.	
	
State	 Department	 officials	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 growing	 opposition	 to	 an	
agreement	had	taken	them	by	surprise:	“The	PNR	experience	was	a	difficult	and	
long	process	and	we	underestimated	that	at	the	beginning,”	(Interviewee	No.	7).	
The	 PNR	 case	 was	 the	 first	 in	 which	 the	 parliament	 used	 its	 power	 to	 delay	
approval	 for	 an	 international	 agreement	 by	 the	EU,	 and	 in	 interviews,	 officials	
acknowledged	this	action	had	taken	them	by	surprise	(Interviewee	no.	7,	8).	 In	
response,	 a	 widespread	 multi-departmental	 effort	 was	 launched	 to	 analyse	
political	risks	and	win	support	from	MEPs,	ministers,	commission	officials,	NGOs	
and	 influential	 figures	 in	 national	 capitals.	 Embassies	 reported	 to	 numerous	
government	 agencies	 on	 the	 implications	 of	 national	 political	 trends	 for	 data-




actively	 sought	 to	 shape	 it:	 a	 senior	 State	 Dept	 official	 said	 that	 diplomats	 in	
national	capitals	engaged	MEPs	in	their	home	capitals,	often	through	the	national	
party	 structures,	 rather	 than	 in	 Brussels;	 “We’re	 still	 figuring	 out	 what	 is	 the	
proper	 degree	 of	 engagement	with	 the	 EP,	 that’s	 still	 being	worked	 out	…	We	
approach	through	member	state	capitals,	we’ll	support	visits	to	Washington	DC	
by	 some.”	 (Ibid)	 Much	 of	 the	 work	 involved	 reassuring	 MEPs	 on	 US	 data	





in	 the	 search	 for	 agreement	 on	 new	 counter-terrorism	 initiatives.	 Some	 of	 the	
cables	 suggest	 that	 the	 frustration	 with	 a	 perceived	 slowness	 or	 inability	 to	
deliver	on	the	part	of	EU	officials	had	led	to	a	pivot	away	from	Brussels	towards	
pressuring	 national	 capitals.	 Pressing	 for	 the	 opening	 of	 negotiations	with	 the	
Irish	 Government	 on	 a	 data-sharing	 agreement	 entitled	 “Preventing	 and	


























same	responsibility:	you	are	 the	one	ultimately	answerable	 if	a	 terrorist	attack	
occurs	in	your	country.	That	shared	sense	of	responsibility	always	kept	us	pretty	
much	 on	 the	 same	 page.” 125 	An	 interviewee	 for	 this	 study	 confirmed	 the	
secretary’s	 engagement	with	 these	ministers	 increased	 in	 frequency	post-2009	
and	on	several	occasions	he	met	with	the	 interior	ministers	of	an	 inner	core	of	
six	EU	member	states	(Germany,	France,	UK,	Poland,	Italy	and	Spain)	at	informal	
biannual	meetings.	 	 In	 January	 2010,	 Secretary	 Janet	Napolitano,	Mr	 Chertoff’s	
successor,	 also	 lobbied	 interior	 ministers,	 one-on-one,	 at	 the	 EU’s	 Justice	 and	
Home	Affairs	 Council	 in	 Toledo,	 Spain126.	 Around	 this	 time,	 the	 US	 launched	 a	
fresh	 effort	 to	 agree	 new	 terms	 for	 sharing	 criminal	 records	 of	 potential	





that	 progress	 on	 the	 new	 data	 sharing	measures	 would	 help	 them	 to	 achieve	
their	aim	of	an	agreement	on	visa	 liberalisation.	Offering	national	governments	
VWP	 programs	 as	 a	 quid	 pro	 quo	 for	 adopting	 border	 security	 measures	 was	
viewed	 with	 increasing	 frustration	 by	 Commission	 officials,	 who	 saw	 these	
attempts	to	by-pass	Brussels	with	bi-lateral	bargains	as	undermining	community	
competences	in	an	ostensibly	communitarized	policy	domain	(Argomaniz	2010,	
127).	 Following	 bi-lateral	 talks	 between	 Washington	 and	 national	 capitals,	
member	 states	 in	 turn	pressured	 the	Commission	 to	abandon	 its	opposition	 to	












the	 countries	 that	 wanted	 the	 programmes,	 basically	 said	 you	 know	 ‘you	
guys	have	been	promising	us	the	visa	waiver	programme	for	years	-	If	you	









complained	 of	 some	 approaches	 to	 member	 states	 as	 “disrespectful.”128	The	
content	and	interview	analyses	show	that	by	employing	a	set	of	core	negotiation	





























wider	 debate	 on	 data	 privacy	 concerns	 (See	 Fig.	 8.1).	 Secondly,	 the	 analysis	
reveals	how	US	officials	 coordinated	a	multi-agency	effort	 to	 further	 their	data	
sharing	 objectives	 by	 bypassing	 supranational	 authorities	 –	 framed	 as	
“unaccountable”	and	unreliable	by	senior	negotiators	-	and	instead	pursuing	a	bi	
lateral	strategy.	The	analysis	explored	how	officials	in	national	capitals	reported	
political	 analysis	 and	negotiated	with	national	 political	 actors	using	 three	 core	
negotiation	points	(see	Fig.	8.2).	The	following	section	will	compare	the	findings	
of	 sections	 8.1	 and	 8.2	with	 the	 findings	 from	 chapter	 7.	 The	 comparison	will	
review	 key	 divergences	 between	 public	 and	 private	 texts	 and	 also	 analyse	 the	
































officials	 is	markedly	more	 critical	 than	 the	public	 communicative	discourse.	 In	
fact,	 privately,	 officials	 echoed	 certain	 elements	 of	 the	 conservative	 analysts’	
narrative.	 In	 particular,	 private	 official	 discourse	 appeared	 to	 align	with	 three	
themes	 associated	with	 the	 conservative	 discourse	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 an	 ineffective	
obstructionist:	 frustration,	 ineffectiveness	 and	 a	 preference	 for	 a	 bi-lateral	
strategy.	 These	 narrative	 themes	 were	 explored	 further	 in	 interviews	 with	
current	and	former	officials	involved	in	the	PNR	talks	-	all	articulated	a	view	of	
the	 post-Lisbon	 Treaty	 EU	 structures	 as	 more	 institutionally	 complex	 and	
complicated	to	engage	with.	Interviewee	No.	5	echoed	the	Heritage	Foundation’s	
assessments	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 unaccountable	 and	 preoccupied	 with	 internal	
institutional	struggles.		
	
The	 coordinative	 discourse	 constructed	 the	 EU’s	 increasingly	 complex	
institutional	structures	and	data	privacy	principles	as	“problems”	that	“continue	
to	 jeopardize	our	 commercial,	 law	enforcement,	 intelligence	and	 foreign	policy	
objectives” 129 .	 Data	 privacy	 concerns	 expressed	 by	 European	 officials,	
parliamentarians	 and	 activists	 were	 portrayed	 as	 dangerous	 “misperceptions”	
that	 threatened	 US	 interests	 (Ibid).	 Commission	 negotiating	 partners	 were	
described	 in	 interviewees	 as	 unreliable	 and	 ineffective	 dealmakers.	 These	
criticisms	of	 institutional	 and	political	 complexity	mirror	 similar	 complaints	 in	
conservative	discourse	on	the	EU	in	case	1.	While	private	coordinative	discourse	
acknowledged	 the	 EU’s	 emerging	 action	 in	 counter-terrorism	 cooperation,	 by	

















persisted	 in	 the	 counter-terrorism	 case,	 it	 was	 nevertheless	 viewed	 as	
potentially	 damaging	 to	 significant	 US	 foreign	 policy	 objectives.	 While	 US	
officials	 voiced	 frustration	 at	 what	 they	 described	 as	 “ineffectiveness”	 –	 these	
complaints	were	often	described	as	Commission	officials	“not	delivering”	or	not	
“giving	 me	 what	 I	 want,”	 –	 these	 complaints	 could	 arguably	 be	 rephrased	 as	
frustration	with	Commission	officials	 for	 being	uncooperative	 or	 perhaps	 even	
non-compliant.	 The	 senior	 negotiator	 never	 ascribed	 this	 lack	 of	 “delivery”	 as	





both	 State	 and	 Homeland	 Security	 shifted	 their	 strategy	 to	 national	 capitals,	
where	they	employed	a	series	of	negotiating	tactics	–	as	outlined	in	Fig	8.2	-	to	
achieve	 their	 aims.	 In	both	 communicative	 and	 coordinative	discourse,	 privacy	
objections	 were	 framed	 as	 “misperceptions,”	 that	 should	 be	 “corrected.”	
Privately,	 officials	 elaborated	 on	 the	 reasons	 behind	 these	 misconceptions;	





	Arising	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 both	 public	 and	 private	 statements	 and	 the	
revealing	 comments	 in	 interviews	 for	 this	 study,	 the	 main	 motivation	 for	 the	
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shift	 of	 focus	 to	 national	 capitals	 was	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 pace	 of	 EU-US	
negotiations	and	unease	with	EU	data	privacy	standards.130	The	cables	confirm	
that	 key	 actors	 in	 the	 US	 foreign	 policy	 community	 expressed	 growing	
frustration	 with	 the	 nature	 of	 EU-US	 lengthy	 negotiations	 in	 both	 bi-lateral	
exchanges	 and	 internal	 State	 dept.	 memos.	 The	 cables	 reveal	 that	 even	 when	
State	dept.	officials	identified	the	European	Parliament	as	the	key	veto	player	on	
the	 PNR	 Agreement,	 the	 diplomatic	 strategy	 remained	 focussed	 on	 national	
capitals.	US	diplomatic	missions	led	a	strategy	to	influence	the	voting	intentions	




agreements	 as	 incentives	 for	 national	 governments	 to	 either	 pressurise	 the	
Commission	to	drop	its	concerns	relating	to	new	counter-terrorism	data	sharing	
measures	 or	 to	 assert	 their	 role	 as	 lead	 interlocutors	 with	 Washington.	 The	
cables	 also	 show	 that	 US	 officials	 rejected	 requests	 by	 national	 officials	 to	
conduct	 data-sharing	 talks	 at	 EU	 level,	 adopting	 a	 “forum-shopping”	 approach	
which	sought	greater	asymmetric	advantage	by	negotiating	with	capitals	rather	











analysed	 in	 private	 discourse	 echo	 three	 core	 frames	 from	 conservative	








between	 these	 two	 groups.	 In	 order	 to	 examine	 whether	 the	 preference	 for	
bilateralism	matched	the	conservative	analysts’	resistance	to	EU	cooperation	in	
almost	 all	 circumstances	 and	 as	 a	 rule,	 officials	 were	 asked	 whether	 the	
experience	 had	 led	 to	 a	 lasting	 reluctance	 to	 seek	 EU-US	 level	 cooperation	
through	Brussels-negotiated	agreements.	The	senior	Homeland	Security	official	
said	it	had	not	but	indicated	a	scepticism	about	the	capacity	of	the	Commission	
to	 act	 as	 a	 final	 decision-maker:	 “It’s	 not	 so	much	 avoiding	 the	EU	 as	much	 as	
seeing	 who	 ultimately	 can	 do	 the	 deal.”	 (Interviewee	 No.	 5).	 The	 State	 Dept	
official	responsible	for	the	talks	portrayed	the	US	strategy	as	under	constant	re-
evaluation,	with	no	set	preference	for	either	national	capitals	or	EU	institutions.	
Instead,	 the	officials	 said	 each	 initiative	would	 require	 an	ad	hoc	 evaluation	of	
the	optimal	forum	for	seeking	European	cooperation:	“You	know,	we	are	always	
going	 to	work	with	member	states	directly	on	some	 issues	and	with	 the	EU	on	
others.	We	will	work	with	our	European	partners	on	whichever	platform	is	most	




unsatisfactory	 behaviour.	When	 asked	 if	 European	 opposition	 to	 US	 proposals	
were	 rooted	 in	 an	 instinctive	 or	 reflexive	 anti-Americanism	 –	 as	 argued	 by	
Heritage	analysts	–	all	official	 interviewees	rejected	this	assertion.	The	analysis	
of	private	cables	also	found	no	evidence	to	suggest	this	belief	was	held	in	official	
circles.	 Official	 interpretations	 of	 EU	 action	 in	 this	 area	 portrayed	 some	 EU	
motivations	 as	 malign;	 ideologically	 driven,	 arising	 from	 unaccountability,	
ignorance	or	an	 inability	 to	deliver.	But	officials	were	resistant	 to	 the	 idea	 that	
the	EU	was	intrinsically	hostile	to	US	interests	and	certainly	not	anti-American.	
	
These	 findings	 suggest	 that	 while	 private	 coordinative	 discourse	 was	 more	
critical	of	EU	action,	 and	 indeed	borrowed	some	of	 the	 themes	of	 conservative	
discourse	 –	 including	 a	 preference	 for	 bilateralism	 in	 counter	 terrorism	
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cooperative	 measures,	 officials	 differed	 from	 Heritage	 Foundation	 analysts	 in	
their	portrayal	of	the	motivations	for	Europeans’	behaviour.		
	
These	 findings	 are	 significant	 for	 our	 within-case	 comparison,	 in	 that	 they	
support	a	view	of	institutional	context	as	an	important	shaper	of	discourse.	At	a	
minimum,	this	divergence	highlights	the	discursive	action	of	officials,	seeking	to	
reshape	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 debate	 in	 the	 public	 debate,	 in	 ways	 that	 differ	
markedly	 from	 their	 private	 analyses.	 The	 evidence	 of	 contrasting	 patterns	 of	
public	 and	 private	 discourse	 (two	 of	 the	 embedded	 cases)	 supports	 a	 view	 of	
institutional	 context	 as	 an	 important	 determinant	 of	 discursive	 patterns.	 This	
finding	 is	 noteworthy	 and	 confirms	 our	 expectations	 that	 officials	 will	 frame	
ideas	differently	when	addressing	the	general	public.	But	how	can	we	explain	the	
greater	divergence	of	public	and	private	discourse	in	this	case,	when	compared	
with	 case	 one?	 Unlike	 case	 one,	 US	 officials	 discussing	 the	 PNR	 case	 were	
engaged	in	complex	and	long-running	bi-lateral	negotiations	over	an	agreement	
with	direct	commercial	and	security	impacts	for	both	flight	operators	and	the	US	
government.	 In	 this	 context,	 officials	 speaking	 in	 public	 were	 more	 likely	 to	
employ	strategies	designed	to	shape	opinion,	convince	interlocutors	and	prevent	
potentially	 damaging	 public	 backlash	 against	 the	 measures.	 In	 private,	 the	







Ideological	 affiliation	once	 again	provided	an	 important	 indicator	of	 discursive	
divergence,	much	as	it	did	in	case	one.	Although	the	themes	of	the	conservative	
narrative	 were	 echoed	 in	 private	 coordinative	 discourse,	 the	 root	 cognitive	
frames	 employed	 by	 conservative	 analysts	 to	 explain	 EU	 obstructiveness	
(reflexive	anti-Americanism)	were	not	shared	by	any	of	the	officials	interviewed.	
Secondly,	while	officials	shared	a	preference	 for	bilateralism,	only	conservative	
analysts	 eschewed	 any	 possibilities	 of	 EU-level	 counter-terrorism	 cooperation.	
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These	findings	reaffirm	the	conclusion	from	case	one,	that	ideological	affiliation	








became	 clear	 these	 reforms	 might	 obstruct	 US	 data	 access	 preferences.	 By	
contrast,	 in	 case	one,	 threat	perceptions	diminished	as	officials	 interpreted	 the	
institutional	 reforms	 of	 Lisbon	 as	 unlikely	 to	 result	 in	 significant	 real-world	




EU	security	 integration	as	 threatening	–	by	 their	own	words,	 in	public	at	 least,	
integration	 is	 actively	 encouraged	by	US	officials.	Rather,	 it	 appears	 that	when	
integration	 is	seen	to	bestow	veto-like	powers	on	the	EU	institutions	over	vital	
transatlantic	 security	 cooperation	measures,	 like	PNR-sharing,	US	officials	 shift	
back	to	a	preference	for	bi-lateral	cooperation	with	member	states.	In	this	case	







public	 communicative	 discourse	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 complex	 and	 long-running	
negotiating	 process,	 which	 officials	 viewed	 as	 potentially	 threatening	 to	 US	
interests.	 In	public,	officials	attempted	 to	win	support	 from	sceptical	European	




internal	 memos	 employed	 frames	 that	 deflected	 EU	 privacy	 objections	 by	
bracketing	objections	as	arising	 from	problems	external	 to	 the	PNR	agreement	
itself.	 In	particular,	 the	pre-existing	cognitive	 frame	of	 the	EU	as	 institutionally	
ineffective	and	obstructionist	featured	strongly	in	this	framework.	The	evidence	
suggested	 that	 a	 conservative	 public	 narrative	 of	 the	EU	 as	 a	 threat	was	more	
closely	 aligned	with	 elite	 ideas	 than	 the	 QCA	 of	 public	 discourse	 in	 chapter	 7	
suggested.	
	
Providing	 a	 definitive	 explanation	 for	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 divergence	 of	
public	and	private	discourse	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	dissertation	and	such	an	
attempt	 reaches	 beyond	 the	 epistemological	 range	 of	 the	 approach	 this	
dissertation	employs.	The	findings	are	also	limited	by	the	number	of	documents	
coded	 and	 officials	 interviewed.	 The	 frustration	 and	 criticisms	 of	 EU	
ineffectiveness	expressed	by	the	most	senior	official,	a	Republican	nominee,	may	





Finally,	 the	 community	 policy	 context	 was	 seen	 to	 have	 important	 effects	 on	
discourse,	 raising	American	 threat	perceptions	when	US	officials	perceived	 the	
Lisbon	treaty	reforms	as	producing	a	form	of	European	“policy	imperialism.”	US	
officials	 made	 great	 efforts	 to	 engage	 supranational	 actors	 in	 the	 European	
parliament	and	the	Commission	but,	ultimately,	sought	many	of	their	objectives	
through	bi-lateral	negotiations	with	member	states.	This	resistance	to	collective	
EU	 security	 action	 warrants	 further	 examination.	 Can	 we	 reconcile	 American	











policy	 community	 -	 shaped	 the	 pattern	 of	 discourse.	 The	 study	 opened	 up	 for	
examination	 the	 processes	 of	 discursive	 competition	within	 an	 influential	 elite	
and	revealed	how	ideological	and	institutional	cleavages	within	that	group	were	
mirrored	 in	 divergent	 narrative	 accounts	 of	 EU	 security	 action	 in	 two	 policy	
fields.	The	analysis	also	considered	how	official	discourse	on	EU	security	action	




Discourses	 on	 ideas	 and	 identities	 are	 an	 important	 element	 of	 international	
politics.	The	discourses	of	significant	actors	set	expectations	for	the	behaviour	of	
other	actors	within	the	system	–	marking	out	socially	constructed	parameters	for	
legitimate	 action,	 cooperation	 and	 conflict.	 As	 Wendt	 (1999)	 argued,	 the	
generation	of	 international	 identities	 for	actors	 is	an	 inherently	social	exercise,	
involving	interactions	with	Others,	who	“mirror”	role	expectations	back	onto	the	
Self.	 Scholars	 (Baker-Beall,	 2014)	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 EU	 is	 engaged	 in	 a	
“continuous	 discursive	 struggle”	 to	 define	 its	 relationship	 with	 the	 world	 (p.	
212).	Some	have	analysed	CFSP	as	a	tool	of	rhetoric	designed	to	personify	an	EU	
identity	 (Tonra	 2005),	 a	 product	 of	 national-level	 European	 discursive	
competition	(Larsen,	2004)	and	a	way	for	the	Union	to	project	 itself	externally,	
articulating	its	significance	for	the	World	(Rosamond	2005).	However	analysis	of	






to	European	debates	on	 the	EU’s	 security	action	miss	an	 important	part	of	 the	
socially	 constructed	 discursive	 puzzle.	 The	 EU’s	 role	 as	 a	 security	 actor	 is	 a	
highly	 contested	 concept,	 with	 divergent	 terms	 of	 debate	 between	 European	
actors,	but	also	on	either	side	of	the	Atlantic.		Hence	discourse	on	the	EU’s	policy	
conduct	 and	 in	particular,	 non-European	discourse	on	 this	 subject,	 plays	 a	 key	
role	 in	 the	 Union’s	 identity	 construction	 -	 one	 which	 International	 relations	
scholars	and	EU	specialists	cannot	ignore.	
	
Within	 the	 generation	 of	 US	 discourse	 on	 EU	 security	 action,	 elite	 sub	 groups	
with	 access	 to	 financial,	 political,	 media	 and	 intellectual	 resources	 play	 an	
important	 role.	 Elite	 foreign	 policy	 narratives	matter	 because	 in	 lower	 profile	
areas	of	policymaking,	which	are	characterised	by	low	media	salience	and	public	
awareness,	 small	 groups	 of	 specialists,	 operating	 from	 influential	 institutional	
positions,	can	exercise	a	high	degree	of	influence.	Analysing	their	activity	reveals	
a	 competitive	 ideological	 field	 of	 purposeful	 discursive	 competition,	which	 has	
significant	 effects	 on	 US	 policy	 and	 on	 broader	 perceptions	 of	 the	 EU’s	 role	





and	 policy	 competence	 in	 shaping	 discourse.	 Divergent	 narrative	 accounts,	
rooted	 in	 the	 differing	 ideological	 positions	 of	 the	 elite	 sub-groups,	 were	
expected	because	 these	actors	consciously	seek	 to	reshape	 the	 terms	of	debate	
on	 the	 EU’s	 nature	 and	 conduct	 in	 line	 with	 their	 preferences.	 It	 was	 also	
expected	that	variation	in	policy	competence	levels	between	case	studies	would	
be	 mirrored	 in	 differing	 evaluations	 of	 the	 EU’s	 capacity	 for	 action,	 firstly	 in	
conventional	 security	 (CSDP)	 and	 secondly	 in	 counter-terrorism	 cooperation.	
The	 case	 studies	 partially	 confirmed	 these	 expectations.	 But	 they	 also	 showed	








The	 sections	 below	 review	 the	 main	 findings	 and	 arguments	 of	 this	 thesis,	






9.1	 Elite	 discourse	 and	 EU	 security	 action	 –	
reassessing	the	research	puzzle	
	
This	 thesis	 has	 proposed	 a	 novel	 qualitative	 content	 analysis	 of	 discourse	
produced	by	 the	US	 elite	 foreign	policy	 community,	 specifically	 on	EU	 security	
action.	 The	 project	was	 sparked	 by	 a	 recognition	 of	 the	 gap	 in	 scholarship	 on	







interpretive	 framework	 incorporating	 ideological	 and	 institutional	 cleavages	
informed	by	variation	 in	EU	policy	 competence	 level.	The	explanation	emerges	
from	 discursive	 institutionalist	 scholarship	 that	 conceptualises	 discourse	 as	
simultaneously	 an	 external	 structure	 and	 an	 internal	 construct,	 providing	
cognitive	and	normative	frames	that	order	phenomena.	But	the	framework	also	
reveals	 how	 agents	 purposefully	 shape	 discourse	 using	 their	 foreground	
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discursive	 abilities	 (Schmidt	 2008).	 The	 study	 modified	 the	 framework	 by	
theorising	 that	 privileged	 and	 influential	 elite	 groups	 can	 organise	 individual	
discursive	 actions	 and	 harness	 political,	 financial,	 media	 and	 intellectual	
resources	 to	 shape	 discourse	 at	 the	 institutional	 level.	 The	 approach	 thus	
addresses	 broader	 debates	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 agent-level	 action	 and	
structure-level	 discursive	 change	 and	 the	 role	 of	 power	 relations	 in	 discourse	
theory	(Panizza	and	Miorelli;	2012).		
	
The	 formulation	 of	 an	 elite-focussed,	 competitive	 discursive	 model	 for	 the	
analysis	 of	 US	 foreign	 policy	 discourse	 was	 the	 study’s	 main	 theoretical	
contribution.	 The	 application	 of	 discursive-institutionalist	 analysis	 and	 the	
adoption	 of	 a	 qualitative	 content	 analysis	 method	 for	 the	 study	 of	 public	 and	
private	 foreign	 policy	 discourses	 were	 the	 key	 methodological	 innovations	 of	
this	 work.	 This	 was	 the	 first	 time	 –	 to	 the	 author’s	 knowledge	 -	 that	 US	 elite	
discourse	on	the	EU	as	a	security	actor	was	analysed	to	produce	a	representative	






The	 comparison	 of	 embedded	 cases	 showed	 that	 the	 ideological	 cleavage	
between	 think	 tanks	 was	 the	most	 consistent	 indicator	 of	 divergent	 narrative	
accounts	 of	 the	 EU.	 Although	 an	 overarching	 discourse	 of	 EU	 weakness	
dominated	 analysis	 across	 sub-groups	 and	 policy	 fields,	 this	 cognitive	
framework	was	flexible	enough	to	encompass	widely	differing	conclusions.	Most	
notably,	 conservative	 think	 tanks	 consistently	 portrayed	 EU	 security	 action	 in	
both	 policy	 domains	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 US	 security	 interests,	 despite	 the	 Union’s	
apparent	weakness	and	decline.	Within	this	conservative	narrative,	 the	EU	was	
portrayed	 as	 obstructionist,	 ineffective,	 Anti-American	 and	 hostile	 to	 NATO.	
Meanwhile	 -	 in	 public,	 at	 least	 -	 liberal	 think	 tanks	 and	 officials	 consistently	
described	 EU	 security	 integration	 as	 creating	 valuable	 opportunities	 for	
transatlantic	 partnership,	 rooted	 in	 shared	 values	 and	 histories.	 US	 officials	
	 252	
expressed	concern	about	 the	 risks	 to	NATO	posed	by	EU	conventional	 security	
integration.	But	these	fears	diminished	throughout	the	late	1990s	and	2000s.		
	
The	 shaping	 effect	 of	 ideological	 affiliation	 cross	 cut	 the	 variation	 in	 policy	
competence	in	each	case,	thus	demonstrating	the	important	effects	of	ideology	in	
the	 discourse	 of	 analysts.	 Most	 accounts	 were	 responsive	 to	 institutional	
changes,	 in	so	far	as	analysts	responded	to	new	signs	of	deepening	 integration.	






The	 institutional	 context	 also	 provided	 a	 useful	 indicator	 for	 the	 pattern	 of	
discourse.	 Although	 official	 discourse	 in	 case	 1	 (CSDP)	was	 broadly	 similar	 in	
thematic	content	in	public	and	private	settings,	officials	speaking	in	public	were	
more	 likely	 to	conceal	 their	 threat	perceptions	of	security	 integration	 in	case	2	
(counter-terrorism	 cooperation).	 The	 thesis	 argued	 that	 this	 tendency	 arose	





EU	 in	 case	 2	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 view	 the	 Union	 as	 obstructing	 US	 security	
interests,	provided	valuable	insights	for	our	cross-case	comparison.	In	the	more	
communitarian	 policy	 domain	 (Case	 2:	 counter	 terrorism)	 officials	 were	
surprised	 to	 learn	 that	 the	 Lisbon	 reforms	 could	 allow	 “unaccountable”	 and	
“ineffective”	 supranational	 institutions	 to	 restrict	 US	 access	 to	 transatlantic	
passenger	 data.	 The	 QCA	 of	 private	 analysis	 circulated	 within	 the	 State	 Dept	
shows	 a	 group	 of	 officials	 highly	 alarmed	 by	 the	 consequences	 of	 European	
integration	 and	 the	 apparently	 extra-territorial	 influence	 of	 EU	 data	 privacy	
principles.	 The	 findings	 showed	 that	 in	 more	 communitarian	 policy	 domains,	
such	 as	 counter-terrorism,	 where	 supranational	 institutions	 obtain	 veto-like	
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powers,	 officials	 shifted	 their	 negotiation	 preferences	 to	 bi-lateral	 cooperation	
with	 member	 states.	 In	 case	 two,	 the	 US	 strategy	 appeared	 to	 unpick	 the	
Commission’s	negotiating	prerogative,	and	reach	around	the	institutions	to	make	
progress	 in	 national	 capitals.	 Furthermore,	 by	 bracketing	 European	 data	
objections	 as	 misinformed	 or	 rooted	 in	 institutional	 dysfunction,	 the	





The	 finding	 that	 liberal	 and	 conservative	 analysts	 were	 consistent	 in	 their	
contrasting	 appraisals	 of	 EU	 security	 action	 across	 time	 and	 policy	 fields	
supports	 the	 central	 argument	 that	 these	 actors	 are	 engaged	 in	 purposeful	
discursive	competition.	The	evidence	suggests	that	elite	sub-groups	are	engaged	





elite	 conceptualisation	 approach	 pursued.	 The	 thesis	 rejected	 an	 epistemic	
communities	approach	to	US	think	tanks,	instead	highlighting	the	highly	diverse	
ideological	nature	of	the	think	tank	community	and	its	competitive	features.	This	
claim	 was	 buttressed	 by	 chapter	 three’s	 description	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 an	
ideologically	 competitive	 think	 tank	 field	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s.	 When	 Jack	
Kemp,	 Republican	 congressman	 for	 New	 York,	 wrote	 that	 the	 Heritage	
Foundation	 had	 become	 “the	 single	most	 important	 intellectual	 ‘bank’	 for	 our	
growing	 positive	 conservatism…”(cited	 in	 Medvetz	 2012,	 111)	 he	 was	
highlighting	both	 the	explicitly	 ideological	bent	of	 the	organisation	and	also	 its	
significance	as	a	political	resource.	By	this	time	the	liberal	analysts	in	Brookings	
were	already	keenly	aware	that	the	think	tank	arena	had	become	ideologically-





rather	 than	 a	Haasian	 (1992)	 vision	 of	 think	 tanks	 as	 technocratic	 actors	with	
shared	 assumptions	 of	 expertise,	 competence	 and	 objective	 knowledge,	 the	
image	of	think	tanks	that	emerges	from	the	empirical	findings	of	this	study	is	one	
of	 purposeful	 and	 politically	 savvy	 operators,	 marshalling	 sophisticated	
techniques	 and	 resources	 to	 influence	 the	 debate	 on	European	 security	 in	 line	
with	their	preferences.		
	
This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 these	 institutions	 do	 not	 produce	 valuable	 assessments	
and	critiques	of	EU	policies,	nor	is	it	to	infer	bad	faith	on	the	part	of	any	analysts	
sampled.	 It	 is	 rather	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 the	 discursive	 landscape	 is	
characterised	 by	 competing	 actors,	 with	 differing	 ideological	 standpoints	 and	





These	 findings	support	 the	 theoretical	extension	proposed	 in	 this	 thesis,	which	
argued	 for	an	examination	of	how	changes	 in	discursive	 institutions	are	driven	
primarily	by	elite	level	action,	in	addition	to	the	individual	agent	level	described	
by	Schmidt	(2008).	This	modification	responded	to	two	criticisms	by	scholars	in	
the	 field;	 firstly,	 that	 the	mechanisms	 connecting	 agent	 level	 discursive	 action	
with	 structure	 level	 institutional	 change	had	not	 been	 specified.	 Secondly,	 that	
the	power	relations	enabling	certain	actors	 to	be	effective	 in	 this	process	were	
also	 under-analysed	 (Panizza	 and	Miorelli,	 2013).	 By	 virtue	 of	 their	 resources	
and	reputations,	Brookings	and	Heritage	afforded	the	analysts	they	employed	a	
platform	to	 influence	policy	discourse	that	would,	 in	most	cases,	not	have	been	
available	 to	 them	otherwise.	As	Heritage	 founder	Paul	Weyrich	 remarked,	 “We	
had	no	real	experts.	We	had	a	bunch	of	eager	young	people	who	in	time	became	
expert.	But	at	the	time	that	I	had	them,	nobody	knew	who	they	were,”	(Medvetz	






of	 foreground	 discursive	 change,	 the	 study	 touched	 on	 the	 role	 of	 power	 and	
resources	 in	 discursive	 competition.	 It	 is	 the	 potent	 combination	 of	 financial,	
political,	intellectual	and	media	power	resources	exercised	by	these	think	tanks	
that	give	impact	to	their	analysts’	communicative	action.	These	findings	suggest	
initial	 bridging	 points	 between	 agent-level	 discursive	 action	 and	 institutional	
level	 discursive	 change,	 thus	 responding	 to	 some	 of	 the	 criticisms	 of	 earlier	
discursive	institutionalist	work	(Panizza	and	Miorelli,	2013).	
	
The	 analysis	 also	 highlighted	 how	 individuals,	 in	 particular	 Secretary	 Clinton,	
used	 their	 institutional	 standing	 and	 foreground	 discursive	 abilities	 to	 try	 and	
reshape	the	debate	on	 the	EU’s	role.	 In	Secretary	Clinton’s	case,	 the	analysis	of	
public	 and	 private	 texts	 revealed	 her	 attempts	 to	 support	 HRVP	 Ashton’s	
standing.	By	employing	communicative	action	before	political,	media	and	public	
audiences,	she	consciously	sought	to	empower	the	post-Lisbon	officeholder.	The	







The	 thesis	 pursued	 a	 novel	 approach	 by	 performing	 a	 QCA	 on	 classified	
documents	 and	 comparing	 the	 findings	 with	 public	 discourse.	 The	 findings	
revealed	a	paradox	at	the	heart	of	US	support	for	integration	outlined	in	the	next	
section	 but	 they	 also	 suggested	 that	 officials	 have	 incentives	 to	 shield	
preferences	and	criticisms	 from	public	view,	court	 favour	and	 influence	among	
opinion	shapers	and	allay	fears.	The	innovative	analysis	of	private	coordinative	
strategies	 in	 both	 case	 studies	 enabled	 the	 thesis	 to	 highlight	 the	 quasi-causal	
impact	 of	 discursive	 frames.	 In	 case	 2	 in	 particular,	 US	 officials	 interpreted	
European	data	privacy	objections	within	 the	pre-existing	 frame	of	 institutional	
dysfunction,	rather	than	as	pragmatic	and	plausible	concerns.	As	a	result,	the	US	
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coordinative	 strategy	 foreclosed	 any	 opportunities	 for	 further	 compromise	 on	
data	protections	with	the	Commission.	The	strategy	was	rooted	in	the	dominant	
discursive	map	 of	 US	 officials,	 which	 centred	 on	 ideas	 of	 EU	 institutional	 and	
political	weakness.	The	logical	consequence	of	this	narrative	was	the	pursuit	of	
side	 deals	 and	 issue-linkages	 with	 member	 state	 governments,	 rather	 than	
conducting	negotiations	exclusively	in	the	US-EU	negotiating	framework.		
	
The	 findings	 indicate	 that	 further	 studies	 comparing	public	and	private	 speech	
can	produce	valuable	insights	into	how	officials	analyse	and	strategise	in	closed	
networks	 and	 how	 this	 differs	 from	 public	 pronouncements.	 The	 spread	 of	
freedom	of	 information	provisions,	as	well	as	 the	unprecedented	availability	of	









officials	 were	 cognisant	 of	 institutional	 reforms	 embodied	 in	 Lisbon	 but	 the	
timeframe	covered	a	period	of	uncertainty	about	the	real-world	impact	of	treaty-
based	 institutional	 change.	 As	 revealed	 in	 the	 case	 studies,	 officials	 were	
increasingly	supportive	of	CSDP’s	role	as	the	much-feared	threat	to	NATO	never	
materialised.	 Private	 strategies	 from	 2007-onwards	 mirrored	 this	 public	
endorsement	 of	 a	more	 prominent	 security	 role	 for	 the	 EU,	 suggesting	 that	 in	
public	 words	 and	 private	 deeds,	 the	 Obama	 administration	 was	 consistently	
supportive	 of	 conventional	 security	 integration.	 Recently,	 support	 for	 the	 EU’s	
security	 role	 is	most	 evident	 in	 support	 of	 the	 Lisbon	office	 holders	 –	 a	 policy	
revealed	 publicly	 and	 in	 private	 correspondence.	 But	 this	 enthusiasm	 appears	








nature	 of	 AFSJ	 policymaking	 was	 reflected	 in	 higher	 levels	 of	 official	 and	
conservative	 analyst	 threat	 perception	 –	 suggesting	 that	 the	 conservative	
narrative	was	not	as	marginal	as	it	appeared	in	case	one.	Rather	than	viewing	the	
more	integrated	policy	domain	as	increasing	European	effectiveness,	US	officials	
viewed	 the	 Lisbon	 reforms	 as	 empowering	 European	 dysfunction.	 In	 the	 post-
9/11	 world,	 officials	 are	 resistant	 to	 any	 externally	 imposed	 negotiation	
requirements	 impinging	on	security	prerogatives.	Such	requirements	are	 liable	
to	be	portrayed	by	US	officials	as	a	form	of	“policy	imperialism”	by	over-reaching	
external	 partners.	 In	 the	 PNR	 case,	 the	 EU’s	 resistance	 to	 some	 of	 the	 US	
demands	 for	 European	 passengers’	 private	 data	 was	 interpreted	 through	 pre-
existing	 cognitive	 frames.	 US	 officials	 employed	 the	 dominant	 discourse	
European	weakness	and	ineffectiveness	to	frame	the	Commission’s	resistance	to	
PNR	 demands	 as	 symptomatic	 of	 institutional	 dysfunction,	 bureaucratic	 turf-
wars,	 “dangerous	 misperceptions”	 and	 marginal,	 ideologically-driven	 actors,	
rather	than	rooted	in	reasonable	concern.	The	strategies	that	followed	sought	to	
deflect	privacy	objections	and	outflank	the	institutions	by	dealing	with	member	
state	 governments	bi-laterally.	US	officials	 incentivised	 compliance	by	member	
state	 governments,	 using	 side	 bargains	 on	 visa	 waiver	 programme	 status,	 in	
what	was	an	ostensibly	communitarized	policy	domain.	
	
These	 findings	 reveal	 a	 paradox	 that	 hints	 at	 the	 limits	 of	 US	 support	 for	
European	 security	 integration.	 It	 is,	 in	 some	ways,	 similar	 to	 the	 long-running	
tension	at	the	heart	of	post-war	US	support	for	integration	reviewed	in	chapter	
2,	where	 sectional	 and	bureaucratic	 actors	 resented	European	 integration	 that	
ran	 counter	 to	 US	 sectional	 interests.	 In	 this	 case	 however,	 supranational	
institutions	 appeared	 to	 be	 obstructing	 vital	 US	 national	 security	 objectives.	
Washington	 publicly	 insists	 it	 supports	 security	 integration	 but	 in	 case	 two,	
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when	 this	 integration	 appeared	 to	 undermine,	 or	 at	 least	 delay	 data-sharing	
objectives,	 enthusiasm	 for	 engaging	 with	 Brussels	 quickly	 evaporated.	 The	










terrorism	 partner,	 particularly	 given	 the	 resurgence	 of	 legal	 conflicts	 over	
divergent	 data	 privacy	 standards	 on	 either	 side	 of	 the	 Atlantic.	 It	 may	 also	
chasten	the	enthusiasm	of	pro-integrationists	in	the	US	government,	now	aware	
that	 concerted	 European	 action	 may	 not	 be	 consistent	 with	 unchallenged	 US	
leadership.	
	
Since	 the	 analysis	 for	 this	 study	 was	 completed,	 a	 significant	 ruling	 by	 the	
European	Court	of	Justice	invalidated	the	European	Commission’s	finding	that	US	
data	 standards	provided	adequate	protections	 for	Europeans’	 private	data	 and	
required	 the	 suspension	of	 the	EU-US	 Safe	Harbour	 agreement,	which	 governs	
transatlantic	 data	 transfers 131 .	 Implementing	 this	 judgment	 will	 involve	
wrestling	with	enormous	commercial	and	security	risks	and	raise	the	spectre	of	
another	 transatlantic	 data	 transfer	 dispute.	 These	 challenges	 have	 been	
complicated	and	further	politicised	by	revelations	of	mass	digital	surveillance	of	
citizens	 by	 both	 American	 and	 European	 intelligence	 services.	 The	 PNR	 case,	
along	with	the	SWIFT	data	exchange	controversy,	should	therefore	be	seen	not	
as	 isolated	 spats,	 but	 as	 the	 first	 rounds	 of	 an	 unresolved	 policy	 puzzle	 for	
European	and	American	policymakers.	The	analysis	of	official	private	discourse	






of	 institutional	 dysfunction.	 The	 analysis	 also	 showed	 how	 data	 privacy	
objections	 were	 deflected	 within	 this	 cognitive	 framework.	 These	 findings	
suggest	 further	 lines	 of	 enquiry	 for	 scholars	 seeking	 to	 analyse	 how	 the	






Despite	 the	 differences	 analysed	 across	 all	 cases	 and	 embedded	 cases,	 there	
were	some	areas	of	consensus.	The	most	prominent	theme	across	all	sub-groups,	
policy	fields	and	over	time,	was	the	perception	of	the	EU	as	weak	and	ineffective:	
militarily,	 politically,	 institutionally,	 economically	 and	 demographically.	
Although	sub-groups	drew	differing	conclusions	from	this	shared	starting	point,	
the	prevalence	of	 this	 theme	among	an	 ideologically	and	 institutionally	diverse	
group	of	 actors	points	 to	 a	 level	 of	 discursive	dominance	 that	 requires	 further	
examination.	In	particular,	the	flexibility	and	adaptability	of	the	cognitive	frame	
of	European	weakness	deserves	attention.	The	narrative	of	European	weakness	




sinkhole	 for	 ever-diminishing	 military	 resources.	 For	 these	 conservative	
analysts,	a	weak	Europe	could,	paradoxically,	pose	a	greater	threat	than	a	strong,	
militarily	capable	one.	This	shift	 in	argumentation,	occurring	 in	 the	mid-2000s,	
arguably	allowed	analysts	who	had	depicted	CSDP	as	a	“dagger	aimed	at	NATO’s	
heart”	to	adapt	the	normative	framework	to	sidestep	the	reality	that	CSDP	never	
came	to	challenge	NATO	 in	any	real	way	over	 the	 last	25	years.	These	 findings	
reinforce	Milliken’s	(1999)	theory	that	dominant	narratives	survive	in	large	part,	
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by	 incorporating	 new	 and	 sometimes	 countervailing	 information	 within	 a	
flexible	explanatory	framework.		
	
But	 the	 long-running	 narrative	 themes	 of	 economic	 and	 demographic	 decline,	
low	 defence	 spending,	 rooted	 in	 differing	 strategic	 cultures	 and	 welfare	 state	
tendencies,	displays	a	 level	of	continuity	with	earlier	discourse	on	transatlantic	
relations,	 reviewed	 in	 chapter	 two.	 This	 discourse	 is	 rooted	 in	 traditional	
conceptions	 of	 power	 and	 its	 projection	 abroad;	 perspectives	 which	 some	
scholars	engaged	in	the	EU	role	debate	–	outlined	in	chapter	one	-	have	sought	to	
replace	 with	 post-modern	 notions	 of	 soft	 power	 and	 the	 power	 of	 attraction		
(Nye	2005,	Smith	2003).	In	stark	contrast	to	the	European	academic	and	political	
debate	 on	 the	 EU’s	 soft	 power	 tools	 of	 enlargement,	 attraction	 and	 norms	
projection,	there	was	scant	evidence	of	soft	power	acknowledgements	in	any	of	
the	 sub-groups	 analysed.	 This	may	 support	 Kagan’s	 (2004)	 claim	 that,	 arising	
from	 differing	 strategic	 cultures,	 and	 the	 perception	 of	 modern	 Europe	 as	 a	
“post-Kantian	 paradise,”	 Europeans	 will	 remain	 unwilling	 to	 increase	 military	
expenditure.	 Alternatively,	 it	 may	 point	 to	 a	 form	 of	 wishful	 thinking	 among	
Europeanists,	 who	 seek	 to	 depict	 the	 EU’s	 lack	 of	 significant	 and	 autonomous	
conventional	security	resources	as	strength,	rather	than	a	weakness.	This	study	
did	not	 seek	 to	definitively	 explain	 the	presence	or	 absence	of	 certain	 themes.	
But	at	the	least,	this	finding	suggests	a	transatlantic	divide	in	the	debate	over	EU	
security	action,	in	which	analysts	and	policymakers	on	either	side	of	the	Atlantic	





of	 this	 thesis	 postulated,	 EU	 foreign	 policymaking	 has	 a	 significant	 ideational	
element,	which	seeks	to	establish	a	role	or	identity	for	the	EU	in	global	politics,	
then	it	must	engage	with	external	perceptions	as	they	are.	US	elite	discourse	on	
the	EU,	as	revealed	 in	 the	 limited	scope	of	 this	 thesis,	does	not	share	 the	same	





of	EU	security	action.	By	promoting	 ideas	of	 the	EU’s	 role,	which	are	 rooted	 in	
European	 discourse,	 policymakers	 may	 be	 guilty	 of	 “wasting	 the	 ink”	 as	 one	
respondent	put	 it	(interviewee	no.	19).	 Instead,	EU	officials	seeking	to	 improve	
perceptions	 of	 EU	 security	 action	 should	 consider	 focussing	 on	 the	 handful	 of	
policy	tools,	which	sources	in	this	study	identified	as	significant.	These	included	
the	role	of	joint	sanctions,	humanitarian	aid,	security	interventions	in	secondary	
arenas	 (sub-Saharan	 Africa)	 and	 post-conflict	 expertise.	 The	 existing	







elite	 sub-groups	 in	Washington	D.C.,	 limitations	of	 time	and	 space	prevented	a	
secondary	analysis	of	how	and	when	these	efforts	produced	shifts	in	policy.	The	
gap	between	discourse	and	action	remains	as	old	as	the	field	itself,	but	this	study	
represents	a	step	 forward,	by	 illustrating	how	 influential	actors	 try	 to	shift	 the	
terms	 of	 debate,	 assert	 interpretations	 and	 frame	 policy	 questions.	 At	 certain	
points	 in	 each	 case,	 the	 analysis	 drew	 attention	 to	 common	 themes	 across	
conservative	 and	 official	 discourses,	 suggesting	 chains	 of	 influence	 between	
analysts,	 policymakers	 and	 legislators.	 The	 analysis	 also	 focussed	 on	 cognitive	
and	 normative	 frames	 that	 closed	 off	 certain	 policy	 responses	 and	 privileged	
others,	 thus	 exerting	 a	 quasi-causal	 impact	 on	 policy	 action.	 A	more	 definitive	
claim	to	policy	impact	would	require	a	narrower	focus	on	each	individual	debate,	
combined	with	 a	 close	process-tracing	 analysis	 of	 official	 policy	developments.	





The	 study	 took	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 think	 tanks	 as	 pre-given	 by	 their	
ideological	 position	 on	 the	 conservative-liberal	 spectrum	 as	 revealed	 by	
ideological	studies	and	self-professed	mission	statements.	A	more	detailed	study	
on	 think	 tanks	 –	 rather	 than	 on	 their	 role	 within	 a	 broader	 discursive	
competition	on	EU	 security	 action	–	 could	examine	 rationalist	 explanations	 for	
discursive	 action,	 including	 sources	 of	 research	 funding.	 A	 sociological	
institutionalist	analysis	of	the	professional	training	and	recruitment	procedures	





a	 broader	 sample	 of	 think	 tanks	 might	 have	 expanded	 the	 discursive	 map	 of	
analyses	and	perceptions	of	EU	security	action.	On	the	official	side,	the	texts	and	
interviews	 sampled	 a	 group	 of	 EU	 specialists,	mostly	 from	 the	 State	 Dept.	 but	
also	 from	 the	 Dept.	 of	 Homeland	 Security.	 By	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 roles,	 these	
officials	were	highly	informed	and	specialised	staff	members.	Were	the	study	to	
have	taken	in	a	wider	pool	of	officials,	some	without	any	experience	of	EU	affairs,	




from	each	 side	of	 the	 ideological	 spectrum	and	of	officials	dealing	 closely	with	





different	 approach	may	have	 resulted	 in	 a	more	direct	 analysis	 of	US	policy	 in	
each	 of	 the	 cases.	 Rationalist	 models	 may	 have	 focussed	 on	 commercial	 and	
security	incentives	for	the	negotiating	strategy	of	the	US	government	on	the	PNR	
agreements,	for	example.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	theoretical	model	adopted	in	





The	 preceding	 sections	 have	 already	 identified	 new	 and	 alternative	 lines	 of	
enquiry	that	build	upon	the	research	findings	of	this	study	and	offer	the	prospect	





role.	 This	 new	 field	 of	 information	 throws	 open	 new	 forms	 of	 enquiry	 for	
scholars	of	policy	discourse	and	US	 foreign	policy	alike	–	when	are	differences	
between	 public	 and	 private	 speech	 most	 likely	 to	 arise	 and	 how	 should	 we	
interpret	 them?	 This	 approach	 does	 not	 undermine	 the	 case	 for	 discourse	
analysis	of	public	 speech.	 Instead	 it	offers	 the	prospect	of	analysing	a	different	
kind	of	discourse	in	a	complimentary	arena.	A	direct	follow-on	from	the	findings	
of	 the	 thesis	 in	 this	 vein	 relates	 to	 the	 arguments	 over	 transatlantic	 data	
transfers.	As	the	controversy	over	data	privacy	standards	increasingly	comes	to	
dominate	EU-US	relations	in	the	coming	years,	this	study’s	insights	into	how	the	
US	 government	 coordinated	 a	 strategy	 to	 deflect	 EU	 data	 privacy	 objections,	
offers	a	 starting	point	 for	 scholarship	on	differing	official	 conceptualisations	of	




influx	 into	 Europe	 of	 more	 than	 one	 million	 refugees	 in	 2015	 and	 Russia’s	
annexation	 of	 Crimea	 in	 2014,	 following	 the	 conclusion	 of	 an	 EU-Ukraine	
association	 agreement,	 may	 all	 deepen	 American	 perceptions	 of	 European	
weakness.	But	each	of	 these	 subjects	offers	 interesting	new	cases	 in	which	 the	
QCA	 process	 could	 be	 repeated	 within	 a	 broadly	 similar	 research	 design.	 The	
Ukraine	case	presents	itself	as	a	particularly	interesting	case,	given	that	joint	EU-
US	sanctions	were	eventually	 imposed	on	Russia	 in	2014,	despite	scepticism	in	
some	 quarters	 that	 all	 28	 EU	 member	 states	 would	 support	 and	 later	 renew	
	 264	
these	 restrictive	 measures.	 Given	 that	 memos	 circulated	 within	 the	 US	
diplomatic	network	singled	out	joint	sanctions	as	an	area	of	potentially	valuable	




Although	 expectations	 regarding	 the	 real-world	 impact	 of	 EU	 institutional	
reforms	 have	 often	 been	 dashed	 and	 scepticism	 about	 the	 prospects	 for	 a	
effective	 EU	 security	 action	 is	 deep-rooted,	 Secretary	 Clinton’s	 consistent	
strategy	 of	 endorsing	 and	 empowering	 post-Lisbon	 officeholders	 through	
communicative	 action	 highlights	 a	 liberal	 Euro-enthusiast	 strand	 in	 official	 US	
policy	 discourse	 that	 has	 endured	 since	 the	 time	 of	 Eisenhower.	 Without	 the	






Nevertheless,	 the	 overarching	 dominant	 discourse	 of	 European	 weakness	 and	
ineffectiveness	 and	 the	 low	 salience	 of	 EU	 security	 action,	 even	 within	 the	
narrow	policy	 elite,	 suggest	 expectations	 that	 the	EU	will	 “run	 the	 twenty-first	
century,”	 are	 light	 years	 away	 from	 US	 elite	 thinking	 (Leonard,	 2004).	 The	
picture	of	US	discourse	 that	emerges	 from	 this	 study	suggests	 that	 the	Union’s	
pre-eminent	 partner	 views	 its	 emergence	 as	 a	 security	 actor	 as	 partial	 and	
incomplete,	at	best.	While	official	 support	 for	conventional	 security	 integration	
was	 consistent	 in	 public	 and	 in	 private	 settings,	 this	 support	 was	 always	 set	
within	a	broader	scepticism	or	even	jaded	view	of	the	EU’s	capacity	to	deliver	on	
its	integration	promises.	The	view	of	many	officials	that,	despite	one	institutional	
reform	 after	 another,	 “so	 little	 of	 what	 was	 promised	 has	 been	 delivered,”	






eight	 reveal	 that	hostility	 to	 a	 greater	 role	 for	 supranational	 institutions	 is	not	
limited	 to	 marginal	 conservative	 analysts	 and	 this	 further	 underlines	 the	
unstable	nature	of	US	policy	towards	EU	security	integration.	At	the	heart	of	this	
instability	 lies	 an	 unresolved	 paradox	 in	 American	 foreign	 policy	 discourse,	
which	 ostensibly	 encourages	 European	 security	 integration,	 yet	 is	 deeply	
uncomfortable	 with	 the	 consequent	 exercise	 of	 independent	 authority	 by	
supranational	 institutions,	 which	 are	 regularly	 seen	 as	 unaccountable	 and	
ineffective.	The	broader	international	context	for	this	unease	is	the	re-emergence	
of	 war	 on	 the	 European	 continent	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 powers	 such	 as	 China	 to	
challenge	 the	post-war	 transatlantic	 dominance	 of	 international	 politics.	 These	
features	 of	 the	 new	 “pacific	 century”	 may	 encourage	 greater	 American	
enthusiasm	 for	 the	 EU’s	 security	 role,	 or	 alternatively,	may	 cement	 scepticism	
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